

# ARMED CONFLICTS, TERRORISM, ILLECT TRAFFICKING

Christian Hanus, Peter Strasser

*Danube University Krems*

Krems, 23/01/2018

Contract n° EAC-2016-0248

# RELEVANCE

of threats through armed  
conflicts and terrorism

RELEVANCE of threats through armed conflicts and terrorism

Risk for cultural property through **armed conflicts** and **terrorism** is regarded as **lower** than through **natural disasters** (flood, earthquake)




1a) Exposition to each of these risks of the states and regions 1 2 3 4 5 1 least important – 5 most important


RELEVANCE of threats through armed conflicts and terrorism

Discrepancies between the **perceived** and the **actual** level of threat

1a) Exposition to each of these risks of the states and regions ■ 1 ■ 2 ■ 3 ■ 4 ■ 5 1 least important – 5 most important



1b) Subjective consideration



RELEVANCE of threats through armed conflicts and terrorism

man-made disasters are characterised by a **target-oriented approach**



Stari Most in Mostar (hcfilmprod)



Bologna Central Station (stragi.it)

historic significance



Fountain of Justice in Bern (srf)

historic contents

## RELEVANCE of threats through armed conflicts and terrorism

The assesement of the risk exposure of cultural properties is **very dynamic** and can **change very quickly**

**Problem: no time to prepare preventive measures**

**MIND THE GAP**

**RELEVANCE**  
OF THREATS THROUGH  
ARMED CONFLICTS AND TERRORISM

Final remarks and  
gaps to be covered

ARMED CONFLICTS, TERRORISM, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

**RELEVANCE** of threats through armed conflicts and terrorism

**GAPS**

Low sensitivity towards the topic  
Hardly any basic research on risk assessment  
No classification of risks and no risk register  
Hardly any concepts and strategies





 R12

ARMED CONFLICTS, TERRORISM, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

# RECOMMENDATIONS

**RELEVANCE**  
OF THREATS THROUGH  
ARMED CONFLICTS AND TERRORISM

Overall Recommendations  
& Conclusions

[Caption/Notes]

4



R22

## ARMED CONFLICTS, TERRORISM, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

**RELEVANCE** of threats through armed conflicts and terrorism

### *RECOMMENDATION*

Awareness programs on the topic  
Program for basic research on risk assessment  
Elaboration of classification of risks and risk register  
Development of concepts and strategies





# COORDINATION

of the various responsible actors

**COORDINATION** of the various responsible actors

The **Hague Convention (1954)** lies in the responsibility of the **ministries of defence** and the **national armies**

The prepared concepts and strategies for the protection of cultural properties are focused on a **military approach**. <sup>(1c,d,e)</sup>

**Structural limitations** between the decisions-makers in the field of disaster mitigation concerning nature-disasters and concerning armed conflicts and terrorism. <sup>(1f)</sup>

However, when drafting a concept for protection measures by applying different categories, due to overlapping issues **synergy-effects** can be identified.

**COORDINATION** of the various responsible actorsDevelopment of the **civil-military cooperation** (CIMIC)

In most European states the armed forces focus on providing assistance to the **civil authorities**, but not specifically on the protection of the cultural heritage.

NATO promotes the civil-military cooperation through its **Civil Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence**



NATO is planning to set up a "**Center of excellence for cultural property protection**" in order to develop and implement strategies and tactics for the protection of the cultural heritage.

## COORDINATION of the various responsible actors

### Implementation of the **enhanced protection**

The implementation of the **enhanced protection** of cultural property of highest importance the cooperation and coordination of the civil and military forces will become necessary.

(Art. 10-14, 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention)



In this field urgent need for **action is necessary**. Until now **only eight objects** in Europe were put under enhanced protection (in Belgium, Italy, Lithuania and Cyprus).


**COORDINATION** of the various responsible actorsElaboration of the **Basic Material**

Strategies and concepts for the protection of cultural goods during armed conflicts and terrorism are **rare** (some 5 %).<sup>1f Tab,7, 8</sup>

However, with regard to military operations, **basic tools** and **material** are **not sufficient**.

NATO and UNESCO have elaborated **manuals** and **guidelines** for PCP

The military needs civilian competencies to implement the **PCP**



**MIND THE GAP**

## COORDINATION OF THE VARIOUS RESPONSIBLE

Final remarks and  
gaps to be covered

ARMED CONFLICTS, TERRORISM, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

**COORDINATION** of the various responsible actors

**GAPS**

Hardly any coordination and cooperation  
between those responsible

Many unused synergy potentials, non-networked knowledge

CIMIC not enough developed in PCP

Basic material is insufficient for the implementation of PCP





# RECOMMENDATIONS

## COORDINATION

OF THE VARIOUS RESPONSIBLE ACTORS



Overall Recommendations  
& Conclusions

Coordination of the various responsible actors

*RECOMMENDATION*

Program line for coordination and cooperation  
between those responsible

Projects for synergy developments  
and knowledge transfer in PCP

Targeted activities to strengthen the civilian side in CIMIC  
focused on PCP

Development of standard for basic material for PCP and  
development of basic material for PCP

# ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

limited by databases

ARMED CONFLICTS, TERRORISM, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

## ILLICIT TRAFFICKING limited by databases

### Database as a key measure

The risk of art objects being trafficked by illicit trafficking is generally considered to be **relatively low**, according to the survey. <sup>(1a,b)</sup>

There are currently **a number of databases** with digitized objects, which were stolen. (INTERPOL, ICOM, CARABNIERI TPC)

The databases are not linked to one another.

An internationally applicable and accessible database system **PSYCHE** was developed by the European Union (ISEC)



R30

## ARMED CONFLICTS, TERRORISM, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

### ILLICIT TRAFFICKING limited by databases

#### Database to network and use

However, a fundamental problem in the fight against illegal art trading by means of databases lies in the fact that many objects were **never entered into the database**.

Particularly for private collections as well as for small museums, it is **urgently necessary to implement** a wide range of activities through sensitization campaigns and training programs for inventory and database recording.



**MIND THE GAP**

**ILLCIT TRAFFICKING**  
limited by databases

Final remarks and  
gaps to be covered

**ILLICIT TRAFFICKING limited by databases****GAPS**

A number of databases are not linked to one another.  
The database PSYCHE is not extensively used  
in whole Europe  
The basics are not used.



# RECOMMENDATIONS

**ILLCIT TRAFFICKING**  
limited by databases



Overall Recommendations  
& Conclusions

ARMED CONFLICTS, TERRORISM, ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

**ILLCIT TRAFFICKING limited by databases**

## RECOMMENDATION

The different databases can be linked with the database PSYCHE.

The database PSYCHE is to be used more extensively  
Awareness campaign and training are required

R31

Insert your logo  
RICH; 17.10.2017