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CeDEM Asia 2012 Editorial

Singapore, November 2012

Peter Parycek*, Michael Sachs*, Marko M. Skoric**

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The International Conference for E-Democracy and Open Government Asia 2012 (CeDEM Asia 2012) is a forum that aims to bring together academics, researchers, policy-makers, industry professionals, and civil society activists to discuss the role of social and mobile media in the future of governance in Asia and around the world. New means of interacting with governments and political institutions are causing significant shifts in civic and political life. The emerging social and mobile media practices, including content generation, collaboration, and network organization, are changing our understanding of governance and politics. While the changes are already widely debated in mature, developed democracies, there is an even greater need to address them in the context of rapidly developing Asian societies. Indeed, many governments in Asia are facing significant pressures from their citizens to increase the transparency of political decision-making, allow greater citizen participation in public affairs, and loosen the restrictions on political expression and organization.

Following five successful conferences in Austria, organized by the Centre for E-Governance, Danube University Krems, CeDEM is looking to open a new forum in Asia for the exchange of ideas, networking, and collaboration on the topics of e-democracy and open government. For the 2012 conference, CeDEM is pleased to be working with the Asian Media Information and Communication Centre (AMIC) as its conference organizer and the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore as its main sponsor and partner. CeDEM Asia 2012 has also received invaluable support from the Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore, and the Nam Center for Korean Studies, University of Michigan.

In its inaugural year, CeDEM Asia is taking place in Singapore, a country known for its impressive economic performance, efficient and nearly corruption-free governance, as well as tight government control over the political process. In the past decade, Singapore has also witnessed a significant transformation of its civic life, spurred partly by high levels of education of its citizens paired with the widespread adoption of social and mobile media platforms. Consequently, the conference sets the focus on social media and their impact on governance.
Keynotes Reports
New Media and Good Governance

What Goes, What Stays

Janadas Devan

Director, Institute of Policy Studies, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, and Chief of Government Communications, Ministry of Communication and Information, Government of Singapore

Acknowledgement: This report of the keynote held on 14 November 2012 was not written by the speaker.

Government communication is increasingly about persuading people to the government’s point of view and accommodating differences and not just informing people about things. Singapore society is now more stratified than before, and the problems it faces, are more complex. Thus the government needs a more fine-grained and flexible communication strategy.

Income inequality, declining social mobility and immigration have led to society becoming more diverse. However Singapore’s way of analysing and categorising the population still harks back to a bygone era. The government still slots people into four racial groups of Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others, and three income groups of rich, middle-class and poor.

Mr Devan said that the first challenge thus, is to better understand who we are and that means defining our complexities. The new media landscape is also fractured, with people tuning in only to the channels of their choice. The government has to multiply our capabilities and be able to respond faster across different platforms. Finally, the Government has to accept that it is unlikely to achieve consensus on all matters apart from the fundamentals. Mr Devan said that, "there is no singular public opinion. There are public opinions, plural. We have to accommodate the many, as well as to remain one."

He also said that he believes Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has a far more difficult job to do than the first Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew. Back then, the Cabinet faced dire existential situations which imposed stark choices on people. These days, choices are not so stark. Distinctions between policy options are more fine-grained and the consequences would be seen only far into the future. The government’s communications strategy will have to be commensurately fine-grained, flexible and open ended. He said we cannot pretend to know everything when in fact we don’t.

New media expert Cherian George later asked Mr Devan if a Freedom of Information Act would be enacted eventually. Mr Devan said he was not sure but he felt the Government’s current policy, where it deems most data confidential unless it decides otherwise, should shift to one where you assume most of the information should be publicly available, unless you feel it should be confidential.
New Communication Technologies and Civic Life
Socially Networked, but Politically Engaged?

Nojin Kwak
Director, Nam Center for Korean Studies, and Associate Professor, Department of Communication Studies, University of Michigan

Acknowledgement This report of the keynote held on 15 November 2012 was not written by the speaker.

Prof Kwak mentioned the Psy effect in politics. He said that with regards to social media and relationships, there is a deepening of social bonds among core ties. This core refers to bonding among people who are alike, where close social ties are maintained. Also, social media users have more friends but also more close friends. There is more social support – emotional, companionship and instrumental support- available.

Social media has also a strong presence in politics. The anecdotal evidence would be social-media promoted protests, the Arab spring and flash mobs. There is a significance of social media being used in recent political campaigns. In the 2012 Korean congressional elections, SNS capacity index was part of the criteria for candidate evaluation. The index showed how well-versed the candidates were in social media.

A triadic approach is needed to theorize social media in politics. The social media, users and engagement should be studied together and not independently. Each criterion needs careful consideration and analysis. Social media is an old axiom with a new application. The consequences of social media are highly sensitive to the ways in which technology is used.

People tend to have a very narrow understanding when it comes to technology and the following shows how people generally use new communication technology:

- Informational: getting and/or discussing news and public affairs.
- Relational: catching up and just being social with friends and family members.
- Recreational: significantly related to low level of engagement but things have changed from being merely solitary to social.

Social networking sites are not created equal. The more users interact with politicians and political pundits, the more likely they are to engage politically. Celebrities and family and friends have less effect on the likelihood of political participation.

There are two characteristics of social media users. The first is the reinforcement hypothesis which claims social media strengthens the status quo by further mobilizing those who already
have resources and opportunities. The second is the facilitation hypothesis which claims social media provides novel opportunities for those who otherwise would not be involved. In conclusion, Psy is not popular because of social media. Psy already has a large fan base. However, without social media Psy would not be popular outside Korea.

Income inequality, declining social mobility and immigration have led to society becoming more diverse. However Singapore’s way of analysing and categorising the population still harks back to a bygone era. The government still slots people into four racial groups of Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others, and three income groups of rich, middle-class and poor.

Mr Devan said that the first challenge thus, is to better understand who we are and that means defining our complexities. The new media landscape is also fractured, with people tuning in only to the channels of their choice. The government has to multiply our capabilities and be able to respond faster across different platforms. Finally, the Government has to accept that it is unlikely to achieve consensus on all matters apart from the fundamentals. Mr Devan said that, "there is no singular public opinion. There are public opinions, plural. We have to accommodate the many, as well as to remain one."

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Long Papers
Peer-reviewed
E-Government Engagement and the Digital Divide

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Abstract: This paper connects e-government and digital divide literature to facilitate greater understanding of online civic engagement in Australia. Strong parallels exist between the four dimensions of the digital divide - access, skills, content, and impact - and the ways e-government policy and practice shape citizen participation. Australian e-government initiatives at the federal and local level are outlined to highlight the types of citizen involvement they permit. This paper suggests that governments often equate improved information access and service delivery with online civic engagement, overlooking the importance of two-way participatory practices. If e-government is to advance to facilitate online civic engagement, greater emphasis must be placed on the capacity of citizens to contribute to, and influence, decision-making.

Keywords: e-government, digital divide, ICTs, participation, civic engagement, policy

In recent years, the Australian Federal Government has increasingly emphasised the importance of facilitating online civic engagement. Evidence of the government’s commitment appears in its e-government strategy (Department of Finance and Administration, 2006), principles for information and communication technology (ICT) enabled citizen engagement (Department of Finance and Administration, 2007), the launch of a Government 2.0 Taskforce in 2009 (see http://gov2.net.au), the Declaration of Open Government (Department of Finance and Deregulation, 2010), and in the National Digital Economy Strategy (Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE), 2011). The Federal Government has also set the goal of having eighty percent of Australians engage with governments online by the year 2020, recognising that this goal requires coordination between, and action by, all tiers of Australian government (DBCDE, 2011). This paper suggests that greater online engagement can be facilitated through an increased understanding of the connection between e-government and the digital divide.

Helbig, Gil-Garcia and Ferro (2009) argue that e-government and digital divide literature have been relatively disconnected but that there are important intersections between the two, which help to explain outcomes of e-government policy and practice. The various dimensions of the digital divide recognise the need to address ICT access, digital skill levels, content provision, and outcomes of ICT use (Selwyn, 2004; Servon and Pinkett, 2004). Similarly, e-government, if it is to facilitate civic engagement, requires civic ICT access and skills, with the government responsible for creating online content and spaces for participation, and drawing on civic input to guide decision-making. E-government policies and practices therefore must address each aspect of the digital divide if the intention is to facilitate increased online civic engagement.
While citizens’ ICT access and skill levels are critical factors influencing e-government use, this paper focuses on the way that participatory e-government is reliant upon governments to recognise the need to facilitate the content and outcome aspects of the digital divide. It highlights how Australian e-government policies and practices at the federal and local levels often do not address the provision of spaces for civic contributions, and fail to allow civic views to impact government decision-making. At present, it appears that governments equate improved access to online information and service delivery with increased civic engagement.

1. Linking E-Government and the Digital Divide

1.1. E-Government and Civic Engagement

E-government is a term with diverse meanings, understandings, and applications, which include internal and external government communications, alterations to service delivery, broader administrative reform, and changing notions of democracy and citizenship. While early understandings of e-government often focused on the use of new technologies for one-way information dissemination and improved service delivery methods (see, for example, Silcock, 2001; Ho, 2002), more recent research places greater emphasis on the ways that e-government can be used to facilitate two-way government-citizen communication (see, for example, Norris, 2005; Homburg, 2008). Government development of advanced broadband infrastructure combined with the increased interactivity capabilities and open source nature of Web 2.0 have created growing importance on government online applications and services that facilitate democratic citizen involvement through the inclusion of, for example, user-generated content, social networking and collaboration. Such processes have broader effects on the transparency and accountability of government actions and operations (Eggers, 2005; Wong and Welch, 2004), and political or civic ‘engagement’ has subsequently emerged as a key research area (Reece, 2006).

In their empirical study of mediated public engagement, Couldry, Livingstone and Markham (2007) highlight that civic engagement involves citizens both paying attention to politics and being provided with opportunities to participate in public issues. Participation involves citizens being able to exert influence on decision-making processes (Norris, 2001; Burns, Heywood, Taylor, Wilde and Wilson, 2004). Couldry et al. (2007) found that the majority of citizen involvement with government occurs at the local level through, for example, attending community events and council meetings (see also Couldry and Langer, 2005). However, they note an almost complete absence of spaces for participation and engagement where civic contributions can be articulated into action, and found that citizens felt they were unable to influence local decisions. One of the proposals put forth by Couldry et al. (2007) to address this situation was the need for governments to take greater account of citizens’ choices, reflexivity and understandings, as there is currently a disconnection between what governments and citizens think and do. Their study furthermore highlights the need for governments to create opportunities for dialogue with citizens (Couldry et al., 2007). Two-way e-government mechanisms offer one such opportunity.

To facilitate participatory e-government practices and online civic engagement, governments will require policies that guide the development of ICT infrastructure, enhance citizens’ ICT adoption and use, support online content and spaces to which citizens can contribute, and ensure that citizen involvement influences decision-making. Cohen, van Geenhuizen and Nijkamp (2005) terms these ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ ICT policies, with ‘direct’ policies explicitly concerned with ICTs (for example, access to the Internet and addressing digital skill inequalities) and ‘indirect’ policies
concerned with using ICTs for other goals, such as increased information dissemination, improved service delivery, or the provision of spaces for citizen discourse and deliberation. In other words, policies are used to shape ICT-related development, and ICTs can be used to assist policy processes. Online civic engagement requires both direct and indirect policies to shape e-government development to ensure equity in citizens’ capacity to access and use e-government applications, to guide the provision of online content and spaces for civic discourse, and to shape the subsequent ways participation informs decision-making. In this way, e-government can enable citizens to become informed about, participate in, and influence public issues and decisions.

These broad e-government objectives are likely to require coordination through various tiers of government, for example, to combine national resources and infrastructure developments with local knowledge to ensure that implementation of e-government policies and practices is the most appropriate for citizens (see Bradford, 2008; Wilson, Cornford, Baines and Mawson, 2011). Local governments occupy key positions for participatory e-government as civic involvement in politics primarily occurs through individual and community interests (Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker, 2001). Local issue-based participation enables citizens to see the direct implication of policy deliberations for their lives (Karakaya-Polat, 2005), and is more manageable than online deliberation at state or national levels (see Jimenez, Mossberger and Wu, 2012). Such local online contexts allow for a pragmatic sense of public connection to be formed, where citizens can engage in discussions of relevance to themselves and their communities. The following section outlines the digital divide and suggests how its various dimensions relate to e-government engagement.

1.2. The Digital ‘Continuum’

Socio-economic inequalities create divisions of access to, and use of, networked communication technologies, a phenomenon identified as the ‘digital divide’ (Castells, 2001; Norris, 2001; Loader, 1998). This divide exists at several levels. In the broadest sense, there are ICT access inequalities caused by varying levels of infrastructure and resources between different nations, particularly in relation to developed and developing economies (Cullen, 2006). But inequalities also exist within nations, where different populations in a country are disadvantaged along, for example, geographical, gender and racial lines. Similarly, these types of divisions exist within populations and areas covered by cities and towns (Baker and Coleman, 2004; Holloway, 2005).

While access to sufficient ICT infrastructure had been the primary focus of digital divide debate, recent research stresses individual capabilities and skills as key factors affecting Internet adoption by disadvantaged groups (see, for example, Loader and Keeble, 2004; Baker and Coleman, 2004; Hargittai and Shafer, 2006). The digital divide is now considered as “a more complex continuum of use, and the need for skills as well as access” (Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal, 2008, p. 9). Access to computers in homes or in public remains important, but access alone means little without the necessary skills to use the technology. Skill divisions are based around socio-economic standings associated with, for example, income, age and education (Mossberger et al., 2008).

1 At present, there is no requirement for the three tiers of Australian government (federal, state and local) to coordinate e-government policy or practice, meaning e-government initiatives are often autonomously developed and implemented by individual agencies and authorities.

2 Nevertheless, access to improved technology, such as broadband, facilitates more advanced citizenship practices and contributes to increased skill development (Mossberger et al., 2008).
Warschauer (2003) highlights the importance of addressing both access and skills in policies to promote ICT use for social inclusion. Inequalities vary depending on specific circumstances and often require multiple strategies to address them. Some populations may demand more advanced stages of infrastructure (for example, the need for broadband), while other disadvantaged groups may benefit from targeted approaches, such as free public access terminals or training programs (see Warschauer, 2003). Local governments are ideally positioned to recognise and address community-based issues that limit ICT use for social inclusion. Moreover, taking a local government approach to the digital continuum enables greater knowledge and understanding when it comes to implementing effective e-government practices. For example, local governments can specifically develop websites to suit community needs in terms of the content provided, the languages in which the content is offered, the type of support needed, and how inclusion can produce meaningful outcomes for citizens (Warschauer, 2003; Selwyn, 2004).

In order to effectively assess the impact of socio-economic divisions on online civic participation with government, it is necessary to distinguish between different areas of the digital divide (or continuum). Servon and Pinkett (2004) suggest three dimensions:

1. Access to infrastructure – computers and the Internet;
2. Computer literacy – the knowledge and ability to use ICTs; and
3. Content – being able to find and contribute to information relating to users’ lives, communities and cultures.

(Servon and Pinkett, 2004, p. 323)

In the Australian context, limitations to access occur through the rural–urban divide; in remote areas with low population levels, adequate infrastructure is lacking compared with economically affluent, urban regions, where technological infrastructure (that enables reliable and quality access) has often been prioritised (see Graham, 2004). However, the Federal Government’s National Broadband Network (NBN) aims to provide ubiquitous, high-speed broadband of at least 12 megabits per second to all Australian premises. Fibre optic connections will be available to 93 percent of households, with the remaining areas covered by fixed wireless and satellite technologies (see DBCDE, 2011). Currently, a lack of service providers in remote regions inhibits competitive pricing, resulting in an increased cost to access inferior infrastructure (Eardley, Bruce and Goggin, 2009). While the NBN has a national uniform wholesale price, retail costs will be determined by the service providers that use the network (DBCDE, 2011). The cost of accessing ICTs prevents those with limited financial resources (both rural and urban) from taking advantage of these new technologies. However, Servon and Pinkett (2004) note that the gap between those who can and cannot access ICTs is rapidly closing. In terms of computer literacy and the capacity to use the Internet, inhibiting factors include age, education levels, and the appropriate training or technical knowledge and skills. Such knowledge and skills also need to be updated to suit changes in the ICT environment, which requires access to newer technologies and content (Warschauer, 2003).

3 More broadly, government ICT use must coexist with traditional methods for civic involvement to ensure social inclusion (Cullen, 2006).
Even if citizens have access to ICTs and sufficient ability to use new technologies, they are not necessarily provided with information relevant to their lives, community or culture, or given the capacity to contribute to this content. Without such meaningful content, individuals may be unable to perceive benefits of ICT access and use (whether they be social, cultural, psychological, economic or political reasons), which influences individuals’ acceptance of, and motivation to use, new technologies (Selwyn, 2004). In other words, citizens’ needs and interests must be reflected in online content and applications to encourage use. Further content and contribution barriers also occur as the result of other factors, such as linguistic backgrounds and literacy levels (Servon and Pinkett, 2004; Cullen, 2006). These divisions impact on individuals’ capacity and desire to access and use e-government mechanisms.

Selwyn (2004) suggests similar dimensions of the digital divide as Servon and Pinkett (2004), but adds a fourth factor relating to the actual and perceived outcomes and consequences of ICT use. This dimension is concerned with the way ICT use relates to broader participation in society. In terms of e-government, such outcomes and consequences include increased political activity and its impact on policy, and the effects that manifest from this type of participation. Importantly for e-government, this fourth aspect of the digital divide advances from the provision of ICT access, skill development for effective use, and sufficient content, to the need for online citizen participation to have an impact. Citizens are unlikely to utilise participatory e-government mechanisms if they do not perceive that their participation will have tangible results (see Margolis and Moreno-Riaño, 2009). These digital divide dimensions therefore influence both “the accessibility and uptake of e-government in all communities” (Cullen, 2006, p. 289). As such, the development of e-government policies and practices needs to take these factors into consideration.

There are strong parallels between the digital divide and e-government. Figure 1 has been developed to illustrate the relationship between e-government, ICT policy areas, and the four dimensions of the digital divide (access, skills, content, and impact).

![Figure 1: Linking E-Government, ICT Policy, and the Digital Divide](image)

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4 Whilst differently labelled, Selwyn’s (2004) first three digital divide dimensions – formal/theoretical access to ICTs and content, effective access to and use of ICTs and content, and engagement with ICTs and content – align closely with Servon and Pinkett’s (2004) three dimensions.
This figure highlights how a cohesive approach that involves both direct and indirect ICT policies to address each of the four dimensions is necessary to facilitate civic participation through e-government. Such a framework provides participatory spaces, enables citizens to access and contribute to these spaces, and ensures that online civic discourse is considered in decision-making. The following section outlines key e-government developments at the federal level in Australia, and how these address the various aspects of the digital divide and facilitate citizen involvement.

2. E-Government Engagement in the Australian Context

2.1. Australian Federal E-Government: Service Delivery vs Civic Engagement

There is an array of Australian federal documents and initiatives surrounding e-government that address direct and indirect ICT developments and the various aspects of the digital divide. For example, as previously outlined, the NBN is expected to enable greater access to ICT infrastructure throughout Australia. The government has also endeavoured to address ICT skill inequalities through programs such as ‘Digital Communities’. In this program, the government will invest AU$23.8 million over three years to establish digital hubs in forty communities from the NBN initial rollout stage, where citizens can receive training to develop digital literacy skills (DBCDE, 2011). In terms of indirect ICT applications, the government’s Declaration of Open Government indicates the desire to create a culture of engagement that promotes participation in Australia’s democratic processes, with government-citizen collaboration to be both enabled and encouraged to improve policy outcomes (Department of Finance and Deregulation, 2010). This is a promising objective in terms of the provision of online content and spaces for participation, as well as the use of civic involvement in government processes.

However, current federal e-government initiatives are predominantly focused on ICT use for one-way information provision and enhanced service delivery methods. For example, the ‘improved online service delivery and engagement goal’ of the Federal Government’s National Digital Economy Strategy (DBCDE, 2011) aims to develop three initiatives. The ‘tell us once’ initiative is currently investigating ways to provide more customer-centric and efficient online services, such as enabling pre-filled forms for individuals who have previously completed a transaction with a government agency. The ‘service delivery reform’ initiative intends to transform the way people contact Human Services, with the aim of providing online transactions such as forms, letters, and benefit claims. The ‘data.gov.au’ initiative seeks to provide an online catalogue of government information, including downloadable datasets. While each of these are important aspects of e-government that will help to enhance information dissemination and service delivery and improve e-government for civic use, they do not address the ‘engagement’ aspect of the government’s goal. That is, these initiatives are not intended to provide two-way spaces for civic dialogue, where contributions inform decision-making.

Instead, these initiatives follow previous schemes that stressed ‘engagement’ but in practice followed a service delivery trajectory. For example, a streamlined website (Australia.gov.au) was created under the Federal Government’s e-government strategy, and was meant to provide the framework for online civic consultation and engagement (Department of Finance and Administration, 2006). However, opportunities for two-way interaction on the site are largely limited to links to public consultations that request formal submissions be posted or e-mailed to the government department. Even the official title of the e-government strategy – Responsive...
Government: A New Service Agenda – appears to assume that government responsiveness is related to service provision. The implicit assumption, although flawed, is that the concepts of service delivery and civic engagement are synonymous. Greater understanding of the differences between improved services and online engagement is required if the government is to address all four aspects of the digital divide in its ICT use. Engagement, as detailed in the federal documentation, requires the actual implementation of online contexts for two-way participation, where civic contributions influence policy outcomes.

As previously suggested, the scale of federal e-government presents challenges to facilitating participatory online spaces and allowing civic discourse to influence public policy (see Jimenez et al., 2012). Localism has subsequently emerged as a key theme in e-government research, particularly as citizen involvement in politics is understood by citizens as primarily taking place at the local level (Couldry and Langer, 2005). Local e-government mechanisms that enable two-way citizen involvement therefore offer key spaces for the enactment of political action. For this reason, it is useful to explore e-government practices at the local level, and how civic input has been enabled and received at this level of government decision-making.

2.2. Local E-Government Engagement: The City of Casey

Local governments provide a useful setting for participatory e-government, particularly for reasons of scale and increased citizen interest in local issues (Lowndes et al., 2001; Karakaya-Polat, 2005; Jimenez et al., 2012). This section briefly outlines one local government’s attempt to facilitate an online context for civic consultation. While it is recognised that a single case study does not provide sufficient reflection of all Australian local governments, these local experiences offer insight into areas and issues for future development.

The City of Casey (Casey) was selected for examination for several reasons. Casey is Australia’s seventh largest local government in terms of population (over 256,000 residents), with 89 percent of the municipality’s residents under the age of 60 and 29 percent under 18 years of age. In comparison, throughout Australia, 81 percent of residents are under the age of 60 and 23 percent are under 18 years (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010a, 2010b). This observation suggests Casey’s young population may have an increased likelihood of familiarity with, and capacity to use, new media technologies than other local government areas (see Montgomery and Gottlieb-Robles, 2006). The council is also well positioned in terms of infrastructure and resources (both financial and personnel) to utilise e-government mechanisms, and has autonomously developed an extensive online presence without the aid of an e-government or Internet related policy guiding its indirect ICT use.

The local government’s main website (www.casey.vic.gov.au) offers an abundance of information about the local area, upcoming events, and council activities, and all publicly available official documentation (such as policies and budgets) is available to download. The website receives substantial usage, with over 736,000 visitors viewing more than 2.8 million pages in the 2008-2009 financial year. The council uses social media including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube

5 In order to accommodate the length of a conference paper, only one local government example will be explored.

6 Key information on the council’s website, including local services, laws, construction requirements and community centre details, is also offered in five languages to cater for the multicultural community.
(albeit restrictedly) to further information dissemination to the public. Innovatively, Casey established a civic networking website (www.caseyconnect.net.au) for local groups and associations to create free webpages to recruit new members. In November 2010, Casey launched a community consultation website (caseyconversations.com.au) in order to understand the needs and preferences of local citizens and to enable civic involvement to shape decision-making. Furthermore, the local government employs measures to address ICT access and skill inequalities, including the provision of free public access terminals and offering Internet education programs in local libraries. These initiatives and measures are quite advanced for an Australian local government. In contrast, most Australian local e-government initiatives tend to focus on one-way information dissemination and simple service delivery practices through websites (O’Toole, 2009).

Overall, in relation to e-government engagement, Casey’s citizens are able to become informed about and participate in public issues online. In terms of how the council addresses the digital divide, Casey’s current practices facilitate access to technologies, help ICT skill development, provide extensive content relevant to the community, and intend on allowing the outcomes of civic contributions to impact local decision-making. As the need to consider the fourth digital divide dimension to enable e-government engagement is a key concern of this paper, the online civic consultation facilitated by Casey warranted further analysis to determine if and how outcomes of deliberations impact decision-making.

While the development of the consultation website highlights that Casey Council has recognised the need to incorporate participatory practices into its Internet use, civic contributions to this site do not yet appear to influence Casey’s decision-making processes. In part, this is due to the fact that the discussion forums offered on the site are predominantly for advocacy campaigns, in which case the responsibility for final decisions rests with state and federal authorities rather than with the local government itself. The council has also outsourced the development, maintenance and moderation of the site, and it does not use a government Internet domain. This indicates a reluctance to incorporate *Casey Conversations* into the local government’s everyday practices and potentially mitigates any likely impact of discussions on decision-making. Additionally, there is no indication that local government representatives engage with the website or read citizens’ posts.

Citizens’ comments on *Casey Conversations* have begun to recognise a lack of responsiveness by the local government. An example of this appears in a discussion forum that was launched following flooding throughout the municipality in February 2011, when the drainage systems jointly managed by the local government and water authority were unable to cope with heavy rainfall and rapid flood waters. The government-initiated forum requested citizens’ experiences of the floods, stating that improving drainage systems was a key priority for the council. The forum has been viewed over 1,200 times and currently contains 29 threads. Citizens posted comments about how they were affected by the floods, and offered information on community-run support groups that were set up for the emergency. They also suggested potential action that could be taken by the council to prevent the severity of future flooding, such as building additional footbridges over drainage areas, sealing dirt roads, keeping drains along roadways clear of rubbish, and employing mobile-based emergency notification systems. Four official responses

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7 The broadband infrastructure intended to be installed under the Federal Government’s NBN will facilitate improved civic access to ICTs within the municipality. Telecommunications infrastructure developments in Australia lie outside the control of local governments.
were posted over a twelve month period by an administrator. Each was a generic ‘thank you for your feedback’ reply; often weeks after citizens’ comments had been made. Use of the website does not appear to result in effective communication with the local government. As one citizen’s post on 19 July 2011 suggests, “I believe this site is more of a front to stop us calling and bothering the Casey, Seriously will we get any feed back from this?” (Peterk, errors in original). A generic thank you response was again given by the administrator. The council did not undertake any of the suggestions provided by citizens and, in June 2012, the municipality again flooded resulting in widespread emergency evacuations and substantial further damage to homes and businesses.

The launch of the consultation website was a promising local e-government development that aimed to provide spaces for involvement in issues of direct relevance to citizens. However, this example indicates that the government’s acknowledgement of the need to provide relevant content and contexts for online citizen involvement must be coupled with genuine willingness to incorporate civic views into decision-making. While Casey’s online consultation site is an advanced local e-government initiative that moves beyond early understandings of e-government and its service delivery focus, a major divide still exists within the local government’s online practices in terms of engagement. The council has addressed the access, skills and content dimensions of the digital divide, but the capacity for citizens to exert influence on local decisions through online participation remains limited. It is likely that, in part, this has resulted from insufficient policy guidance of Casey’s e-government applications and how online civic involvement can be incorporated into decision-making processes.

### 3. Conclusion: The Role of Government Willingness

In Australian e-government, one-way information dissemination and improved service delivery practices are often prioritised over contexts for citizen participation. The intersection between e-government and digital divide literature provides a useful framework for understanding government ICT use and how it impacts on civic engagement. If governments intend to enable online engagement, a cohesive approach to e-government policy and practice is required. This approach would address access and skill inequalities, offer content and spaces for civic discourse, and enable that discourse to inform decision-making. Opportunities for online engagement rely as greatly on governments addressing the content and impact aspects of the digital divide as ICT access and skills.

Interestingly, while the Australian Federal Government is addressing access and skill inequalities and has extensive policies stressing the value of online civic engagement, the online content and practices implemented are primarily service delivery focused. In contrast, the City of Casey example highlights the development and use of participatory practices at the local level. However, like many Australian local governments, Casey is developing its e-government without policy documentation to guide and enhance civic engagement, and there is little evidence to suggest that community consultation is informing decision-making. These observations highlight the value of greater coordination between national and local governments to advance online civic engagement mechanisms. For example, national infrastructure developments and training programs can draw from local knowledge to ensure that implementation is the most appropriate for locales and citizens’ needs. Conversely, local governments can utilise national resources and policy guidance to enhance the participatory practices provided to citizens and to shape the way civic involvement informs decision-making.
Previous research on e-government and the digital divide has highlighted that government willingness to use ICTs to communicate with citizens is crucial for the online participation opportunities provided to, or withheld from, citizens (see, for example, Cullen, 2006). This paper extends this argument and demonstrates that government willingness also determines whether civic participation is considered in decision-making. Without recognising that citizen involvement needs to have a tangible impact, participatory e-government practices are unlikely to effectively encourage civic use, let alone facilitate citizen engagement with government.

References


About the Author

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State Governors on Social Media
Reciprocity and Homophily in Twitter Networks

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** Towson University, skaza@towson.edu

Abstract: In recent years, Web 2.0 services like blogging, micro-blogging and social networking have become channels of information sharing and communication between friends, followers, and business stakeholders. While there have been studies on the use of such services by political candidates, there have been few studies focused on elected representatives in state and federal agencies using these services to communicate with citizens. This study explores how sitting U.S. state governors are using the Twitter micro-blogging service. We obtained two levels of friends and followers of ten state governor’s Twitter accounts to study their interactions with respect to reciprocity, homophily, and network structure. Our results show that the governors have significantly more Twitter followers than friends. This could be because the governors typically use the social media tools as a means of disseminating information to citizens and agencies rather than using it for two-way communications. In addition, we also found their social networks have very low level of reciprocity and most governors have followers limited to the big cities in their states.

Keywords: Twitter, Government, Online social network, Homophily, Reciprocity, Web 2.0

Government transparency and the right to government information, among other things, are highly regarded as fundamental to democratic participation and informed decision making by the government (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010; Shuler, Jaeger, & Bertot, 2010). With the advent of the highly participatory form of the web (commonly known as Web 2.0), social networking and other services can be used to communicate both within government agencies and externally to citizens (Wigand, 2010a) as well as to build relationships with stakeholders.

Since the 2008 general elections, social media has increasingly become a cradle for political activities and activism in the United States. Web 2.0 appears to be a good platform for both political communication between citizens and for communication between candidates and their constituents (Osimo, 2008). It has been suggested that the unprecedented speed in which changes are occurring in the Middle East was due to the social media and social networks (Cheterian, 2011; Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011). Research studies have also found that predicting the outcome of general elections by analyzing the popularity meter and sentiments for the candidates may be possible (Balasubramanyan, Routledge, & Smith, 2010; Metaxas, Mustafaraj, & Gayo-Avello, 2011). While there has been much study on how political candidates use social networking tools (Chung & Mustafaraj, 2010; Cohen & Eimicke, 2003; Metaxas et al., 2011; Osimo, 2008; de Kool & van Wamelen, 2008), there has been little work on the use of these tools by government officials,
Long Papers

government agencies, and other stakeholders interacting with the current administration. Though there has been a significant increase in the number of online services provided by government agencies, social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter are severely underutilized and it has been suggested that agencies should use those tools more readily to reach the under-served populations (Chang & Kannan, 2008; Golbeck, Grimes, & Rogers, 2010; Smith, 2010; Wigand, 2010a, 2010b).

In this study, we focus on the use of Twitter by state governors and study their interactions with other agencies, citizens, and other stakeholders. We explore the following questions: how are government agencies using the social networking media to communicate with its citizens? What are the properties of their social network? Who are the agencies following and is there a degree of reciprocity between followers and friends?

The next section contains a review of literature in this area. Section 2 presents our research design. Section 3 presents and discusses the results and Section 4 concludes and presents future directions.

1. Literature review

In this section, we first present an overview of the use of Web 2.0 technologies by government agencies and officials (with a focus on U.S. state and federal government). We then focus on social networking tools specifically and their use in government. We also cover previous work that has studied the use of these tools for government work. In the third subsection, we present the specific characteristics of social networks we focus on to study the use of Twitter by state governors.

1.1. Government and Web 2.0

Web 2.0 is a very broad concept. It can be viewed as a second generation of Internet content where the focus shifts from consumption to participation (de Kool & van Wamelen, 2008). Web 2.0 can also be considered to be a network platform that delivers software and a service that dramatically improves the user experiences to that of Web 1.0 (O’Reilly, 2007). All in all, Web 2.0 technology is closely associated with online collaboration, interactive information sharing, a design built with the user in mind and connection anywhere at any time (O’Reilly, 2007). Government agencies have started using Web 2.0 services to provide access to government services and/or increase interaction with citizens. Table 1 shows a summary of previous literature on the use of Web 2.0 services by government agencies and officers in the United States. Here we focus just on services used for official business and those associated with permanent positions (like Speaker of the House, rather than the individual account of the current speaker).

As can be seen in fromTable 1, there are several federal government agencies that use Web 2.0 technologies for various purposes. However, the primary focus appears to be information dissemination rather than to build social networks and to encourage public participation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Web 2.0 Service</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Aim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Services Administration (GSA) (Wigand, 2010b)</td>
<td>Mashups, Web services</td>
<td>Usa.gov, GobiernoUSA.gov, GovGab.gov, kids.gov, Webcontent.gov</td>
<td>Develop strategy for government agencies to provide better services using Web 2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (Wigand, 2010b)</td>
<td>Mashups (widgets)</td>
<td>FBI Most Wanted Widgets</td>
<td>Provide capability for other government sites to add the FBI most wanted list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD &amp; other Intelligence Agencies (Wigand, 2010b) (DoD, 2009)</td>
<td>Wikis, Mashups, RSS feeds, Rich Internet Applications</td>
<td>Intellipedia, DoDLive, Virtual Worlds, TroopTube</td>
<td>To improve intelligence sharing, contribute and sharing of content using simple markups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The White House (Wilshusen, 2010)</td>
<td>Podcasts</td>
<td>White House podcasts</td>
<td>Provide updates, coverage of live government deliberations, emergency response information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Transportation and Security Administration (TSA) (Wilshusen, 2010)</td>
<td>Social Networking - Facebook, Twitter</td>
<td>GreenVersations</td>
<td>Support public interaction in response to agency announcements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Disease Control (Mergel, Schweik, &amp; Fountain, 2009)</td>
<td>RSS feeds, Instant Messaging, Podcast</td>
<td>Flu Wiki, Second Life</td>
<td>Provide emergency text messages, seasonal flu updates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library of Congress (Mergel et al., 2009)</td>
<td>Multimedia Sharing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of digital content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Wilshusen, 2010) (DoD, 2009)</td>
<td>RSS feeds, Social Networking</td>
<td>SpaceBook, Twitter</td>
<td>Publicize events, news releases, real-time updates and information from space stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Education (Wigand, 2010b)</td>
<td>Mashups (Facebook, Twitter widgets)</td>
<td>College Navigator, Federal Student Financial Aid ForeCaster</td>
<td>Make college more accessible and affordable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Social Media Tools</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department (Wilshusen, 2010) (DoD, 2009)</td>
<td>Wikis, blog, Social Networking</td>
<td>Diplopedia, Deskipedia, communities@state, Exchanges Connect, DipNote</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internal foreign affairs Encyclopedia; blogging platform organized into communities of practice and interest; tool similar to Facebook</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (Wilshusen, 2010) (DoD, 2009)</td>
<td>Wikis, blog</td>
<td>MilSuite, MilBlog, MilWiki, MilBook</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A series of tools to disseminate information internally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Network to foster interagency collaboration and coordination; chat rooms in multiple networks that help speed up information gathering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provides the USGS with initial indication of an earthquake before the scientific data reaches the USGS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Education</td>
<td>Rich Internet Application</td>
<td>ED Data Express</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interactive web site aimed at making timely and accurate K-12 data available to the public</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (Wilshusen, 2010) (DoD, 2009)</td>
<td>Mashups</td>
<td>USA Search, HUD National Housing Locator System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provides a searchable web based database of available rental housing nation-wide</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury/IRS (Wigand, 2010b)</td>
<td>Web Service</td>
<td>IRS eFile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Make it easier for taxpayers to pay taxes quickly and accurately</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.2. Social Networking in Government

In this study, we focus on the use of Twitter by state governors and study their interactions with other agencies, citizens and stakeholders. Posts on Twitter (known as “Tweets”) allow Twitter users to update and share information readily with individuals who follow them. People who receive or subscribe to your tweets are referred to as your followers. Your friends (often called followings) are other Twitter users you have chosen to follow. A one-way or two-way relationship may exist between followers and followings, however, unlike most other online social networking sites, Twitter does not require any level of reciprocity between followers and friends (Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010a). Another interesting functionality of Twitter is “re-tweeting.” Re-tweeting is the Twitter-equivalence of email-forwarding, where users post messages which were originally posted by other Twitter users (Boyd & Golder, 2010). Using the power of re-tweeting, social micro-
blogging sites like Twitter have enabled individuals, groups and organizations to broadcast, share and disseminate information about their activities, opinions, and status remarkably easily through their network of followers or friends (Boyd & Golder, 2010; Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010a. Among young adults 18 – 24 years old, about thirty-seven percent make or read Twitter online updates (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010). Twitter is free, it is relatively low network resource intensive, it is easy to learn and use, and integration with mobile services and other existing applications is very simple. These features give it the potential to radically extend the communications reach and make it a viable option for the adoption by the government (Skoric, Poor, Achananuparp, Lim, & Jiang, 2011; Wigand, 2010a, 2010b).

Table 2 summarizes a selected set of studies on the use of Twitter and other similar social networking services in the government. Though these studies have interesting findings, none of the studies have looked at the structure of the networks of government agencies and citizens. To understand the use of Twitter by state governors, we look at two primary characteristics:

- What is the level of interaction in the network – here we look at the reciprocity in the network to see if the governors are also following the citizens and other agencies in their networks.
- What are the spatial characteristics of the network of followers – here we look at geographical homophily and examine the geographical spread of the governors’ networks.

Table 2. Previous studies on the use of social networking tools by the Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Finding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Chang &amp; Kannan, 2008)</td>
<td>Understanding how to leverage web 2.0 for Government-citizen and government-employee interactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Wigand, 2010b)</td>
<td>Author examined the role of Twitter in government agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Wigand, 2010a)</td>
<td>Research to explore the adoption of Twitter by government agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Osimo, 2008)</td>
<td>Research questions revolve around the significance of web 2.0 for e-Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Smith, 2010)</td>
<td>Study to determine to what extent citizens are using government online services and information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Waters & Williams, 2011) Study to examine the Twitter accounts of federal and state politicians to determine how they are using this social networking tool

Government agencies primarily relied on a one-way communication that sought to inform and communicate rather than two-way symmetrical communications

(Mergel et al., 2009) Among other things, to determine how government agencies are using web 2.0 tools

Web 2.0 tools are already being deployed internally through government agencies.

(Golbeck et al., 2010) Determine the type of content legislators are posting

Law makers are primarily using Twitter to post information to their constituents

1.2.1. Reciprocity

Social networking typically involves a high level of reciprocity which can be defined as a pattern of mutual exchange between actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Ever since the inception of the social media and networking sites and their popularity, there has been a renewed interest in the reciprocity of social networking (Kivran-swaine, Govindan, & Naaman, 2011; Yardi, 2010; Zhang, Dantu, & Cangussu, 2009). The typical new users of social networking are added by mutual acquaintances or because their friends invited them to do so. This generally evolves into bi-directional/reciprocal communication between friends. However, Twitter networks are slightly different as they have two kinds of relationships - followers and friends. Friends generally follow each other to share information or to keep abreast of new developments in each other’s lives. However, that may not be the case for followers. We investigate this phenomenon in the networks of state governors to examine if they follow the accounts of their followers.

Some studies have been done to investigate reciprocity in Twitter. Java et al. (2007) compared micro-blogging to regular blogging and found that users of micro-blogging social networks have a significantly high degree of correlation and reciprocity (Java, Song, Finin, & Tseng, 2007). They determined a 58% reciprocity in Twitter friends – which mean that 58% of the users were likely to follow the users who were following them. Kwak et al. (2010) found that only about 22 percent of Twitter users have some form of reciprocal relationships. They also observed that 67% of users are not followed by their friends. Other studies on social networks such as Flickr (Cha, Mislove, & Gummadi, 2009a) and Yahoo (Kumar, Novak, & Tomkins, 2006) have found the reciprocity to be 68% and 84% respectively.

1.2.2. Geographical Homophily

Sociologists have found that individuals who live in a common geographic area, have work or family ties or have common interests have the tendency to relate to each other (Lauw, Shafer, Agrawal, & Ntoulas, 2010). This phenomenon is called Homophily and is defined as the principle
that contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Essentially, homophily implies that the “distance in terms of social characteristics translate into network distance” (McPherson et al., 2001). Geographic homophily is the most fundamental of all homophilies. Contacts occur more frequently with individuals who are in close proximity with the other. This is because it takes a lot more effort to establish and maintain relationships with someone who is far away than one who is readily available. With the proliferation of online social networks, one would deduce that spatial and temporal factors have a lesser effect on the establishment of connections between people. A recent study by Kwak et al. (2010) found that Twitter users who have reciprocal relations tend to be geographically close. In general, it was found that a slight homophily exists only if there is some form of reciprocity (Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010a). A study of a sample of users of LiveJournal (Lauw et al., 2010) found that geography also affects homophily. They concluded that two arbitrary users, even with a remotely few common interests, are more likely to be friends especially when not restricted by organization or geographic constraints such as distance and time (McPherson et al., 2001).

2. Research Design

Here we describe the data acquisition and analysis techniques used to study reciprocity and homophily in the study.

2.1. Data Acquisition

To select state governors active on Twitter, we gathered data on ten US state governors with the most number of Twitter followers and friends. Twitter keeps a public profile of each user which includes the name, a brief description, screen name (pseudonym), location, the total followers and friends count. Using the Twitter API (https://dev.twitter.com/), we downloaded a two-level network for each governor using the friend and follower relationships. For example, the governor was at level zero, the friends of the governor were at level 1; their friends were at level 2. To work with the download limit of Twitter, we used a self-regulating, automatic download process which allowed us to gather 3,500 users per hour. Between March, 2011 and November, 2011 we collected information for a total of 3,892,868 users (5,470,647 as followers and 4,133,087 as friends).

2.2. Analysis

2.2.1. Reciprocity

Reciprocity is an indicator that a symbiotic relationship exists between a user and her/his friends and followers. In Twitter, a reciprocal follower relationship exists between user $U$ and user $V$ if $U$ follows $V$ and $V$ follows them back. Thus, if $U$ posts a message on Twitter then $V$ sees it and vice-versa. The same applies for friendship relations. For each governor, we looked at the reciprocity at the first level of the network to determine the number and percent of friends and followers that the governors reciprocated with. A high level of reciprocation by the governor would imply that he/she can see the tweets posted by the citizens or agencies in their network.
2.2.2. Geographical Homophily

Twitter users contain a location attribute in their profiles which can be used to establish the geographic homophily of each of governor’s followers. In addition, using this variable, we can establish to what degree the governors’ followers are located within its state, nationally, internationally or within the proximity of its ten largest cities. Since e-Government is targeted towards providing services for its citizens, it is therefore anticipated that the majority of the followers for any governor should be located with its state, however with online social networking, distance may be a lesser factor in determining relationship.

3. Experimental Results and Discussion

Table 3 shows the basic statistics for the 10 U.S. state governors and their first and second level friends and followers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>Followers 1st Level</th>
<th>Followers 2nd Level</th>
<th>Friends 1st Level</th>
<th>Friends 2nd Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerry Brown, CA</td>
<td>1,090,111</td>
<td>4,446,441</td>
<td>4,093</td>
<td>4,445,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deval Patrick, MA</td>
<td>19,505</td>
<td>1,393,940</td>
<td>11,524</td>
<td>1,384,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Haslam, TN</td>
<td>8,118</td>
<td>73,375</td>
<td>2,959</td>
<td>605,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin O’Malley, MD</td>
<td>6,788</td>
<td>97,583</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>96,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Gregoire, WA</td>
<td>5,748</td>
<td>199,341</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>199,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan Deal, GA</td>
<td>5,693</td>
<td>46,367</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>46,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Cuomo, NY</td>
<td>4,834</td>
<td>13,368</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>105,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Kitzhaber, OR</td>
<td>3,093</td>
<td>170,558</td>
<td>1,688</td>
<td>169,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Sandoval, NV</td>
<td>2,731</td>
<td>39,975</td>
<td>1,959</td>
<td>38,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Hickenlooper, CO</td>
<td>2,669</td>
<td>374,439</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>373,594</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The governors have significantly disproportionate number of Twitter followers than friends. A main reason for this could be that governors overall use Twitter as a means of disseminating information to as well as communicating directly with its citizens rather than collecting information on what its people are doing.

3.1. Reciprocity

With over five million followers and four million friends in the study, there are only twenty-nine instances of a governor following a second-level user. Conversely, if a User A follows a governor B, and User A is followed by User C, then there were only 218 (0.003 %) cases at the second level that that User C followed governor B. On the other hand, that number was 724 (0.002%) for friends. Thus, the network for governors does not appear to show the characteristics of more typical friendship based social networks (Cha, Mislove, & Gummadi, 2009b) and shows much lower levels of reciprocity than other more general Twitter networks (Kwak, Lee, Park, & Moon, 2010a).
Table 4 shows the details for all the governors. It can be observed that the followers’ reciprocal count for each of the governors is considerably smaller than that for friends. The reciprocal percent is a measure of the ratio of the reciprocal count for that governor at that particular network level to the total number of followers or friends at that network level. It can also be seen that the reciprocal percentage of friends for each of the governors is several times higher than for followers. These low reciprocal percentage numbers in the follower and friend networks imply that there may not be much conversation happening between the governors and citizens with most governors not seeing the updates from citizens on their accounts at all.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reciprocal Followers Count</th>
<th>Reciprocal Followers Percent</th>
<th>Reciprocal Friends Count</th>
<th>Reciprocal Friends Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martin O’Malley, MD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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3.2. Geographical Homophily

We sought to determine the locations of the users for each governor as well as who are they communicating with. Figure 1 provides detail information of first level followers for Governor O’Malley and which counties or cities those users are located. More than ninety-eight percent of O’Malley’s followers are geographically located within the United States. It should be observed from Figure 2 that a preponderance of Governor O’Malley’s followers is located in the metropolitan cities of Baltimore and the capital, Annapolis. For example, the metropolitan cities of Baltimore and Annapolis with a population of 620,961 and 38,390 have 1,175 and 160 followers, respectively whereas Columbia and Gaithersburg with populations of 99,615 and 59,333 have 51 and 25 followers. Moreover, one can observe from Figure 2 for Governor O’Malley that the outlying areas of Salisbury and Ocean City have very few followers. Similar results were obtained for Massachusetts (see Figure 2). We found that followers for most (with the exception of Maryland and Nevada) governors are predominantly within their states as well as from the large metropolitan cities of these states. The Maryland governor had a big following in Washington D.C. (which is closely linked to Maryland) and the Nevada governor had following in California (which is a more active state on social media than the governor’s home state of Nevada).
4. Conclusions and Future Directions

In the eight month period between March and early October, 2011, we downloaded more than seven million followers and four million friends for a total of over six million unique users for ten state governors. We observed that a certain level of homophily exists between the governors’ followers and governors’ friends as it relates to geographic location and political or social status. We also found that more than sixty percent of each governor’s followers reside in their state. Further, over ninety-eight percent of all state governors’ followers are from the United States of
America. In addition, we discovered that the governors who are affiliated to their political party top brass have a large followers and friends base.

U.S. state governors have been utilizing Twitter and other latest technology in disseminating daily government information and government notices to its citizens on a regular basis. They appear to be reaching a certain portion of its population because the majority of their followers are within their states. However, the fact that the governors are reaching the metropolitan cities at an appreciably higher rate than the smaller, rural communities who need the services most, should be of some concern. We conclude that they have to do a better job in adding utility to their Twitter accounts so that citizens in any part of their state could use this medium to obtain state updates.

For future work, it would be worthwhile to know why state governors are following certain individuals and state agencies. Knowing why the governors are following the agencies could be beneficial to the federal government when disseminating human, economic and other valuable resources to its citizens.

References


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Is there a business case for governments using social and mobile media?

Exploratory evidence from the UK and USA

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Abstract: This paper examines a number of current examples which have partially or fully demonstrated a business case justifying the deployment of social and mobile media by governments. They fall into two main types across the public sector and across the spectrum of service delivery. First, shorter-term quick-win examples where business cases were formulated and which have demonstrated or claimed concrete savings. Also, shorter-term quick win examples where business cases were formulated and which have demonstrated or claimed concrete efficiency savings through encouraging users to shift to cheaper channels and increasing staff productivity. Second, longer-term, preventative and development examples that are successfully addressing ‘hard-to-reach’ key target groups as well as enabling such groups to change their behaviour and to participate in shaping their own futures. Because of the time horizon in these examples, the business case is less clear-cut, mainly because benefits remain largely in the future.

In many of the examples, however, good analysis still has to be completed by the governments concerned. Specifically there is still a need to document savings and other business benefits in detail, including their precise size, provenance and impact, as well as to analyse the savings/benefits in order to unravel the implementation, process and policy lessons which underpin the business case. Thus the research reported in this paper is exploratory and on-going – a report from the frontline. The next step is to systematically analyse the benefits as well as address any dis-benefits and challenges, to validate the two main types as well as add others, and to start to draw up lessons and recommendations for governments in relation to their policy objectives.

Keywords: Business case, social media, mobile media, short-term, quick-wins, longer-tern, benefits.

Much e-participation research and practice to date has focused on the use of social and mobile media for citizen involvement in political decisions and public policy making at both local and national levels. For example in the European context, a common definition of e-participation relates “mainly to inputs to policy- and decision-making for political or public-policy purposes, both within formal systems and informally” (Millard et al 2009). This paper will argue strongly that, however useful this rather narrow view of e-participation has been in the past, it is no longer tenable either in terms of practice or theory. Social and mobile media are increasingly being seen as more wide ranging tools with the potential to integrate across back-offices, across
front-offices, and to link back- to front-offices. There are now burgeoning examples where governments are looking for the business case in using social and mobile media in which they can both cut costs and become more efficient on the one hand, whilst also offering better user services and interaction on the other. Many governments are reluctant to invest increasingly scarce money, time and effort in social and mobile media unless such benefits can be clearly anticipated and achieved.

Although social and mobile media are just part of the mix needed to realise these benefits, they are, as this paper attempts to show, key enablers and drivers of them. Social and mobile media provide the architecture of participation which enable users not only to be passive consumers of content and services but also active contributors and designers in their own right. Indeed, the experience presented in this paper shows this is happening mainly at local and regional level which means that these levels of government are, and are likely to remain, e-participation leaders. E-participation working well is a seamless part of a government’s broader policy of openness, transparency and collaboration. It needs to be continuously woven into a user’s experience of the public sector, built into the fabric of all aspects of the way in which he or she interacts with the authority. It should become a natural and fundamental way in which the government conducts all its business, whether in what is traditionally termed either the back- or front-office so that this distinction becomes misleading – all is now ‘front-office’ in the sense all can now become open and visible.

This paper examines a number of current and recent examples which have partially or fully demonstrated a business case justifying the deployment of social and mobile media. They fall into two main types across the public sector and across the spectrum of service delivery, presented respectively in sections 2 and 3 below:

- Shorter-term quick win examples where business cases were formulated and which have demonstrated or claimed concrete efficiency savings through encouraging users to shift to cheaper channels and increasing staff productivity.
- Longer-term, preventative and development examples that are successfully addressing ‘hard-to-reach’ key target groups as well as enabling such groups to change their behaviour and to participate in shaping their own futures. Because of the time horizon in these examples, the business case is less clear-cut, mainly because benefits remain largely in the future.

The international search undertaken by the author in looking for social and mobile media business cases in a government context uncovered mainly examples from the UK and USA. This may be thought unsurprising both because governments in these countries have been global leaders in deploying social media as well as because the search for financial justification and measurement has often been highest here. In all the examples presented below, public officials and local researchers confirm that concrete savings and other clear business case benefits have already been made as stated, and that these positive impacts are on-going.
1. Short-term quick-win benefits

1.1. Example 1: ‘Love Clean Streets’, Lewisham (UK)

The objectives of the Love Clean Streets initiative\(^1\), from January 2010 to January 2012 in the London Borough of Lewisham, are to become a social-networking hub for London and help deliver an environment worthy of a world class city for the 2012 Olympics and beyond; empower residents, council staff, partners and politicians to engage in their local environment by uploading photos and other information via smart phones or other devices; provide a robust way for local authorities to process the information and deal with it, while easily keeping the public informed of progress; and to link with and share existing data through a public API.

Investment in the initiative has been about £180,000 (London Borough of Lewisham, 2009), compared with benefits recorded of\(^2\):

- 87% reduction in time taken to process a case
- 70% reduction in report handling costs (telephone handling per case costs on average £5.10, compared to £4.10 for web forum and smart mobile with photo £1.50)
- 21% reduction in environmental casework
- 30% increase in resident satisfaction
- more than fourfold decrease of land at unacceptable standard
- 73% reduction in graffiti and graffiti removal time reduced from average of 2.78 days to less than 0.5 days
- fly-tip removal time reduced from average of 2.5 days to less than 1.0 day
- elimination in staff overtime to collect missing rubbish bins from £300,000 in 2006 to £0 today
- savings of £17,500 by replacing physical inspection with mobile application
- increased trade waste income of £20,000.

These and other cost savings and benefits are the result of three factors. First, significant channel shifts to relatively cheap mobile and social media away from telephone, post and physical reporting. Second, increased staff productivity as information is sent direct to maintenance teams who determine their own best work processes, schedules and targeting rather being coordinated at the town hall. Third, the behavior and awareness of residents has also changed as they see they input acted upon swiftly and effectively. The case is now being replicated more widely.


‘Idea Street’ is a back-office initiative to systematically capture, evaluate and make decisions on good ideas to improve the Department’s performance from staff using social networking and

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\(^1\) http://www.lovecleanstreets.org accessed 10 October 2012.
\(^2\) Interview with London Borough of Lewisham representative, 16 November 2011.
serious games. (Cabinet Office (2011) The software is an off-the-shelf package purchased by DWP, and is claimed to be one of the most successful tools ever used in the UK to increase staff engagement, buy-in and cut costs. It is now being piloted in several other government departments and local authorities. It allows staff to suggest ideas, which are sifted and evaluated by other members of staff, who can vote for the best one. In effect, the share price of ideas is determined by buying and selling, with the most valuable ideas likely to be approved to become real projects some of which save money. If successful all shareholders get a big return, if not they lose their stake. The initiative provides a way of encouraging innovative thinking and building employee engagement throughout an organisation. It is subject to network effects where its value increases as more people join. It is basically a crowd-sourcing platform where approved ideas are then developed into projects in the collaboration part of the platform.

Current facts are over 6,000 staff users discussing more than 1,400 ideas, recruited primarily through word of mouth (staff inviting colleagues to join). All participants get 25,000 DW-Peas – the virtual currency – the aim is to build your net worth by coming up with innovative ideas and investing in the ideas market. The documentation states “clear cost savings”, although details are yet to be calculated.

1.3. Example 3: Office of Children and Family Services, New York State (USA)

At the end of 2009, the Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) adopted several social media tools, namely Twitter and Facebook, to communicate directly with the public, external media and between regional offices within the agency about all issues related to OCFS’ policies, services and activities. In 2010, the Public Information Officer stated that he was able to show “direct significant cost savings” because the social media is essentially free and easy to use compared to other less effective channels which were then closed.

The social media used are more effective in that they exploit “network and social effects” between the OCFS and the public, as well as within the agency, which saves money by shortening consultation time and reducing the time previously expended addressing questions and complaints via traditional channels. The channels directly closed as a result of using the social media were a PR services agency which supplied information, news, press releases and outreach services to the public, and physical travel between regional offices previously used to introduce new and updated OCFS directives across the agency as a whole.

1.4. Example 4: California Department of Motor Vehicles (USA)

In 2010, the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) started an initiative using accounts on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to host instructional and interactive information, discussion and videos for teenage (as well as other) drivers to study for driving tests and improve driving skills, road safety and knowledge of regulations, as well as provide feedback and handle queries

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5 Interview with representative of Office of Children and Family Services, New York State, 24 June 2011.
and complaints. For example, the purpose of the videos was to partially replace written brochures and manuals that were previously disseminated to teens. This was done because the target group is more likely to engage with these media than written texts, as they are more engaging, interactive and clearer in conveying and embedding driving skills and other messages. A vibrant user and instructor community has been developed round social media.

The DMV claims to have realised overall cost savings, although the magnitude is not clearly documented. By using YouTube for example, which is free to use, DMV saves money by printing and distributing many fewer brochures and manuals. Further, they do not have to purchase the additional bandwidth that would otherwise be required to support a video infrastructure. Some of the videos have been viewed over 500,000 times.⁷

1.5. Example 5: San Francisco Twitter 311 Service (USA)

"More than 50 SF agencies and officials use Twitter for citizen engagement and empowerment and government marketing, not including political accounts."⁸ For example, the former Mayor had 1.3 million followers. In an effort to improve the ‘311 service’ (i.e. non-emergency telephone information and complaint service) and simultaneously lower costs, the City of San Francisco launched ‘SF 311’ on Twitter in June 2009. This allows residents to access 311 services online in addition to by telephone, and is now the dominant channel for this service.⁹ Twitter 311 offers a number of quick win advantages over the phone service which benefit both City officials and residents. For example, fewer 311 staff members are able to respond to more requests than they previously could by phone alone. When residents submit requests through Twitter, they can also attach pictures of problems they need addressed, clarifying why the issue requires resolution. After a Twitter request has been made, 311 staff can easily provide follow-up, allowing residents to track resolution of the problem.

Twitter and Twitter 311 have together now become an important tool for interaction between the City and residents. Much more than simply registering complaints, Twitter is now used for receiving and commenting on suggestions and helping to build a vibrant citizen community. A new phase benefiting the longer-term started in early in 2012 by using the data generated as empirical evidence for service and policy development across all City functions. Indeed, since 2008 the data collected with local information covers 855,906 cases, derived from both Twitter 311 and telephone 311 services.¹⁰ Experiments are now being made to feed these data into the decision-making process complementing the traditional outreach methods, like town hall meetings.

1.6. Example 6: San Francisco open city data (USA)

"In 2011 the term "hackathon" became common and many cities all over the world opened datasets for developers to build applications around."¹¹ In 2011, San Francisco got over 200 apps for free,

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⁷ Interview with California Department of Motor Vehicles representative, 24 June 2011.
⁹ Interviews with Shannon Spanhake, Deputy Chief Innovation Officer, City of San Francisco, and Adriel Hampton, community and social media activist, 20 April 2012.
about 10% of which were useful in filling the gap in what the City could do itself. In most cases no money prizes are awarded, and this seems to be unique amongst global cities. Instead the City helps to turn winners into celebrities and to promote them, for example by assisting them to pitch to Twitter, Facebook, or other investors, or helping to match them with suitable partners or customers. Having the City as an ally and trusted supporter is preferable to most entrepreneurs in San Francisco than some money in the bank.

However the ‘hackathon’ approach has been criticised as being solutions looking for a problem most of which are never implemented. So in February 2012 the City launched ‘Hackathon 2.0’ which starts with specific problems looking for a solution, and involves not just coders but also designers and companies, civic groups, etc., which need a specific problem to be solved as soon as possible. This is known as an ‘unhackathon’: “Calling all designers, software engineers, business strategists and other clever problem solvers who love big challenges....join the City of San Francisco, California College of the Arts and Mix & Stir Studio for 24 hours of intensive fun while inventing design-driven technology solutions to real world problems. We provide the challenges and interesting data; you collaborate with other smart creative people to find the solutions.”12

Indeed, within a few months in 2012, several mobile and web app solutions were generated to solve San Francisco’s taxi coordination problems which had dogged the city for years. This was done through mixing public and private data and building social media communities amongst residents and taxi companies. Virtual community platforms and physical forums were used provided by local entrepreneurs for negotiating partnership and organisational issues around taxi routes, fares, and jurisdictional issues. The mix of actors included the City, hackers, designers, taxi companies and drivers. This has already saved the City authorities and taxi companies “considerable money as well as providing a much better service for residents and visitors.”13

2. Longer-term preventative and developmental benefits

2.1. Example 7: ‘Why Let Drink Decide?’ and ‘Moment of doubt’ campaigns (UK)

In 2009 research showed that whilst the number of young people drinking alcohol in the UK had fallen this no longer seemed to be the case, and the amount being consumed by those who were still drinking had risen. As part of the UK’s Department for Children, Schools and Families Youth Alcohol Action Plan (launched in June 2008) and the Department of Transport’s Moment of Doubt Action Plan (launched in 2007), a communications campaign was launched aimed at parents and particularly young people themselves focusing on drink driving. The traditional campaign tactics that build public outrage and admonishment were found to become meaningless and ineffective, as were the traditional channels of mainstream media. The new campaign instead focused on persuading the target audience that drink driving could have immediate negative consequences for them personally and used a mixed social media strategy. This consisted of 4 main portals (parents, teens, children and stakeholders), 1 Facebook App, 1 Bluetooth game, 4 children’s games,

13 Interviews with Shannon Spanhake, Deputy Chief Innovation Officer, City of San Francisco, and Adriel Hampton, community and social media activist, 20 April 2012.
5 videos with the respected expert/media medic, and 6 display adverts.\textsuperscript{14} The total cost was £205,000. (Cabinet Office, 2010a)

The main outcome of the campaign for young people was a measurable rise in perception from 58\% to 75\% that drink driving was dangerous and that they would be caught by the police. The number of people breathalysed rose by 6.4\%, while the number testing positive fell by 19.5\%. The number of deaths and serious injuries caused by drink driving fell for the first time in six years, from 560 to 410 over just one year. (Government Communication Network, 2010)

2.2. Example 8: ‘Talk to FRANK - Pablo the Drug Mule Dog’, Health Department (UK)

FRANK is a national drug education service jointly established by the Departments of Health and the Home Office in 2003. The aim is to reduce the use of both legal and illegal drugs by providing "targeted" and "accurate information on drugs and alcohol", particularly to school pupils. (Cabinet Office, 2010b) It is advertised and promoted through television, radio and particular to reach young people via Facebook and YouTube. As part of FRANK, in December 2008 the Pablo campaign launched via TV and using social media to communicate the social, health and environmental damage cocaine can cause – “there’s a darker side to coke”. Pablo is a dead dog that has been used to smuggle cocaine into the country. Motivated by his unfortunate fate, he’s on a quest to find out what’s the big deal with coke. The key objective of this campaign is to communicate the harms of cocaine use and prevent first time use. The business objective of this social media project was to extend the existing Pablo campaign to Facebook and YouTube to build relevance and trust amongst 15-21 year olds and create a conversation with young people about the harms of cocaine.

Key performance indicators on Facebook include over 197,000 fans (putting it in the top 1\% of fan pages), page viewed more than 500,000 times, over 25,000 interactions (posts, comments, etc.), more than 250 questions through the application and many more directly on the page, and Pablo’s YouTube videos received over 137,000 views.\textsuperscript{15} The total cost is £148,000. The campaign had viral success with 73,000 fans coming directly from media whilst 124,000 were organic. There is confidence that drug use by school pupils is being reduced. But the specific impact of this initiative has not yet been analysed.

2.3. Example 9: ‘THMBNLS’, Department for Children, Schools and Families (UK)

The Department for Children Schools and Families’ (DCSF) THMBNLS initiative is the world’s first interactive drama series, part of the “Want Respect? Use a Condom” campaign. It uses a mobile social media strategy to promote condom usage amongst 16-18 year olds -- the first coordinated attempt to tackle both the causes and the consequences of teenage pregnancy. (Cabinet Office, 2010c) The challenge was to promote safe sex awareness by hard-to-reach 16-18 year old teenagers. All local areas in the UK had a 10-year strategy in place, with local under-18 conception rate reduction targets of between 40\% and 60\%. These local targets underpin the national 50\% reduction target. Research shows that this audience (particularly boys) relies on the


\textsuperscript{15} An example YouTube vide “Talk to frank advert - Pablo the drugs mule dog” on: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LnA-xCz5U8 accessed 30 April 2012.
respect of peers for their self-esteem, and this is best promoted by peer-to-peer communication which is expressed ‘personally’. ‘Old media’ campaigns – like mass broadcast government ads – would not reach this target group. The social media solution is a weekly film series produced for mobile applications, to promote condom usage by teenagers, as well as promoting the ‘delay’ and ‘protect’ messages and encouraging young people to be more open about sex and relationships more generally. At the end of each episode the viewer is invited into the drama using mechanisms such as a follow-up text or voice mail from one of the characters, an MMS on social networking enabling the users to formulate his or her own opinion about the ‘Want Respect’ themes.

The business case is to (contribute to) halving the under 18 unwanted pregnancy rate. Evaluation shows the total cost 2009-2010 at £284,000, with 267,744 website visits, over 100,000 mobile visits, 10,513 referrals (Facebook, MySpace, YouTube\(^\text{16}\) and on the BBC), and over 60,000 personal interactions. Benefits by the end of 2010 are said to have been a “great success”, although the direct impact on teenage pregnancy is not (yet) calculated.

2.4. Example 10: ‘Text4Baby’, Center for Disease Control (USA)

The Center for Disease Control has partnered with a number of non-profit and government organizations to provide information to expectant and new mothers about how to take care of themselves and the baby while pregnant and during the first year of the baby’s life. Realizing that the women most at risk usually came from a disadvantaged background and thus have limited access to the internet, while at the same time usually have access to mobile phone, the CDC devised a program where relevant information was sent once a week to women who signed up by texting Text4Baby.\(^\text{17}\) A recent study showed “very high satisfaction with the service, increase in users’ health knowledge, improved interaction with healthcare providers, improved adherence to appointments and immunizations, and increased access to health resources.” (National Latino Research Center, 2011) The study consisted of interviews with 38 text4baby users and a survey of 122 text4baby users, all in San Diego County. Participants rated text4baby as an 8.5 out of 10 overall, and indicated that:

- 81% have an annual household income under $40,000
- 65% are either uninsured or enrolled in California’s Medicaid program
- 63% said the service helped them remember an appointment or immunization that they or their child needed
- 75% said they learned a medical warning sign they didn’t know previously
- 71% talked to their doctor about a topic they read on a text4baby message
- 39% called a service or phone number they received from a text4baby message (this rose to 53% among individuals without health insurance).


\(^\text{17}\) http://text4baby.org accessed 30 April 2012.
2.5. Example 11: ‘ImproveSF’, San Francisco (USA)

“ImproveSF is a fun way to submit your great ideas, help others improve their great ideas, and ultimately determine the best ideas for your community. Too often, great community ideas are lost because residents don’t know how or don’t feel comfortable getting involved. ImproveSF empowers people to improve their community, all from the convenience of their own home.”

Using social media platform ‘Mindmixer’, ImproveSF was launched in early 2012 with two main strands. First, the City authorities launch ideas for civic improvements and elicit feedback from residents. Second, residents can themselves make suggestions for consideration by their peers. In both cases, gamification is an important incentive, i.e. the more a citizen participates, including commenting and voting on ideas put forward by others, the more points can be earned for “cool” rewards.

Like the San Francisco Twitter 311 example above, these rewards are rarely anonymous cash but typically offer incentives that support the ethos behind ImproveSF, such as “lunch and walk with the Mayor”, “ride on a vintage muni vehicle”, “Mayor Lee voicemail greeting”, etc., and this is very successful.

For example, in early April 2012, the issue of whether the MTA (Municipal Transport Authority) proposal to reduce the number of bus-stops and save money should be implemented, Over 90 comments were received over a few weeks, resulting in “a great conversation”, including a tweet from Tim O’Reilly. Three benefits arise from this. First, citizens opposed to a possible reduction now appreciate the hard decisions MTA needs to make, and second the MTA Board responsible for the decision has access to a whole new demographic compared to just traditional town hall meetings. Third, cost saving plans can be both determined more accurately using citizen inputs on social media and ensure that citizens better appreciate the need for such plans so acceptance of them is raised. Over the longer term, this is designed to assist local residents understand hard policy choices, especially at a time of austerity, and take much of their neighbourhood planning into their own hands.

3. Lessons and conclusions

A summary overview of the examples and their business case impacts is provided in Table 1. Although systematic analysis by the case owners themselves of these and other examples has been piecemeal to date, sufficiently strong evidence has been demonstrated which allow some tentative conclusions to be drawn as an input to further research. (See also Millard et al, 2009)

3.1. Short-term, quick-win benefits

Most of the examples demonstrating or claiming short-term quick wins do so for both the public sector and for users. These include the following:

- Shifting channels, i.e. reducing the use of, or closing, more expensive traditional channels and replacing these with the use of social media. There is some concern by public authorities that

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21 Interviews with Shannon Spanhake, Deputy Chief Innovation Officer, City of San Francisco, and Adriel Hampton, community and social media activist, 20 April 2012.
needing to run both new social media channels and traditional channels at the same time, where the latter are not closed down, will increase costs, and this danger is real. However, most examples presented have solved this problem by shifting customers sufficiently rapidly to cheaper social media and in large enough numbers so that overall costs are lower. The mobile smart phone channel can also be used to help achieve channel savings as well as better services, as exemplified by the ‘Love clean streets’ case.

- Increasing staff productivity, for example the number of cases successfully handled in a given time or for a given resource. This is both due to the lower transaction costs of social and mobile media, but also to reductions in customer contact time because the quality of service delivered in a given time unit is improved as staff know customers and their (often individual and specific) needs much better through social media engagement. Back-office processes are improved as this customer knowledge increases, leading to improved segmentation and targeting using social media. The challenge, which many governments have not yet solved, is that social media engagement might lead to more extensive (i.e. time consuming) and expensive contact. Most examples presented here, however, show that the goal of the majority of customers is to save time rather than use the service more. Customer satisfaction in these examples is derived from a convenient, quick, efficient as well as highly effective, service.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Short-term ‘quick-win’ benefits and business case</th>
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| Love Clean Streets, UK | - Move to cheaper mobile and social media channels for reporting local problems  
- Improved staff productivity, work processes and targeting  
- Changed behaviour and awareness of residents |
| Idea Street, UK | - Crowdsourcing where ideas are suggested and developed into projects through collaboration, gamification and virtual currency  
- Increased staff engagement and buy-in where good ideas cut costs |
| Office of Children and Family Services, USA | - Facebook and Twitter used to engage public, external media  
- Develop network and social effects  
- Cheaper social media and abandonment of physical print, meetings and travel |
| California Department of Motor Vehicles, USA | - YouTube, Facebook and Twitter for hosting interactive information  
- Develop user and instructor community round social media  
- Move to cheaper social media and abandonment of physical print |
| San Francisco Twitter 311 Service, USA | - Twitter to provide non-emergency information and feed from and to residents  
- Move to cheaper social media and a vibrant citizen community  
- Fewer staff, greater productivity and data-mining for better resource deployment and forward policies |
| San Francisco open city data, USA | - Public open data to develop applications linked to social media community  
- Focused problem solving with mix of public and private data, plus virtual platform and physical forum for negotiating partnership, organisational and jurisdictional issues  
- Savings for city and local companies, plus improved services |
| Why Let Drink Decide?’ campaign, | - Main aim to reduce the harm of youth drinking especially whilst driving  
- Social media campaign focused on negative consequences for youth |
### Case | Short-term ‘quick-win’ benefits and business case
---|---
**UK** | • Increased awareness of damage and reduction in road deaths and injuries caused by youth drink-driving

**‘Talk to FRANK’ campaign, UK** | • Main aim to reduce drug use amongst youth and school pupils  
• Both traditional and social media campaign on the “darker side” of drugs  
• Viral success across the different social media channels used

**‘THMBNLS’ campaign, UK** | • Main aim to reduce teenage pregnancy  
• Mainly MMS channel of weekly drama series plus others social media  
• Viral success across the different social media channels used

**‘Text4Baby, USA** | • Main aim to provide information to expectant and new mothers, especially from disadvantaged backgrounds, on how to care of themselves and the baby  
• Mobile text service once a week of relevant information, plus Facebook page  
• 250,000 mothers, the majority improving their knowledge and acting on it

**‘ImproveSF’, USA** | • Main aim to improve neighbourhood planning and decisions with residents  
• Social media platform 'Mindmixer' with gamification plus Twitter  
• Cost saving plans determined more accurately using resident inputs with greater acceptance

- Some of the examples have been developed in partnerships with the private sector or third sector partners, which as an overarching strategy can also lead to public sector savings if learning from these early pilots can be harvested.

These shorter-term quick win examples are also likely to provide longer term benefits, given that the quick wins are not ephemeral.

#### 3.2. Longer-term, preventative and developmental benefits

Most of the examples demonstrating or claiming longer-term preventative and development examples do so for both the public sector and for users. These include the following:

- The main focus in most of these examples is typically described as preventive, pre-emptive or early intervention, i.e. removing, or circumscribing problems highly likely to arise in the medium to longer-term which would otherwise impose large costs on the public sector, apart from depriving customers of personal benefits. The examples are thus seen mainly as long-term programmes, or as contributions to such programmes. They do impose some (but typically not large) up-front costs, but the confident expectation, which is already being achieved in some cases, is that they will later achieve much larger savings. The general aim is to circumvent or ameliorate future problems using social and mobile media (as well as other instruments) through smart or intelligent intervention.

- There are other additional challenges in these examples. First, although many savings are made through back-office organisational and process changes, the main focus is on changing user behaviour. (See especially Government Communication Network (2010), Thaler and Sunstein (2008), and Darnton (2005 and 2008).) Social and mobile media are, by nature, interactive tools in which the user’s inputs, activity and behaviour are just as important – perhaps more important – than those of the public sector. The public sector has less control over user behaviour than over its own, so this increases the risk. Second, savings and other business benefits might not directly accrue to the public sector department or agency which made the initial investment, but instead
could benefit other entities. Silo thinking and working in the public sector might resist such initiatives, so a more holistic, whole-of-government approach is required.

However, most of those responsible for the examples presented claim that large savings and other benefits, if not yet seen, will be realised as part of a longer term strategy, and that it would be short-sighted for any public sector entity not to invest in these now, even given the current climate of very strained public finances. Indeed, the consensus is that such a strategy should be an essential part of addressing the current economic problems.

3.3. On-going research

In the examples presented above, public officials and local researchers confirm that concrete savings and other clear business case benefits have already been made as stated, and that these positive impacts are on-going. In many of the examples, however, good analysis still has to be completed by the governments concerned. Specifically there is still a need to:

- document savings and other business benefits in detail including their precise size, provenance and impact
- analyse the savings/benefits to unravel the implementation, process and policy lessons which underpin the business case.

Thus the research reported in this paper is empirical, exploratory and on-going. The next step is to systematically analyse the benefits as well as address any dis-benefits and challenges.

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Social Media Usage for Civil Society in Japanese Municipalities

Social Networking Services for Enhancing Civic Activities

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Abstract: This paper analyzes social media usage by local municipalities in Japan, focusing on the possibilities and problems of complementary communication channels such as social networking services for promoting civil society. We examine how municipalities are using social networking services for enhancing civil society and how social networking services can provide vital information and connect citizens, municipal governments, and civil society.

Keywords: Japan, social media, municipalities, civil society, social networking services

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This paper analyzes social media usage by local municipalities in Japan, focusing on the possibilities and problems of complementary communication channels such as social networking services. Rapid transmission allows social media to facilitate communication activities in new ways. One example is the micro-blog Twitter and how followers of a certain Twitter account can continuously learn what each account holder is thinking in veritable real time, even if the follower has never met the person in real life. Social networking services such as Facebook allow one to manage one’s personal connections much easier than before. These links are not all powerfully committed personal links, but rather weaker links (Resnick, 2001; Wellman et al., 2001) that allow for the existence of a connection without requiring a strong commitment among people using social media. If strong commitments exist among users regardless of social media, then such platforms can be utilized to mobilize people, as in the case of the 2010-2011 Arab Spring political movements. In general, just like websites, social media utilization efficiently reduces distances between people and effectively connects people in modern society.

During the Great East Japan Earthquake, we have observed that through social media, a communication network of social support was formed in municipalities experiencing mid-level disruptions, and social interaction was made possible throughout a wide region. Social media became a conduit of information and source of knowledge for the citizens of Japanese
municipalities with mid-level disruptions in the early days of the disaster. This practical utilization suggests that this observed means of transmitting and receiving information is effective and potentially beneficial as a channel for municipal government communications.

1. Social Capital and Social Media

As the Internet allows for greater civic participation, social capital is increasingly important (Putnam, 2000). In recent studies of social capital in relation to the network society, the majority of research results are claiming that the Internet encourages social connections and involvement, upending prior fears of a decrease in social involvement or social displacement (Valkenburg & Jochen, 2007). The case of social media is the same, as studies are indicating that social capital is greater among those that actively use SNSs (Ellison et al., 2011; Pfeil, Arjan, & Zaphiris, 2009; Steinfield, Ellison, & Lampe, 2008). Kobayashi and Ikeda (2005) have indicated that trust and reciprocity are the observed elements of social capital during ICT usage in Japan. Social capital is formed through the social contexts of trust, norms, and networks to make a more efficient society by promoting the resources that exist in the harmony among positive human relationships. The exchanges of ideas during times of difficulty build human relationships, and such are the communication activities that build social capital. Putnam (2000) has termed bridging and bonding to be the two ways of building social capital, however when viewing this idea in the perspective of communication activities of SNSs, these two separate types of social capital may both be present. The communication of bonding among close individuals may occur in SNSs, but the bridging of diverse individuals are equally possible with SNSs, so the intermixing of the two types of building social capital need to be considered as well (Kaigo, 2012).

2. Social Networking Services in Japan

2.1. Social Networking Services in Japan: mixi 2011 to Facebook 2012

The definitions and history of social networking services have been well documented and there have been various comparisons of platforms in different contexts (Raacke & Bonds-Raacke, 2008; boyd & Ellison, 2007). In Takahashi (2010), the Japanese audience engagement with SNS in the social context has been concluded to have the following four dimensions: 1) information-seeking activity, 2) connectivity, 3) bricolage and 4) participation, through an ethnography of users of the Japanese SNS mixi and MySpace. Takahashi states that Japanese SNS use has more of a collective dynamic (us rather than me), in comparison to such networking sites initially developed in the U.S. such as MySpace, which is more about the individual user (me). Takahashi also explains the constructs of uchi (inner) and soto (outer) to explain how users attribute individual properties to their online personas in the different platforms. The web interface of mixi also creates a boundary that reflects society and that this interrelates with preexisting cultural behavior and distinctions between ethnic groups online. However, these results are now facing a new development or transition, as mixi and MySpace are no longer the dominant SNSs in cyberspace.

According to a report by Neilsen Netview (2012) of Japan in June 2012, the SNS Facebook had the most visitors, totaling 16,083,000. In contrast, mixi, formerly the most dominant social network in Japan had only 6,463,000 visitors in the same month. In comparison, data from July 2011 reports 14,033,000 visitors to mixi and 9,504,000 visitors to Facebook. Within the past two years, the SNS usage ratio has changed dramatically among the various social network services. The amount of
users each service has changed rapidly, resulting with Facebook being the most visited SNS in Japan by June 2012. Due to this increase, many organizations and municipalities in Japan have initiated projects to consider or implement Facebook usage.

2.2. Social Networking Services for municipalities in Japan

The usage of social networking services for promoting municipalities in Japan is not new, as can be observed in examples in other nations. One noteworthy example in Japan is Takeo city of Saga Prefecture. Takeo city of Saga Prefecture has switched from using traditional websites as their main presence on the Internet, and initiated using their Facebook page as their main Internet site. Takeo city has been very aggressive in using social media such as Twitter in the past. For example, by 2010 they had provided Twitter accounts to a majority of their workers and have been promoting their workers to post tweets, contrary to the policies of many corporations that prohibit using Twitter during working hours. Their aim was to have ordinary information to flow from the government so that citizens could feel more close to their municipality. During the flooding due to storms in the Takeo area on June 12, 2011, the mayor and other workers continued sending out disaster information about road blocks and flooding, and subsequently were able to raise over 1 million yen in donations in part thanks to their Twitter usage. Their success in using Twitter evolved into their tactics for further enhancing visualization of the municipal government, and eventually they initiated their usage of Facebook.

Takeo city provides information for residents such as child raising support and general safety, tourism, businesses and also releases municipal government information using inline frames (iframe). Therefore, all their information is embedded on Facebook, but is uploaded onto a server outside of Facebook, for averting risky situations, in case of service failure or changes in Facebook policy. Their Facebook page is open access to those who do not have Facebook accounts. Communication is facilitated between the government and Facebook account holders who can comment and “like” any updates by the city.

Using Facebook has certain merits for local governments. It allows for quicker service, more accountability, lower IT server maintenance costs, and greater opportunities for interactivity among citizens and the government. However, there are also potential demerits: Facebook implementation may intimidate or prohibit easy access from citizens with low levels of digital skills (IT literacy or computer literacy), there is risk involved in the case that Facebook services fail, entries are subject to trolling by other Facebook users, and there could be concern about personal (private) information shared with Facebook as a private corporation.

In viewing both the pros and cons of implementing Facebook services, many municipalities have determined that there are more benefits than risks. Japanese municipalities have initiated or are planning Facebook pages to provide a forum for citizens and government so that they can exchange ideas. This paper focuses on one example in Ibaraki prefecture and specifically on the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square Experiment [Tsukuba Shimin Katsudō no Hiroba] of the Tsukuba municipal government of Japan.

2.3. Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square Experiment

The Tsukuba municipal government of Ibaraki Prefecture in Japan is located approximately 30 miles north of the capital of Japan, Tokyo. This municipality has been working with the University of Tsukuba and Intel Corporation to start the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square [Tsukuba
Shimin Katsudō no Hiroba] to help 1) nurture future human resources and cultivate entrepreneurship, and 2) reactivate communities and recreate a healthy civic life by the year 2015. Within this context, the Tsukuba municipal government began in 2012, an empirical experiment for promoting cooperation among citizens by creating a new perspective among citizens. To facilitate this, the municipality created a cyber “plaza” or “Cyber-Square” to help promote networking among civic activities and groups. This cyber-square can create a foundation for information sharing and help visualize civic activities for creating a better civil society. Prior to commencing this experiment, Tsukuba city had the highest number of Facebook users with approximately 10,860 users in October 2011. With these intentions, this experiment was initiated in January 2012 and ends its first phase at the end of June 2012 and will continue operating into the second phase starting from July 2012.

This paper examines this ongoing experiment and will 1) make a comparison of the activities within this Facebook page and other Facebook pages being operated by municipalities in the vicinity, specifically the Ibaraki Prefecture region, and 2) quantitatively examine the posts made in the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square by a content analysis in reference to social capital.

3. Analysis of Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square Experiment

3.1. Comparison with Other Social Networking Services in Ibaraki

A comparison was conducted among the five following Facebook pages of municipalities in Ibaraki prefecture from January 20, 2012 through June 30, 2012. 1) Foodies in Ibaraki [Uaimondokoro Ibaraki] which is operated by the Ibaraki prefectural agriculture and fisheries distributions department (907 Likes in June 2012), 2) The Enchantment of Ibaraki [Ibaraki no miryoku-o tsutatetai] which is run by the Ibaraki prefectural public relations department (863 Likes in June 2012), 3) Mito City Tourism [Mitoshikankōka Mitoshikankōkyōkai] run by the Mito (capital of Ibaraki) tourism board (286 Likes in June 2012), 4) Sakuragawa City [Sakuragawashi] which started its Facebook page at the same period (491 Likes in June 2012). The Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square had 1263 Likes in June 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Likes</th>
<th>Under 50</th>
<th>51-100</th>
<th>Over 101</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibaraki Foodies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Enchantment of Ibaraki</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mito City Tourism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakuragawa City</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Comparison of Social Networking Services from Jan 20 - Feb 21 2012
Tables 1 to 5 indicate the number of Updates, Comments and Likes among the five pages. Any updates are indicated by an addition of a row. The numbers indicate the number of posted comments. The gradation of gray indicates the number of “likes” made to an update. For example, if an update is made, but does not have any comments but has over 11 “likes”, there will be a 0 in a row under the date column, with a dark shade of grey.

**Table 2: Comparison of Social Networking Service Pages from Feb 22 – Mar 25 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tabliga</th>
<th>Tendril</th>
<th>Engine</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Mix</th>
<th>TableRage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3: Comparison of Social Networking Service Pages from Mar 26 – Apr 27 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tabliga</th>
<th>Tendril</th>
<th>Engine</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Mix</th>
<th>TableRage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar-6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table data
If one can divide the quality of information into “soft” and “hard”, the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square communicates “hard” information about civic activities, whereas the other four pages 1) Foodies in Ibaraki, 2) The Enchantment of Ibaraki, 3) Mito City Tourism and 4) Sakuragawa City communicated about relatively “soft” oriented daily themes such as tourism or food.

Through the quantitative comparison of five months of the five pages, we discovered that the pages that communicated “soft” information were likely to have more posted comments and “likes” in comparison to communication of “hard” information. Still, the Tsukuba Civic Activities
Cyber-Square had a competitive amount of posted comments and likes in comparison to the other four pages in consideration of the characteristics of information being communicated. A sudden increase can be observed during May 2012 in the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square. The increase in updates and posted comments after May 6, 2012 in the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square is due to the tornado disaster that occurred around 13:00 that day which resulted in outages affecting 20,000 residences and deaths and injuries, along with destruction of homes and other facilities.

From this analysis, we observed that among the pages we selected, 1) social networking service pages that communicate about “soft” information are more likely to have comments posted or likes, however, 2) social networking service pages that focus solely on communicating on “hard” government and civic information may be considered effective even without communicating “soft” information for increasing artificial feedback – such as comments or “likes” on Facebook.

3.2. Analysis of Posts in the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square

The Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square had a total of 109 posts (inclusive of updates and also comments to updates) from January 20, 2012 to June 30, 2012. These posts were extracted as data and were analyzed morphologically by computer software to find communality with concepts related to social capital, such as community, public interest, social participation and civic participation. The results are as follows.

3.2.1. Gratitude

Posts that reflected gratitude were the most common. A total of 27 posts (approximately 25% of all posts) were in someway related to gratitude. This could reflect social support and reciprocation among the users of the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square.

3.2.2. Request

Requests were the second most common morpheme among the posts. A total of 16 posts (approximately 15% of all posts) These posts could also reflect social support and reciprocation among the users of the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square.

3.2.3. Affirmation

A total of eight posts were determined to be affirmative. This may reflect a positive image towards the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square among the users.

3.2.4. Delight

A total six posts were determined to reflect delight. These reflect the situation of the local area (Harper, 2002).

3.2.5. Encouragement

A total of five posts were determined to be of encouragement. These posts reflect reciprocity and trust among the users that posted comments.
Table 6: Analysis of Posts in Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morpheme</th>
<th>Total Posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gratitude</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delight</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouragement</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.6. Summary of Results: Social Capital through the Posts?

The results of the comparison of the activities within the Facebook page of the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square and the other Facebook pages being operated by municipalities in the vicinity show that the total number of posts are lower in the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square when compared to the other pages with “softer” content. However, the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square has been proven to be effective in nurturing social capital through quantitative content analysis of the posts made in the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square. Even without making the content artificially “softer”, communication to enhance civil society through social networking services has been demonstrated to be a viable option and has been seen in this example that it can gain attention equal to the other Facebook pages of local municipalities in the same region.

The month after a natural disaster in the Tsukuba area demonstrates that “hard” information such as disaster relief communication and civic activity notices are equally valuable for users of SNSs with such orientation and can be competitive when comparing the number of “likes” or comments. Municipalities need not post “soft” information all the time to artificially add “likes” or comments to their updates. People who have or who developed an interest in the communications of the municipality will “like “ the page and will subscribe to the disseminating information. Initially, this subscriber might be silent and this condition will continue until the time comes when the subscriber feels the need to comment or communicate in another way. When the person is activated to communicate and participate in the communications encompassing the municipality, the person becomes more involved in the civic activities of this community. This interest can resonate from cyberspace back into real society, and poses the possibility of SNS usage among the local municipalities in Japan.

4. Discussion

This paper analyzes an ongoing experiment of social network service usage by the Tsukuba municipal government in Japan, focusing on the possibilities and problems of complementary communication channels. We have demonstrated how municipalities are using social networking services for enhancing civil society and how social networking services can provide vital information and connect citizens, municipal governments and civil society. Then, what are the problems of using social networking services?

The main obstacle to initiating usage of SNS by the Tsukuba municipal government in the beginning stages stemmed from fears of making a mistake in the posting and/or having posts of inappropriate information through social media. For example, in Japan, there have been incidents
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where hotel restaurant personnel began posting onto Twitter private information of customers who are celebrities in the mainstream media, and subsequently this scandalous information made its way back into the mainstream media, such as gossip tabloids and tabloid television. Such information essentially lures trolls to begin trolling about such information provided by the personnel and results in creating a negative image of the organization – in the case of this example, the restaurant and the hotel.

These negative examples in the past in Japan have resulted in delaying or prohibiting usage of social media among many organizations and have created a general fear of social media among those with less digital skills or information technology literacy. However, instead of denying usage due to fear of trolls, creating a guideline of usage was vital in implementation of the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square. Their guideline was to use a SNS with actual names, not to post slanderous information, not to leak secret or private about the organization, not to post opinions that may be misinterpreted as the opinion of the organization, and not to post about uncertain facts and avoid mistakes. These rules, along with the recent diffusion of Facebook — which coincides with guidelines of using real names (in contrast to the Japanese SNS mixi which can be used anonymously) — were vital factors for pushing forward this experiment to a successful first stage.

![Figure 1: Increase of Likes of The Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square from Feb – May 2012](image)

The Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square was not able to enforce an artificial increase of “likes” therefore, the number of “likes” has increased steadily but not acutely as seen in figure 1. As a result, the Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square has built a following of people who are relatively interested in civic activities that can soon be mobilized in disseminating information about volunteering, especially in the case of disaster relief as seen during the May 2012 tornado in
Tsukuba city. SNSs can therefore play a vital role in filling in the gap between the ordinary citizen and government, allow for more transparency and create a community in cyberspace with people that have common interests. As we know from sociological studies, people within a similar environment, with similar characteristics, and similar experiences tend to form communities (homophily). Homophily within Facebook, especially with similar orientations (in this case, towards government and civic activities) is natural behavior and with more time and accompanying the increase of users, the Facebook community can reflect onto the real world and society what is currently being seen in cyberspace. Outside of this context of this example, this may be seen as a problematic characteristic of SNSs and cyberspace, however, in the case of government and civic activities, this can be viewed as a possibility.

The ongoing experiment has now entered the second phase from July 2012 and by increasing the size of the SNS community page, it may foster future possibilities of civic activities in the Tsukuba City area and offer other local municipalities ideas and solutions on how to employ usage of SNSs to further their causes.

Figure 2: Tsukuba Civic Activities Cyber-Square

References


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Elected Officials' Interactions with Citizens on Twitter

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Abstract: Enthusiasts propose that social media promotes vertical political communication, giving citizens the opportunity to interact directly with their representatives. However, skeptics claim that politicians avoid direct engagement with constituents, instead using technology to present a façade of interactivity. This study explores if and how elected officials in three regions of the world are using Twitter to interact with the public. We examine the Twitter activity of 15 officials over a period of six months. We show that in addition to the structural features of Twitter that are designed to promote interaction, officials rely on language to foster or to avoid engagement. It also provides yet more evidence that the existence of interactive features does not guarantee interactivity.

Keywords: Elected officials, Interactivity, Language, Twitter, Vertical communication

New media optimists have claimed that social technologies, such as the micro-blogging service Twitter, stand to change political communication in positive ways. Many hope that new technologies can help level the playing field between political elites, who enjoy a number of resources to their advantage including access to traditional media channels, and non-elites, who struggle to get their messages out (e.g., Bimber, 1998; Rheingold, 1993). Likewise, there is optimism that new technologies might be harnessed and used to reverse the trend of increasing apathy among citizens in liberal democracies, and particularly among youth (Delli Carpini, 2000).

We will explore if and how elected officials use Twitter to interact with the public. Twitter touts itself as a technology used around the globe. Therefore, to observe a wide variety of ways in which officials use Twitter, we conduct a study of officials in three regions with liberal democratic governments. Particularly, we draw upon datasets used in our ongoing research (Hemphill et al., 2013), in which we are following the tweets of Members of the European Parliament, Korean National Assembly Members, and United States Members of Congress. The goal is to examine qualitatively the types of vertical communication taking place between elected officials and the citizens they represent and to develop a framework for analysis that can facilitate future work.

Our analysis suggests that while Twitter provides the infrastructure to facilitate a high level of interactivity between political officials and constituents, not everyone takes advantage of these affordances. We illustrate that Twitter is being used in a variety of ways, from an essentially one-
way channel for information provision from official to citizen, to a space in which genuine mutual
discourse takes place. In addition, we argue that despite its image as a social technology, many
officials use Twitter to engage in para-social interaction rather than human-human interaction. In
such cases, officials provide just enough interaction for citizens to respond to them as people
(Giles, 2002) while yielding little control of the communication situation to citizens. Finally, we
offer suggestions for analyzing interactivity on Twitter, which considers not only the use of
structural features, but also language tactics. Future work can exploit such measures in a large-
scale, representative study of officials’ behaviors, in order to expand on our initial findings.

1. Background and Related Literature

Twitter is “used by people in nearly every country in the world”¹ and elected officials in many
regions have adopted it as a part of their communication strategy. One way that Twitter might
positively impact political communication is by promoting vertical communication between officials
and the citizens they represent. For instance, according to the website of the European Parliament
(EP), social media is “revolutionizing” the way that MEPs communicate with citizens². The EP
views social media as a means to engage citizens, allowing them to “question MEPs themselves.”

1.1. A Trend toward Interactivity?

But do politicians really interact with citizens? Lilleker and Malagón (2010) point out that
politicians are simultaneously the party facing the greatest risk and the greatest potential reward
from such encounters. Interactivity can help the politician establish rapport and a sense of
connection with citizens (McMillan, 2002b), portraying her as a responsive and capable
representative with good intentions. However, the risks include losing ambiguity in the political
message, as well as a general loss of control of the communication situation (Stromer-Galley, 2000).

Stromer-Galley (2000) not only finds that politicians are resistant to interactive, vertical
communication, but also claims that new technologies allow them to present a façade of
interactivity, reaping the benefits while minimizing risks. She distinguishes human-media
interactivity (e.g., engaging with content, such as a photo or video) from human-human
interactivity (e.g., messaging one’s representative and receiving a response). Stromer-Galley and
Foot (2002) conducted focus groups with citizens before the 2000 elections in the United States,
questioning them about candidates’ websites. They found that citizens perceive the possibility for
both types of interactivity. However, their needs for interacting with politicians are largely
satisfied by human-media interactions, and that they do not demand or expect direct interactions.

1.2. Interactivity on Twitter

Social media are often assumed to be interactive by their very nature. However, CMC researchers
consider interactivity to be a variable in any communication setting, and so it is not a characteristic
of the medium itself (Rafaeli & Sudweeks, 1997). Indeed, Twitter structures and conventions of use
can facilitate interactivity (e.g., mentioning or directly addressing someone using “@”); the use of

¹http://twitter.com/about
“RT” to rebroadcast another’s post). However, as we will show, the provision of these features alone does not guarantee that they will be used in an interactive manner.

The following examples of recent public exchanges between MEPs and citizens illustrate not only the potential risks and benefits to politicians using Twitter, but also the challenges for researchers in terms of studying interactivity.

Exchange 1: Marietje Schaake (MEP, Netherlands) and Faceyet (citizen)

Marietje Schaake: Anyone looking through the #SyriaFiles who finds something that needs political follow up, feel free to email me.

Faceyet: @MarietjeD66 Isn’t offering to help with “political follow up” on #SyriaFiles in effect an offer of assistance to #WikiLeaks? #EU #NATO

Marietje Schaake: No, I’d look into it, take parliamentary action independently on a daily basis, but based on (multiple) info sources... #Syriafiles @faceyet

Exchange 2: Julie Girling (MEP, UK) and Hollicombe (@ToxicTorbay) (citizen)

Hollicombe: @juliegirling as our MEP could we ask you about your views on the #hollicombe development in #Torbay, & the possible #publichealthrisk?

Julie Girling: @ToxicTorbay Thanks for getting in touch. As this is a local planning and development matter I urge you to contact local Cllrs and your MP.

Exchange 3: Alexander Alvaro (MEP, Germany) and Caren S Wood (citizen)

Caren S Wood: @AlexAlvaro Sorry me getting personal, but did already someone told you that you look like Mr. George Clooney of the EP? How refreshing!! :))

AlexanderAlvaro: @CarenSWood Life could be worse, hm?

In contrast to the latter two exchanges, the official initiates the first one. She does not directly address anyone, but instead extends a general invitation to citizens to contact her. In addition, it’s the longest of the three exchanges. The second and third exchanges are both initiated by citizens; the addressed officials respond with a single message, essentially ending the conversations.

In all three cases, the officials demonstrate that they are responsive to inquiries. However, particularly in exchanges one and two, their responses show that they are simultaneously trying to save face and preserve their political ambiguity. Schaake is put on the spot as to where she stands on WikiLeaks. Rather than answering directly, she counters that she would rely on multiple information sources before acting politically. Similarly, Girling is directly asked where she stands on a particular issue. It is clear that the citizen would like to hear Girling’s view (“as our MEP...”), however, Girling deflects the question. The third exchange, in which a fan has contacted an MEP to flirt with him, might be considered as embarrassing or distracting from the political message or image. However, Alvaro uses the exchange to show his sense of humor.

1.3. Evaluating Interactivity in CMC

Much research on interactivity in CMC takes one of two approaches: analyzing structures provided by the medium or users’ perceptions of its capabilities (Van Dijk, 1999). In the first camp,
researchers have focused on the extent to which interactive features are included in politicians’ websites, and have tried to understand how communication approaches correlate to party and demographic characteristics (e.g. Braghiroli, 2010; Jankowski et al., 2005; Lilleker et al., 2011). In contrast, others have argued that interactivity is not only a variable in terms of the structures provided by a medium, but is also a psychological factor (Kiousis, 2002).

McMillan and Downes (2000), taking the user-driven approach, determined that there are two key dimensions to interactivity: the direction of communication that may take place between senders and receivers of messages (i.e., one-way versus two-way) and the level of control that the message receiver has. McMillan (2002a) subsequently developed a four-part model of cyber-interactivity, which is summarized and related to the case of Twitter in Figure 1. We argue that Twitter use by political officials might fall into any of the four quadrants and provide examples. As will be seen, we use this framework of cyber-interactivity to guide our exploration of politicians’ interactions with citizens via Twitter.

![Figure 1: Twitter activity in relation to McMillan’s (2002b) model of cyber-interactivity](image)

2. Goals and Research Questions

While much previous research considered political officials’ use of interactive features in their websites, we are not aware of studies that seek to examine interactivity between political elites and citizens on Twitter. Therefore, our exploratory study seeks to characterize the types of interactivity that politicians are engaging in using this new medium. Inspired by the review of related literature, we propose two research questions:

- RQ1: What is the level of cyber-interactivity of politicians on Twitter?
- RQ2: Do they engage in mutual discourse or do they avoid it?
3. Data and Method

We consulted our datasets of public officials who use Twitter in their communication strategy. For each region (Europe, South Korea, and the US), we identified five officials\(^3\) who had been active on Twitter from 1 January 2012 to 1 July 2012. We also considered diversity with respect to gender and political party. Details on the officials selected for the study are provided in Table 1.

The dataset comprises nearly all\(^4\) of the officials’ tweets during the six-month timeframe. Obviously, this is a multi-lingual dataset. The American officials tweeted exclusively in English and Korean officials in Korean. In contrast, four of the EU MEPs we studied tweeted in at least two languages, with English being used as a lingua franca. All non-English tweets were translated to English using Google Translate\(^5\), and were verified by a speaker of the source language to ensure the appropriateness of the translations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Handle) / Party / Country</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Tweets</th>
<th>Followers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Alvaro (@AlexAlvaro), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Germany</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>2,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julie Girling (@juliegirling), European Conservatives and Reformists, UK</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodi Kratsa (@Rodi_Kratsa), European People’s Party, Greece</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>3,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niccolò Rinaldi (@NiccoloRinaldi), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Italy</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marietje Schaake (@marietjed66), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Netherlands</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>16,459</td>
<td>13,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seung-Kyu Kang (@kangara), Grand National Party, Korea</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>14,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Jin Pyo (@jipnyokim), Democrat United Party, Korea</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2,293</td>
<td>12,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu-Jung Kim (@KimYoojung), Democrat United Party, Korea</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>6,547</td>
<td>22,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young-Gil Kwon (@KwonYoungGhil), Democratic Labor Party, Korea</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4,030</td>
<td>50,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young-A Park (@youngahPark), Grand National Party, Korea</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>3,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Foxx (@virginiafoxx), Republican, US House of Representatives</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>7,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirsten Gillibrand (@SenGillibrand), Democrat, US Senate</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>2,859</td>
<td>41,678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^3\) We note that while some of the officials have since left their positions, all are still active in politics.

\(^4\) All Tweets that were being publically displayed by Twitter on 1 July 2012 were captured.

\(^5\) http://translate.google.com/
First, we analyzed the official’s activity and use of Twitter’s structures that enable interactivity:

- How many tweets did the official post during the six-month period?
- How often did the official mention others?
- How often did the official reply to others’ tweets?
- How often did the official retweet?

We also considered the posting of additional content (photos and videos) that fosters human-media interaction. Finally, we read through official’s tweets to find illustrative examples of how officials interact with citizens. In particular, we considered the official’s use of direct reply, in an effort to understand whether or not these replies are to citizens, and if so, what they concern.

4. Analysis

For each group of officials, we first present their activity (i.e., number of tweets posted during the first six months of 2012). We also summarize their use of structures: mentioning another user using “@,” retweeting, and direct reply to another user. As a measure of human-human interactivity, we also compute the percent of tweets that are replies. Finally, we characterize each official’s interactions with citizens, providing illustrative examples of typical behaviors.

4.1. Members of Parliament (European Union)

Table 2: EP officials’ use of structural features supporting interactivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Handle</th>
<th>Tweets</th>
<th>Mentions</th>
<th>Retweets</th>
<th>Photos</th>
<th>Videos</th>
<th>Replies</th>
<th>% Replies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@AlexAlvaro</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@juliegirling</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@Rodi_Kratsu</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@NiccoloRinaldi</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@marietjed66</td>
<td>3,219</td>
<td>2,813</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We note that if users did not use the features provided by Twitter to engage in these activities (e.g., marking a tweet with “MT” but not using the retweet function) then they will not be captured in our statistics.
4.1.1. @AlexAlvaro

@AlexAlvaro, a German MEP who tweets in both English and German, is very responsive to citizens. As shown in Table 2, he focuses more on engaging directly with others, rather than posting content. We observed many cases where he invited citizens to discuss with him, engaging in *mutual discourse*, such as the following:

@AlexAlvaro: Why do you need to stay anonymous to be able to express yourself? Must admit that I don't understand that concept... #eurodig

@ronpatz: @AlexAlvaro because blowing the whistle can get you in jail or just because your opinion is valid without a name, too. #eurodig

@AlexAlvaro: @ronpatz I would disagree about the value of a nameless opinion and...not everyone is a whistleblower (for those I understand) #eurodig

4.1.2. @juliegirling

@juliegirling’s interactivity is mainly *feedback*, with rare direct exchanges. She frequently posts links to content including her monthly newsletter or pictures of events she attended. Even her direct interactions with citizens focus on information provision rather than critical discussion:

@treiziemeetoile: @juliegirling quick question if I may: is Mrs Girling participating in the EP ASEAN delegation to Burma this week, meeting Aung San Suu Kyi?

@juliegirling: @treiziemeetoile yes that's correct. Information about the visit to follow in the coming weeks. via http://www.juliegirling.com

4.1.3. @Rodi_Kratsa

@Rodi_Kratsa’s use of Twitter includes *monologue* and *mutual discourse* and she tweets in both Greek and English. She often positions herself on current issues, and does not post much additional content. More than 20% of her tweets are direct replies, and we observed several exchanges in which citizens ask her to do something:

@billhicks6: @Rodi_Kratsa Could you bring up the case of the suicides in the EP, and ask that they be investigated as a case of murder by negligence or intention? [Referring to the increasing rate of suicide in Greece, during the financial crisis.]

@Rodi_Kratsa: @billhicks6 Soon, I will be taking other initiatives on the matter of the suicides.

4.1.4. @NiccoloRinaldi

@NiccoloRinaldi tweets primarily in Italian with an occasional English tweet. He typically tweets in the *feedback* mode, posting content to engage constituents, such as photos and videos. Almost 10% of his tweets are replies, in the *mutual discourse* mode. Of interest was his interaction with citizens during the recent ACTA vote in the EP, such as this exchange with a student:

@antodicarlo @NiccoloRinaldi #ACTA. What is this?

@NiccoloRinaldi @antodicarlo See http://www.niccolorinaldi.it for more information. It’s an anti-counterfeiting agreement that would affect Internet freedom as well as access to medicines.
4.1.5. @marietjed66

@marietjed66 is the most active and interactive official we observed. She tweets in both English and Dutch using feedback and mutual discourse. As previously noted, she often poses questions and invitations to engage citizens. She is also responsive to unsolicited inquiries, such as the following:

@AmQamar: Hello! May I ask what you are doing at the European level to solve the problems of the persecuted ahmadiyya community? @MarietjeD66

@MarietjeD66: @AmQamar we highlight it in our human rights work on Pakistan etc [con’t]

@AmQamar: @MarietjeD66 Don’t want to hold u up, but just to inform u that I have also visited your website and seen ur work. I appreciate your work.

@MarietjeD66: @AmQamar thankyou

While many officials post quick, one-off responses to citizens’ questions, @marietjed66 frequently has extended exchanges. In interactions such as this one, it is obvious that citizens appreciate the time officials take in responding to their questions.

4.2. National Assembly Members (Korea)

Table 3: Korean officials’ use of structural features supporting interactivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Handle</th>
<th>Tweets</th>
<th>Mentions</th>
<th>Retweets</th>
<th>Photos</th>
<th>Videos</th>
<th>Replies</th>
<th>% Replies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@kangnara</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@jinpyokim</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@KimYoojung</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@KwonYoungGhil</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@YoungahPark</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.1. @kangnara

Citizens often initiated interaction with @kangnara, and he always responded politely. That said, we noted that he frequently responded with generic replies, such as the following:

@kangnara: Thank you for your encouraging words. I’ll do my best to lead.

This is not surprising given that direct interaction with constituents is time consuming (Stromer-Galley, 2000). Another characteristic of @kangnara is that he often posted pictures; we counted a total of 100 photos. Typical photos included him attending official and family events and sports. We characterize @kangnara’s use of Twitter as featuring both mutual discourse and feedback.

4.2.2. @jinpyokim

@jinpyokim is very open to answering questions from constituents; nearly a third of his posts are replies. Citizens often want information from him, as illustrated in the following exchange:

@sununiv_in: @jinpyokim The Yeongtong subway construction is often taking too long. Do you care to comment?

@jinpyokim: @sununiv_in: By the end of this year, the train line should be constructed all the way to Mangpo Station. Announced in 2000 with construction not beginning until 2006 for
various reasons, with no budget problems, there’s been progress. Please be patient for just a little while longer.

We also observed him interacting with students, who asked him to complete a survey, and he quickly responded to their request. @jinpyokim spends a good deal of his time in mutual discourse, and engages in the feedback mode of interactivity as well.

4.2.3. @KimYoojung

@KimYoojung is very prolific, typically posting several tweets each day. In addition to professional activities, she often mentions day-to-day details, which add a personal touch:

I’ve got to have a strong, sugary cup of coffee! Even when there’s a lot going on, a strong cup starts the day!

Over half of her tweets are responses to others in mutual discourse. Many of these interactions are, similar to those of her colleagues, words of encouragement and “thank you’s.” For example:

@lafe12: @KimYoojung: Senator, the last four years have been difficult and filled with anxiety. Thank you for your hard work.
@KimYoojung: @lafe12: Thanks~^^ We’ve missed you! How have you been?

4.2.4. @KwonYoungGhil

While @KwonYoungGhil is quite prolific, he exchanges very few messages with others. He fosters human-media engagement by occasionally posting photos and videos. He tweets about strikes and economic injustices, positioning himself in relation to the events or issues, as follows:

@KwonYoungGhil: Children are often referred to as “the treasures of our country”. Where to spend money if not on them? Free childcare should not be interrupted.

@KwonYoungGhil’s use of Twitter falls mainly into two modes: monologue and feedback.

4.2.5. @YoungahPark

@YoungahPark is the least prolific of the Korean officials we studied. Her tweets often focus on issues of education and her own views, without prompting a reply from citizens:

@YoungahPark: Teacher evaluation in the Teacher Evaluation Bill is now being discussed at the curriculum general meeting. It’s a shame that it was unanimously supported three years ago at the meeting, but it still has not been passed. The situation is very frustrating. Sorry to the people who are waiting for this bill to pass.

We observed @YoungahPark using monologue, feedback and to a lesser extent, mutual discourse.

4.3. Members of Congress (United States)

Table 4: US officials’ use of structural features supporting interactivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Handle</th>
<th>Tweets</th>
<th>Mentions</th>
<th>Retweets</th>
<th>Photos</th>
<th>Video</th>
<th>Replies</th>
<th>% Replies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>@virginiafoxx</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@SenGillibrand</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@clairecmc</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.1. @virginiafoxx

@virginiafoxx exhibits a press agency style of use rather than an effort to interact directly with citizens. For instance, we observed the following message multiple times:

@virginiafoxx: Help me reach 2,000 likes on Facebook! If you follow me on Twitter, be sure to check out & like my Facebook page! [URL]

She had no direct exchanges with anyone. She often mentions and retweets other political elites, however, we were unable to find a single mention or retweet of a citizen. @virginiafoxx tweeted several photos, which often depicted visits to companies and other organizations. It is clear that @virginiafoxx avoids mutual discourse; her primary mode is feedback with limited responsive dialog.

4.3.2. @SenGillibrand

@SenGillibrand’s activity takes a personal tone, but still primarily is in feedback mode. Her tweets are generally written in the first person, and she often posts photos of professional and family activities, as in the following:

@SenGillibrand: Last night, I took Henry, Theo & a friend to Congressional Night at the Natl @AirandSpace Museum. They loved it! pic.twitter.com/pNswZejr

While @SenGillibrand does avoid mutual discourse, she often uses mentions to give kudos to civic groups and individuals involved in work and causes that she supports:

@SenGillibrand: Congrats @ReshmaSaujani on the amazing @GirlsWhoCode project in #NYC & its new partnership w/@Twitter http://bit.ly/MQOvok #oftheshedlines

4.3.3. @clairecmc

Similar to @SenGillibrand, @clairecmc’s tweets have a personal tone, generally written in the first person voice. She occasionally posts photos, often with family members. While @clairecmc had relatively few replies to others (6.2% of her posts), we did observe some interesting interactions with citizens. For example, in one, she defends herself against a citizen’s criticism:

@mrsdeedum: “@FSMidwest: @clairecmc Got her GAME 6 ticket signed [URL] but who paid 4 it? You or lobbyist?

@clairecmc: @mrsdeedum I paid for my own ticket. Always do.

In summary, @clairecmc is primarily tweeting in the feedback mode, with some mutual discourse.

4.3.4. @ThadMcCotter

While @ThadMcCotter interacts primarily with other politicians and the media, he does engage in exchanges with citizens, which he often initiates, such as the following example:

@ThadMcCotter: Lunch with one of Michigan’s finest at USAG-Yongsan. #TM12 [URL]

@AndrewHemingway: @ThadMcCotter killer bow tie! If @repschock will stop hogging GQ I think you have a chance
Similar to @SenGillibrand and @clairecmc, @ThadMcCotter tweets about both professional and personal interests. However, whereas the former often tweet about their families, @ThadMcCotter often had exchanges about TV shows or his home sports teams. His tweets are primarily written in the first person voice. He makes extensive use of both mutual discourse and feedback.

4.3.5. @SenSanders

@SenSanders notes that his staff tweet for him. We counted 65 tweets that were noted as being written by Senator Sanders himself (7.9%). Like @virginiafoxx, @SenSanders does not use direct replies. The dominant voice of the posts is the third person. @SenSanders is also fond of posting questions that provoke citizens to think about an issue, and engages them with additional content:

@SenSanders: The CEOs of 15 top U.S. and European banks got an average raise of 12% last year. Did you get a raise last year? [URL]

@SenSanders extensively uses the feedback mode of interacting, however, he also makes use of responsive dialog, as in the following examples in which citizens are invited to participate in polls:

@SenSanders: Should the US continue to subsidize the fossil fuel industry? Let Bernie know here: [URL] #Energy #Oil #Gas

5. Discussion

Twitter provides a number of features designed to facilitate interaction. Some promote human-media interaction (e.g., posting a URL or photo) while others enable direct, human-human interaction (e.g., mentioning, which often leads to a reply). Structurally, Twitter has the capacity to put citizens in direct contact with their representatives. However, the provision of the functionality alone does not guarantee that the medium will be fully exploited.

We identified several officials who regularly engaged in mutual discourse with citizens. Many of them exhibit a willingness to answer inquiries in a polite and timely fashion. Even more encouraging, some, in particular @AlexAlvaro and @marietjed66, explicitly invited citizens to discuss issues with them, and engaged in more than simple, one-off exchanges.

5.1. Para-social interaction

On the other hand, we observed those who remained in the feedback and responsive dialog modes. For instance, @virginiafoxx and @SenSanders had no direct exchanges with others. Both promoted their Web presences elsewhere in order to drive traffic there (e.g., Foxx’s Facebook) or to collect feedback from the public (e.g., Sanders’ polling site). Many also used Twitter in monologue mode, simply posting updates and views on current events and issues.

It may be that many politicians, despite having adopted Twitter, have no desire to engage in mutual discourse. What do these officials gain by using social technologies in ways that are less than fully interactive? McMillan (2002a) explains a possible effect of the “lesser” forms of interactivity. She describes how para-social interaction can occur as a result of human-content interaction. She claims that even when there is limited ability for human-to-human interaction, that message receivers can develop a feeling of being close to message senders. Thus, some politicians interact just enough to get constituents to identify with them, without having to yield much control in the exchange, and without having to invest the energy necessary to sustain mutual discourse.
5.2. Analyzing Interactivity

We examined the extent to which officials use interactive features of Twitter. Our qualitative analysis revealed something that needs to be addressed – how officials use language in conjunction with Twitter’s structures. We observed how @MarietjeD66 and @AlexAlvaro posed provocative questions or invitations to encourage constituents to interact. Likewise, we saw the importance of “thank you’s” issued promptly in response to citizens’ inquiries. Hyland (2005) explains that writers use linguistic tactics to engage readers, highlighting features such as pronouns (e.g., the use of “you” to directly address readers, or “we” to create a sense of in-group belonging). In future, we will consider how officials use such tactics. It may be that using engaging language, along with Twitter’s structures, is key to its use in direct interaction with citizens.

6. Conclusion

Politicians’ Twitter use varies in terms of how interactive they are. We observed interesting cultural differences that warrant further study; American officials were significantly less interactive as compared to Europeans and Koreans. We plan to conduct a large-scale study to see if the patterns observed are representative of the way politicians are using Twitter.

In conclusion, Twitter has much potential for promoting interactive, vertical communication. Of course, it’s unrealistic to expect that all or even most officials will use Twitter in a highly interactive way, and we observed officials who did not exploit its interactive potential. We are most disturbed by researchers’ claims that citizens, who are aware of the interactive potential of new technologies, do not demand interaction with their representatives (Stromer-Galley & Foot, 2002). We hope that further work might show positive examples of interactive communication that will at the very least encourage citizens to try to engage officials via new media such as Twitter.

References


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Jahna (Ph.D., University of Michigan - Ann Arbor, USA) is a communication and information scientist. Her endeavor is to discover patterns in the use of language and other communicative devices in order to better facilitate technology-mediated interactions, enhancing access to information.

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Nazis vs Paedophiles
The power of the metaphor in Internet regulation

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Abstract: The digitisation of media presents unprecedented challenges for developing an effective and dynamic regulatory framework. How stakeholders communicate their policies to the public (and how the media then reports on these) affects the meaning-making potential of the public sphere around specific issues and policy initiatives. This article adopts a critical discourse analysis based on Robert Entman’s theory of framing in order to understand the role played by discourse in negotiations surrounding the regulation of the Internet by identifying the ideologies and values imbedded in a text and considering their mobilisation within these negotiations. The framing analysis is applied to the case of the ‘Net Filter’, a debate in the media that took place between 2008 and 2010 on the proposal by the then Australian government to introduce mandatory web filtering at the Internet Service Provider level. The paper argues that the powerful value-laden frames that emerged from both the proponents of and opposition to the Net Filter dominated the discussion and created an overarching narrative based on a good-evil dichotomy. This narrative monopolised the debate and passively excluded more complex responses to a complex and wide-ranging issue. Future responses to issues regarding the role of government in the new media landscape will be informed by past and ongoing deliberations among legislators and civil society. Consequently, an understanding of the role that discourse plays within these deliberations is paramount for developing an informed citizenry and effective policy to deal with the issues arising from digitisation and convergence.

Keywords: discourse, Internet, media regulation, Net Filter, policy

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As digitisation and convergence continue to shatter the ‘one-to-many’ model of traditional media, the current media regulatory paradigm has found itself in a state of flux as governments attempt to adapt existing legislation to the emergent environs of the new media landscape. Our success at developing a framework that can function effectively within this landscape is predicated upon public understanding and negotiations surrounding issues of policy that concern the regulation of the Internet. This paper examines how media discourse on Internet regulation in Australia affects the discursive potential for rational-critical debate in the context of this digital paradigm shift.

Of particular concern is the role played by discourse in meaning-making around specific policy issues. This paper argues that the role of discourse needs to be more explicitly recognised if we are
to pursue a goal of a discursive democracy based on rational-critical debate. The ‘Net Filter’
debate, which took place between 2008 and 2010 over the Australian Labor government’s efforts to
implement mandatory web filtering by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), will be used as a case
study for a framing analysis. This constitutes an empirical test of the presence of particular
ideologies in discourse as a result of rhetorical devices. This test is used to articulate an argument
and determine the breadth of discussion.

The paper begins with an exploration of the context in which the Net Filter debate took place.
This includes a consideration of the factors which led to this shift in the regulatory paradigm as
well as the three broad approaches to online regulation. The following section analyses the
selected texts and considers the ways that discourse constructs and reinforces the various frames
adopted by the media throughout the Net Filter debate. The paper concludes with a consideration
of the implications of this research for current and future technology debates.

As various digitisation projects are rolled-out by government and industry, a regulatory
framework is required which can adapt to the changing production, distribution, and consumption
of media. In order to design this framework, a multitude of stories as well as voices must be
present in the public sphere. There must, therefore, be recognition of the potential for particular
types of discourse to exclude other narratives and of the implications of this exclusion for
achieving a deliberative democracy.

1. Situating the Net Filter debate within a Shifting Media Paradigm

The debate surrounding ISP filtering in Australia is but one part of a broader contestation of the
role of government and regulation in a new media landscape. This contestation is at the focal point
of a clash between a desire to reconcile past and present approaches to the role of government in
the regulation of media with the actualities of modern usage of digitised media.

Most research suggests that the digitisation of information and the rapid uptake of new media
fundamentally challenge existing paradigms of communications regulation (Gillett, 1999;
Hitchens, 1997; Longstaff, 2000; Prosser, 1997). Digitisation has resulted in the ability to transmit
and store data in substantial sizes with little discernible loss of quality, while convergence has
streamlined access to this data by making more types of media available via a single medium—
digital technology. The new types of media consumption that emerge as a result of these two
factors have radically transformed the media environment.

In this environment, the relatively structured, central domination by a few sources has been
replaced by a model which promotes a general empowerment of the individual to gain the
information that they want, when they want, and in a multiplicity of formats, media, and
quantities. Naturally a regulatory mechanism based on the former model is incapable of dealing
with the environs that develop as a result of the latter.

In a convergent and digital world, content can be broadcast via several media. For example,
televisional content can be broadcast through TVs, delivered via the Internet, and to mobile phones.
While the content being delivered may well be the same, the rules dictating each medium are
different. Lumby and Crawford (2011) argue that, so far, the response from the Australian
government has been incremental and reactive, without a consideration of how to “fully
amalgamate broadcasting and telecommunications with an understanding of the ways the internet is changing the end user’s experience” (2011, 14).

It is in this complex, shifting regulatory landscape that the Australian Labor Party (ALP) revealed the main features of the Net Filter. Firstly, it would be mandatory for all users in Australia and secondly, it was intended to block all overseas-hosted material deemed Refused Classification (RC) by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA).

1.1. Three Broad Approaches

The Net Filter represents one approach to addressing the changing and highly dynamic regulatory environment that is the result of convergence and digitisation. This approach—one among three distinct camps—emerges from the notion that extending pre-existing policies and regulatory frameworks is sufficient for tackling the issues that have and continue to arise from this new paradigm. I term this approach the “If it ain’t broke...” approach for this reason. It emerges from the traditional role of the government as both an arbiter for communications as well as morals, defining what content is legally allowed to be broadcast.

Unsurprisingly, it is an approach typically favoured by governments, especially those with a propensity for state intervention and/or a socially conservative bent. It is for this reason that a policy for government regulation of the Internet has formed part of the Liberal National Party’s (LNP) platform as well. Indeed, it was the LNP who originally brought the Internet in line with other Australian mass-media by including it within the complex regulatory scheme in 1999. Peter Chen (2000) argues that this amendment, constituted by the *Broadcasting Services Amendment (Online Services) Act* 1999 was an example of “symbolic politics”—the desire of decision-makers to appear active on an issue when they are not (Edelman, 1971).

The second approach which I label “Hands off our Internet” does not see a major role for government regulation in the new media environment. Though there has always been top-down hierarchical regulation of the Internet exemplified by the DNS system and the activities of ICAAN, cyberlibertarianism can be considered the default ideology of cyberspace (Myszewski, 2003; Kamiya, 1997). Cyberlibertarianism is a collection of ideas that link enthusiasm for digitally mediated forms of communication with radical libertarian ideas about the proper definition of freedom, social life and politics (Winner, 1997, 1001).

The Electronic Frontiers Foundation (EFF) is the most visible cyberlibertarian organisation and it has played an active role in defending the Internet from perceived incursions from government. The Australian arm of the foundation—the EFA—has been an outspoken critic of the Net Filter and are ‘resolutely opposed’ to content regulation of any sort (EFA, 2011). The EFA partnered with the progressive advocacy group *GetUp!*, another outspoken critic of ISP filtering, to launch a publicity campaign in opposition to the proposed legislation.

The third approach, which received little coverage in the public discussion of the Net Filter and penetrated very little into civil society, encourages a complete reconsideration of the framework that underpins the new regulatory paradigm. Popular among academics (Hitchens, 1997; Gillett, 1999; Longstaff, 2000; Verhulst, 2002; Lessig, 2006; Solove, 2007; Lumby & Crawford, 2009; Lumby, 2011), this view acknowledges the need for some sort of regulation within the new media landscape, though urges a reconsideration of the current regulatory framework. Generally, this
approach proposes a unified regulatory framework, malleable enough to cater for the frequent changes in distribution and consumption that coincide with innovations in technology and production. The argument is that the current framework is too static and antiquated to address the issues that arise from a digitised, convergent, and networked society. Extending the current framework would only further complicate a system which is already characterised as a patchwork of different codes of conducts and legislation stretching across multiple state and federal jurisdictions. It is for this reason that proponents of this approach advocate a complete reconceptualisation of the regulatory framework.

Despite its popularity among academics, this view is drowned out by the proponents of the first two approaches, which tend to polarise the public sphere into competing frames which, while of significant import, do not allow space for other issues to be discussed, as these powerful frames appeal to the emotions and values of the public. This removes the capacity for views in the intermediary, such as this third approach, from being heard and considered.

The significance of the debate surrounding the Net Filter cannot be understated. As the latest major public discussion on the role of the Australian government in the regulation of the Internet it sets the precedent for future discussions surrounding this topic. With the roll-out of the National Broadband Network (NBN) come new debates regarding role of government in new media. Whilst the debate surrounding the NBN currently focuses on the developmental impact and economic potential of the project, as it moves from a network-in-construction to a network-in-use, discussion will quickly refocus on the new media spaces that the NBN will afford. With rapid speeds and more reliable and penetrating connectivity, the existing regulatory framework will become further out-dated and impotent to address the manifold issues that come about in the shift to a new media paradigm.

The discourses surrounding the Net Filter debate that are critiqued in the following section do not belong to a single, anomalous event. The issues and values that emerged in this debate will continue to pervade future discussions on convergence, digitisation, and regulation of media content, especially regarding the Internet.

1.2. Methodology

Robert Entman’s (1993) theory of framing provides the means to analyse the discourse of the ISP filtering debate. A framing analysis attempts to understand a discourse by identifying the key issues and values that have been embedded in a text by the means of various rhetorical devices. According to this theory, a frame has four main attributes—1) the definition of a problem; 2) identification of the agents responsible for the problem; 3) a recommended solution or treatment; and 4) a moral evaluation of the agent and how it is responsible for the problem. A frame can be constructed using a variety of rhetorical devices: metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, euphemism, dysphemism, and hyperbole (Gamson & Modigliani 1989).

George Lakoff (1980) posits that power comes from the persistent ability to control the language of key issues and highlights the centrality of the metaphor in establishing and maintaining this control. This bears some resemblance to Foucault’s (1972) theory of discourse as a medium by which power relations produce speaking subjects. A framing analysis based on a Foucauldian definition of discourse provides the most appropriate method for analysing the Net Filter debate.
as it allows one to empirically consider how language is affected by particular ideologies. I will adopt Habermas’s (2009) categorisation of speaking subjects into three categories: centre, functional system, and civil society. The centre comprises the heart of the political system—politicians and political parties. The functional system comprises lobbyists and interest groups, aimed at controlling public opinion and, to an extent, government policy. Civil society is made up of the uncategorised masses.

This categorisation of speakers within the debate allows us to track the effectiveness of a frame or rhetorical device, as we can measure how successful a frame is by its prevalence in the third category—civil society. This demonstrates how well a frame has filtered from the “frame creators” (politicians and lobbyists) to the “frame consumers” (the voting public and civil society who the frames are aimed at). The samples are drawn from a variety of media to give substantial voice to speakers from all three of Habermas’s angles and they represent a combination of both traditional and new media sources.

This study does not constitute an exhaustive enquiry into the broader public sphere, but, rather, a focused analysis of the dominant mainstream debate surrounding the Net Filter. As such, the sources are drawn from major print, digital and televisual outlets as well as prominent figures and organisations that discussed the proposed filter publicly and with a guise of primarily influencing public opinion as opposed to government opinion (See Appendix). Consequently, there are a number of sources that were excluded from the analysis. For example, submissions to the government enquiry into transparency and accountability with regards to the Net Filter, while valid sources that clearly fit within Habermas’s three-pronged model, are excluded from this analysis due to their very “unpublicness” and relative inaccessibility.

2. Framing Analysis of the Net Filter debate

The framing analysis that was conducted on the discourse surrounding those opposed to and the proponents of the Net Filter revealed two broad frames being used by each party. On both sides, one frame was more dominant than the other. The opponents relied on a major “tyranny frame” while also evoking the minor “technology frame”, while the proponents made extensive use of the “child protection frame” while the “not-so-bad frame” formed the secondary lens.

2.1. Opposition to the Net Filter

The most dominant frame adopted by the opponents of the Net Filter is labelled the “tyranny frame” as it casts the Internet as a positive tool of democracy and freedom; ISP filtering as a breach of human rights which destroys the liberties afforded by the Internet; and the government proposing the filter as a dictatorial regime with no accountability to those it governs. The primary rhetorical devices employed in this frame are metaphor, exemplars and the repetition of value-laden terms.

The most pervasive examples of metaphor are dysphemistic in nature (the practice of deliberately adopting a harsher or more offensive term instead of a neutral or polite term). Examples of dysphemistic metaphor by those opposing the Net Filter include the term ‘censorship’ (and derivations thereof) and ‘blacklist’, both of which appear in every source analysed. Conversely the Internet is portrayed positively as a democratising force through the use of
metaphor, described as ‘a democracy in its own right’ (Q&A, 2010) and a ‘global phenomenon across multiple cultures and beliefs’ (Various, 2009b).

Exemplars are examples from which lessons can be drawn and were used extensively to reinforce the tyranny frame. References to tyrannical regimes, existing (China, Iran, Burma), historical (Nazi Germany), and fictional (George Orwell’s 1984), strengthen the use of terms such as ‘censorship’ and ‘blacklist’ as they become associated with explicit and demonstrable forms of tyranny and human rights abuse.

The repetition of value-laden terms such as ‘freedom’ and other like-terms to characterise a society free from oppression are primarily used in contrast to the proposed Net Filter; indeed they are often portrayed as being at risk from filtering. On the other hand, the repetition of ‘secrecy’ characterises an unaccountable regime and clandestine “blacklist” and posits these in opposition to a free and open society.

While less frequently invoked than the tyranny frame, the technological efficacy of the filter constitutes another broad frame that manifests in opposition to the Net Filter. Though not a value frame in and of itself, particular values such as the importance of child safety were embedded in the technology frame in order to reinforce the technological flaws of the proposed policy. The frame is reinforced using catchphrases, dysphemism and hyperbole, as well as the repetition of value-laden terms.

Catchphrases such as ‘child protection’ (and derivations thereof) were used in order to highlight the extent to which the Net Filter would be unable to protect children. For example, the EFA’s (no date) fact sheet reads quite plainly ‘The filter will not protect children from inappropriate content’. Dysphemistic hyperbole was used in order take the potential repercussions of the filter to an extreme by suggesting that the Net Filter is tantamount to child abuse: ‘supporters of internet censorship filters are therefore directly supporting child abusers; in effect they are essentially child abusers themselves’ (Various, 2009b). Finally, the repetition of the term ‘parent’ was used to highlight that legal guardians are best placed to protect the children under their care rather than the government.

2.2. Proponents of the Net Filter

The ‘child protection frame’ appealed to the idea that the Internet both promotes child abuse through the availability of child abuse material, as well as contains material that is harmful to minors due to its explicit and offensive nature. It was reinforced by the use of repetition, catchphrases, and dysphemistic exemplars. The repetition of value-laden terms was used to emphasise the variety of offensive materials available on the Internet and to highlight those who are most at threat from these materials—namely minors. The references to these materials reinforce the notion that the Internet hosts content which runs counter to social conventions and norms of what is currently permissible by law. The repetition of ‘children’ emphasises the fact that it is this group most at risk and, as such, it is the responsibility of adults to minimise this. ISP filtering, it can be extrapolated, is a means by which this risk can be minimised.

The use of catchphrase to reinforce the child protection frame was the most prominent rhetorical device employed by the proponents of the Net Filter. The catchphrases ‘child abuse’, ‘child pornography’, ‘child protection’, and ‘cybersafety’ appear throughout the source material and are
used to emphasise the notion that the Internet is a potentially unsafe place for children as well as a medium by which material that exploits children is distributed.

The use of dysphemism alongside metaphor and exemplar was less prominent than other rhetorical devices, though these techniques effectively reinforce the child protection frame due to the significant impact of the statements. For example, a panellist on ABC TV’s Q&A claims that an absolute right to freedom of speech is compatible with the distribution of videos of Josef Fritzl’s crimes.

The ‘not-so-bad frame’ is so-named as it downplays the introduction of ISP filtering through euphemism and repetition, emphasising its similarity to the regulatory framework already in place. Euphemism is used to downplay the negative connotations of filtering. Where the opposition makes use of negative terms such as ‘ban’ and ‘censor’, the proponents use terms such as ‘block’ and ‘filter’ instead. These two terms are more positive than the former terms, carrying connotations of defence against a threat or attack and implying a purifying effect, cleansing undesirable contamination respectively. The repetition of the term ‘existing’ underlines the stance that no law is going to be changed and the side-effects on citizens will not be remarkable, let alone tyrannical.

3. The ‘Strict Father’: how frames can undermine deliberative democracy

Both the opposition and proponent frames enabled the first two approaches to online regulation outlined in an earlier section of this paper to emerge in public discourse and, more importantly, combined to form a single cohesive narrative that worked to exclude other frames and limit the influence of other approaches. For those opposed to the Net filter, the frames correspond to the second position named—“Hands off our Internet.” This approach is articulated through value-judgements about three principal objects of the debate—the Internet is characterised as a beacon of freedom and a tool for democracy; the Net Filter as a malignant force running counter to democracy. Lastly, the actor responsible for the policy, the Australian government, is regarded as despotic and tyrannical.

On the other side of the debate, the proponents of the Net Filter deploy frames that reinforce a more traditional stance on media regulation, outlined previously as the “If it ain’t broke...” approach. This approach identifies the Internet as transgressing social mores and the existing regulatory framework. The Net Filter and government are regarded as means by which to re-establish the order of this existing framework.

In both cases, a good-evil dichotomy is established, the opponent and proponent frames coming together to create a single, unified story of the role and nature of Internet regulation in society. George Lakoff (2002) articulates this good-evil dichotomy using a model for moral metaphor—the “strict father”, who conceives of the world as inherently full of evil and his children as in a constant state of temptation. It is the role of the authoritarian father to either beat-back this evil, or encourage self-discipline in his children.

This scenario emerges in both proponent and opposition frames, with the opponents using the tyranny frame to portray the Net Filter and the government responsible for it, as “evil”, and the
Internet as an inherently “good” technology. The government is to be feared and the Internet protected. On the other side, but in a similar vein, the proponents of the Net Filter cast the Internet as full of evils, from which children must at all costs be protected.

The rhetorical techniques used by the opposition that were considered in the previous section characterise the online environment as exceptional and beyond the jurisdiction of government. This positive characterisation reinforces the attacks on government which, in turn, form the basis of the tyranny frame.

The contrasting depictions of the Internet and the Australian government are prime examples of this good and evil dichotomy. Terms such as ‘blacklist’, associated most frequently with the House Un-American Activities Commission which created a blacklist of communist sympathisers in Hollywood, framed the Net Filter as a sinister problem, judged negatively those responsible for it, and associates it with violations of the principle of freedom of speech.

This moral evaluation is highlighted by the use of exemplars which associate the ISP filtering scheme with totalitarian regimes. It is important to note that the principal exemplars—China, Nazi Germany, and the ‘Big Brother’ government of 1984—are known for human rights violations that go well beyond the right to freedom of speech. For example, the attempted extermination of the Jewish people is intrinsically tied to the allusion to Nazi Germany. By linking ISP filtering with attempted genocide, the narrative makes overt claims about the morality of the participants involved—namely that they are evil.

After such explicit rhetorical devices are used to frame the position against the Net Filter, the repetition of terms such as ‘secrecy’, ‘mandatory’, and appeals to ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’, and ‘democracy’ fall into place in order to further reinforce the good-evil dichotomy. This repetition threads the tyranny frame throughout the discourse on the Net Filter, a constant reminder of the oppressive nature of both the proposed Net Filter and the government responsible for it.

The good-evil dichotomy is just as prevalent in the proponents’ frame for the Net Filter, with the Internet cast as a shelter for “evil” content such as child-abuse materials and the Net Filter identified as a social “good” that will protect children. When spokespeople for the government list the most offensive and colourful material that is considered RC, they are emphasising the notion of the Internet as a host to content which runs counter to what is socially accepted to the point that the Internet itself is “evil”. In this context, the Net Filter is offered as a remedy, and a public “good”. This in turn reinforces the idea that the traditional framework is a sufficient and just response to the current need for regulation.

The Internet as “evil” is foregrounded when Clive Hamilton details the hypothetical example of a child who accidentally stumbles across a picture of a ‘woman defecating into another’s mouth’ and ‘a woman and a horse’ among other things (Hamilton, 2009). The profanity of the material is second only to the innocence of the child—a goodness that it is the moral duty of society to uphold. Similarly, the use of catchphrases ‘child-abuse’, ‘child-pornography’, and ‘child protection’ highlights the goodness of the child and the goodness of a regulatory scheme which sets out to protect innocence and childhood itself.

The problem with the good-evil dichotomy, “strict-father” model, is that it is exclusionary in nature. At its base, the strict-father model rejects and excludes any discourse emerging from an alternate worldview as toxic and alien. Lakoff argues that this rejection of an alternate worldview
stems from the belief that people who have different moral values are ‘enemies to be demonized’ (2002, 127). When pitted against frames that adopt recognisable metaphors such as Nazi Germany and paedophilia as symbols for the enemy, the third approach (The Absentees), lacking the mobilising metaphors, tends to be drowned out. This is reflected in the relative absence of discourse emerging from this third approach from the mainstream Net Filter debate, as this narrative is found almost exclusively within academic texts.

3.1. Corridor of Mirrors

While the principal frames of each side—“tyranny” and “child protection”—are in essence a single story of good and evil, there are minor frames adopted by each side that do not simply align with this narrative. In both cases, far from breaking down or challenging the model of the strict father, both the “technology” and “not-so-bad” frames are essentially responses to the primary frames in play. That is to say, the minor frame of one side attempts to address the concerns that are raised by the major frame of the other. I term this phenomenon, The Corridor of Mirrors effect, as the terms of debate bounce of each side in the same way a beam of light bounces through a corridor of mirrors (Figure 1.0).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Major Frame</th>
<th>Minor Frame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tyranny</td>
<td>Technology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Safety</td>
<td>Not-so-bad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1.0—The Corridor of Mirrors Effect**

The technology frame, operating primarily through a child-safety frame, can be seen as a response to the child-protection frame of the proponents. The narrative that emerges from the technology frame is that the Net Filter will not protect children, in fact it has the potential to exacerbate any threat that they would currently face. Examples of this are as plain as the EFA’s statement that ‘The filter will not protect children from inappropriate content’ (EFA, n.d.) but stretch to the hyperbolic accusation that ‘supporters of internet censorship filters are…essentially child abusers themselves’ (Various, 2009b).

Faced with the prospect of appearing or being cast as ambivalent towards the wellbeing of children, the opposition adopted their own child safety frame in order to ensure that the proponents did not have a monopoly over this type of discourse. In this way, the child protection frame adopted by the proponents of the Filter is negated and potentially reversed, leaving more space for the opposition’s primary frame— that of tyranny—to dominate the public discussion.

The not-so-bad frame, adopted by the proponents of ISP filtering, can be regarded as an attempt to address and, to an extent, mitigate the primary frame of the opposition—the tyranny frame. The frame stresses the notion that the Net Filter is part of an “existing” regulatory framework and does not represent an expansion of government powers. A well as the aforementioned repetition of
‘existing’, the repetition of euphemistic terms ‘block’ and ‘filter’ are substituted for the more abrasive opposition terms ‘censor’ and ‘ban’. The not-so-bad frame represents the clearest articulation of an approach to regulation in the new media environment. By stressing the fact that the Net Filter is simply an extension of the existing regulatory framework, the frame reinforces the perception that the existing regulatory framework is the most desirable mechanism for addressing the issues that arise as a result of digitisation and convergence.

The implication of this effect is that the discourse never escapes the Corridor of Mirrors. It is the product of the two major frames—tyranny and child safety. As the debate became condensed into, essentially, an argument between child-protection and freedom of speech, a binary develops and discourse becomes stuck or boxed-in, bouncing between frames. Discourses which do not command as much power as the frames operating within the binary are excluded from the debate.

3.2. Sticky frames: the movement of meaning in the public sphere

Of all the frames that were considered, which ones passed most easily from the centre and functional systems to civil society? Painfully obvious is the fact that the third approach to content regulation does not appear in any significant form outside academic literature. So what did occupy the attentions of civil society? To put it bluntly, it is the tyranny frame. The appearance of rhetorical devices associated with this frame among civil society outstripped even the functional system. The reason for this is the power imbued within the frame of tyranny.

As a frame is constructed by the speakers with the largest soapboxes—politicians and lobbyists—its success at mobilising civil society can be measured by the rate at which it is adopted by the wider public. Testament to the penetration of the tyranny frame is the fact that rhetorical devices that reinforce it are adopted by proponents for the filter. When official government sources, the DBCDE and Stephen Conroy, adopt the term ‘blacklist’ as many times as the centre and functional systems of the opposition combined, or Clive Hamilton attempts to articulate the merits of ‘censorship’, they consolidate the tyranny frame. This has implications for meaning-making as the public’s consideration of the topic is predicated upon the value-laden terms that have become imbedded in the debate.

The frames that dominate the public sphere surrounding the Net Filter controversy are supremely successful in mobilising support and excluding divergent voices. The use of the strict-father model enables overt claims to be made about the Internet, the Net Filter and the government. This narrative reinforced the first two approaches to media regulation at the expense of the third approach which was unable to command the value-laden narrative that so effectively rallies civil society and dictates the character and terms of debate.

4. Recommendations and Conclusion

The narrative that dominated and controlled the discourse surrounding the Net Filter worked to exclude alternate narratives that would otherwise have contributed to a more robust and diverse debate and public understanding of a complicated subject—the effective regulation of a highly dynamic media landscape that is in a period of significant flux. It’s important that we understand that this case study doesn’t simply represent a single anomalous event, but rather stands as a
potential precedent for future negotiations surrounding policy initiatives that concern the regulation of the Internet.

A recent development at a federal level regarding the shifting media landscape ought to be discussed. A review into the National Classification Scheme was conducted by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the final report was released in February of 2012 (ALRC, 2012). It is promising that the review encouraged the submission by any one of a plethora of ideas and approaches to regulation in the new media landscape. Furthermore, while the tyranny and child-safety frames that dominated the debate surrounding the Net Filter are present, they do not dominate the discussion or exclude other approaches. However, in the months that have proceeded the release of the report, the coverage of the story in the mainstream media has been underwhelming.

A possible reason for the lack of uptake by popular news outlets is this deficit of conflict and controversy as well as the density of the report. At over 400 pages, it is inaccessible for the general public. This is not just a problem with the press being either unwilling or unable to cover the story; it is widely understood that news outlets have a responsibility to shareholders and their bottom-line. It is an ailment that afflicts the research and academic industries more broadly: the means by which researchers communicate their theses are not appropriate to be consumed by the public and, what’s more, journalists and newspaper editors are unwilling to transform these theses into a more palatable form.

If the goal is to pursue a deliberative democracy based on rational-critical debate, then it is the responsibility of researchers and academics to communicate their ideas to a broader church. If not, then populist narratives, such as those that pervaded the Net Filter debate, will be inherited in future discussions among civil society and a robust public sphere will remain out of reach.

Appendix: Sources of Framing Analysis

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Youth engagement and ICTs in Southeast Asia

Reflections on emerging trends

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Southeast Asia is a region of rapid economic growth and social modernization along with profound cultural differences and historical conflicts. The complexity of youth engagement in a ICTs (information and communication technologies)-saturated era thus becomes a challenging inquiry. This reflection paper defines ICTs as mainly the Internet and mobile phones and is based on research conducted in three Southeast Asian countries. Recent data (Internet World Stats, 2011) show that the Internet penetration rates range from 29% (the Philippines), to 62% (Malaysia), to 77% (Singapore). In addition to ICTs, both the economic and the political development processes are uneven in the region. Any sweeping region-wide generalization is unlikely to be fully accurate. However, the imperatives for growth are salient enough to generate a reasonable assumption about the normality of the region, which is the theme of development. It is time, therefore, to summarize as far as possible the shared patterns and to reflect on their implications for political development in this region.

1. Media

One common finding across the three countries is the prominent role that ICTs play to be alternative channels, for both acquiring and disseminating information. Young people have become increasingly dependent on ICT-based information sources for alternative facts and opinions. Such information contributes to their understanding of the status quo as well as motivates them to explore alternative solutions to the problems facing their community. Due to the lack of access to mass channels they have to fully, sometimes exclusively, utilize new media as means to reach other citizens. This reliance on ICT-mediated channels has significantly challenged the power of traditional mass media to different extents in different countries. The bigger challenges are seen in countries that have heavier authoritarian rule, including a tighter control of the mass media system. In countries where mass media are relatively free and open, new media function as additional channels rather than replacing the traditional mass media.
Singapore and Malaysia are two neighboring countries that share a similar political system named authoritarian democracy (Zhang, 2012). Both hold regular elections to decide who constitutes of the legislative body and the presidency. However, both have an actual single-party system in which the opposition parties have never overturned the domination of the ruling party. The mass media systems in the two countries are under close control of the governments. The absence of alternative discourses in mass media forced interested youth to look for them through other channels. Meanwhile, the denial of access to mass media forced oppositional forces to reach and foster their social support via new media platforms. The former is evident among Singaporean young activists, who rely on the Internet to find and distribute information regarding various social issues, other than those promoted by the government (e.g., charity). The latter has been found in the Malaysian blogosphere, from which have emerged a few blogger-mps. The traditional mass media, such as newspapers and TV news programs, have lost their status as the only credible source of information. Online sources such as blogs, although recognized as lack of high credibility, do open up a discursive space for alternative opinions, if not facts, to circulate. The mass media also ceased to be the only means to reach the massive number of general public. Bloggers who attracted thousands of followers in the cyberspace have successfully turned this support into actual votes in Malaysia. The decline of mass media in such authoritarian democracies should be seen as a youth response to the tightly-controlled public sphere more than a consequence of technological replacement.

Whereas political engagement seemed to be recently re-ignited by the alternative discourses made available through ICT-based channels in authoritarian democracies, countries such as the Philippines witnessed a rich history of youth activism, even before ICTs became widespread. The role of alternative information channel ICTs played is slightly different here. Instead of bypassing mass media, young activists in the Philippines employed a technique called “blasting” to send (or spam) messages to as many people as possible through numerous online platforms. When the message caught a sizeable online public attention, it could be picked up by large traditional media outfits. Blasting is considered successfully when mass media cover it. This example shows that new media add into the toolbox another efficient technique to influence through mass media. In other cases, new media complement mass media in reporting breaking news and providing interactive functions. As popular as new media are among the youth, the decline of mass media could only be claimed with regards to certain technological affordances (e.g., immediacy and interactivity). The status of mass media in the power structure is not declining any time soon in the Philippines.

2. Parties

Despite the prominent position parties continued to hold in the three countries examined here, youth has shown relatively weak partisanship in comparison to their older generations. In countries (e.g., Malaysia and Singapore) where one single party defines itself as an overarching representation of diverse interests, the concept of partisanship itself appears to be debatable. When voters choose to support a single ruling party over long term, it is less of party identification and affiliation than recognition of the government’s track record. The majority votes Malaysian and Singaporean governments have enjoyed suggest that most citizens either are unaware of opposition parties’ offers due to the silencing from mass media or do not find alternative options more attractive than the current cabinet in providing what they need. For the minority who voted
against the ruling party, their choice is often not based on the traditional connotation of partisanship, which is supposed to build upon social cleavages and ideological differences.

In contrast, the opposition parties found in single-party-dominant countries relied on other sources to identify themselves. In Singapore, for instance, the diversion mainly lies in the oppositions’ insistence on differentiating the local vs. foreign residents, under a vague claim of promoting social welfare for Singaporeans. In addition, many oppositions seem to oppose for the sake of opposing, in other words, they differentiate themselves through running against whatever is supported by the incumbent. In such situations, ICTs do help the oppositions to get their messages out and harness support from youth who were born into an ICT-saturated environment. The relatively stronger support to the oppositions among younger voters has been seen in both countries (Zhang & Lim, 2012). Younger people voted for opposition parties not for the reason of personal identification with the party per se but for striking a stance that they are libertarian and not afraid of authorities.

For young activists who are interested in making social changes, joining parties does not seem to be an efficient option either. The opposition parties in these countries are often too weak to convey their appeals. The ruling party, because of its ubiquitous presence, almost equates itself to the government. Young activists can lobby the different agencies of the government, without the necessity to become party members. The introduction of ICTs into eGovernment systems further opens up the channels to young activists to engage the government directly. In short, although ICTs and the coming-of-age of young voters did shift the balance of party politics towards the opposition, the change is hardly justified as a consequence of accumulated sense of partisanship.

3. Community

While innovations in hardware for ICTs brought rapid diffusion, significantly diminishing the access divide, it was innovations in software and applications that fueled community-building through ICTs. Networked societies (Castells, 2006) as they have been called, burgeoned online in various forms and for various purposes, civic and political organization and mobilization being among them. Young people who grew up in the digital age moved through these networks with ease, joined and sustained online communities. These communities developed in an almost organic way and, as in nature, there are strongly built sustainable communities that are driven by purpose and held together well, and there are weak communities that eventually disintegrate from an inability to thrive and keep people’s interest.

This “return to community” signals a break away from state-dominated development and participation, as can be seen for instance in the Philippines. The youth are obliged to participate in community or social service where volunteer work is mandated and organized by government. However, with the expansion of mobile phone ownership, they are increasingly able to organize among themselves to solve problems in their own neighborhoods, making up for the ineffectiveness of government. In other countries such as Singapore, activists are able to reach a larger number of people and otherwise uninterested youth who find themselves contacted by activists online for petition signing or donating to causes end up cooperating, albeit in a limited online-only way. In this way even admittedly apathetic youth participate in political life as they become increasingly easy to reach through mobile phones and the Internet.

There is trepidation about the effectiveness of using ICTs for activist work both among activists and among the ordinary youth in almost all countries, but there is evidence that this is waning in
the face of wider access and use. In Singapore ordinary youth feel bombarded; there is a sense of information overload, making it easier to tune out of the barrage of causes and issues that are seeking their attention. This creates a more challenging environment for activists and they need to evolve better strategies for attracting the right kind of participation among the young.

Young people in the digital age have the tools to expand and maintain their social contacts in an efficient manner. This is a generation whose social capital exists in visible networks whereby “friends of friends of friends” who have never physically met can have close, exclusively online interactions. Since young people are now used to having contacts or friends whom they know only through the internet, they are more trusting and are able to work with members of these networks whom they have never physically met. This in turn enables productivity within these online communities in the realms of civic and political engagement. It has become second-nature for them to move through these networks, building, expanding, and coordinating to make them more productive for purposes like activism.

Trust in the technology together with trust in one’s online community, has allowed for greater freedom to express political opinions within their social network in countries where expressions were historically heavily policed. Expressions within networks feel “public” and yet offer the safety of being “private” in the sense that it is seen only by people within their social circles. Online communities provide a space for dissent where organized social networks offer support for opinions expressed to largely like-minded individuals. Malaysia presents an excellent example, where youth leaders have adapted to new media resources, using them to reach out and communicate with others. These tools include Twitter accounts and Facebook groups which exist for them as alternative spaces where they can articulate their opinions and demands. The government continues to try to exercise control over such spaces, and in a perfect display of online social network effectiveness for policy intervention, the state retracted a proposal in 2011 to expand the existing law controlling printing presses to include the Internet in response to public criticism expressed largely on blogs.

Online communities can include politically and socially-influential people who otherwise would have no direct communication connection with the young. Creating direct virtual relationships with political leaders make online interactions of individual constituents more impactful. In the Philippines for instance, young activists include Congressmen, Senators, Governors or Councilors in their FB or Twitter networks. Through these connections they disseminate information, communicate opinions, and even plea for assistance. Several activists recount instances when these connections have been fruitful in producing change. In some ways, government becomes part of young activists’ communities, in a more direct way than ever before and with very little, if any, ‘control’ in the part of government.

4. Issues

The young in many of the countries covered by this study have largely turned to issue-based politics and away from party-based politics as discussed earlier in this article. There are issues that the youth gravitate towards, such as environmental and climate change issues, that appear to cut across all countries. On the other hand, there are also unique local issues that enjoy support from the young in a specific country. What virtual communities and new ICT-based mechanisms for involvement have allowed is an expansion of the population of young people that can be attracted to engage with political and social issues. Young, connected people are increasingly exposed to
issues that their peers care about through social network sites and so they are more likely to find a cause that they are interested in.

Through ICTs, political expression can be less public and more community-based, making it a safer space for discussion of “high-risk” topics. In Malaysia and Singapore for instance, there is a reticence for public expressions of politics, but in social networking sites these types of expressions are less transparent to government institutions and are thus insulated from efforts to censor. People find spaces to discuss issues like sexuality, women’s rights, and race relations - typically considered taboo - in public forums. This experience is markedly different for those in the Philippines where free public expression is protected. Political expressions are rife and considered fruitful, whether through ICTs or traditional means. For such countries with a rich history of citizen action by the young, ICTs provide a more efficient way of reaching others in advocacy efforts. The act of public expression per se is not particularly novel, but being able to do it quickly and find niche or wide audiences for their expressions through ICT tools is.

Activist youth who are disillusioned with politics in their own country, a common occurrence since countries like the Philippines are rife with corruption, can channel their energies toward regional or global issues. This is clearly evident in issues such as conservation and climate change which have inspired the young generations to action through online means. Environmental issues were mentioned in practically all the countries in this report. Issue politics has become a refuge from party politics. In Malaysia bloggers who are interested in publicizing their domestic political issues make communicative actions online primarily to engage an international audience, to bring information to the outside world, information that will not be filtered and sanitized by the State.

In addition to global issues, some online activists have also found ways of being involved in issues in other countries. In Singapore, for instance, young activists try to steer clear of domestic politics, becoming engaged in issues such as the Free Burma campaign. National political problems in other countries reach the attention of the young more easily with ICTs through a combination of Internet-based news sources and sharing through social networks. The latter in particular, brings issues to the attention of those who would not normally encounter news items, much less international news items.

Issue-based involvement has also signaled that the young in many of these countries have turned away from mechanisms of engagement provided for by the State. In the Philippines for instance, the formal manner of youth involvement in politics, the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK), does not appear to be as active in politics as more ad hoc kinds of youth activism online. The young can rally around specific local issues and accomplish change while completely bypassing the SK. Online activism also allows for transient political involvement and engagement in very specific political or social problems. In a recent example of this the owners of a shopping mall had to postpone the construction of a high-rise parking lot largely because of public online outcry against the cutting of 180 old trees in the area. This was most notable among the young who organized “occupy” movements in the mall through mobilization efforts conducted through ICTs. Similar experiences are recounted in the chapter on Bangladesh, where the young supported specific issues like anti eve-teasing and road safety.

Issues come to the attention of the young even without coverage from the traditional press. For instance there are experiences recounted by activists in the Philippines where bills proposed in Congress were disseminated through online sites, picked up by young people and supported or opposed through Facebook and Twitter. These are policies that received no media attention until
they became big stories on the Internet. Individuals can upload or release information and stories they are passionate about regardless of whether the traditional media will find it interesting. If enough young people care and become involved through ICTs, the attention of the press is inevitable and the possibility for policy action is heightened.

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Singapore’s Regulation of Cybercrime

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Abstract: Singapore is ranked as one of the most wired and cyber-ready nations in the world; it is internationally ranked the fourth highest in cybercrime victimization rate, and this is expected to increase. As such, there is great significance in exploring Singapore’s glocalized approach towards regulation of Internet behaviors. To this end, this paper, by adopting Lessig’s four modalities of constraint, seeks to examine Singapore’s regulation of cybercrimes.

Keywords: Cybercrime, Regulation, Law, Social Norms, Technology, Cyberwellness Education

The usage of the Internet has proliferated and affected the lives of many people (Keyser, 2003), especially so in Singapore, which boasts a high Internet penetration rate, with 160.2% of its population having broadband access (Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore [IDA], 2012). With a mobile penetration rate of 151.4% (IDA, 2012), and access to wireless, location based, cloud computing and always-on technologies, the usage of Internet-connected devices is pervasive in daily life. However, Singapore also has one of the highest cybercrime rates in the world, which is expected to increase significantly (Ministry of Home Affairs [MHA], 2010). Latest figures show that 80% of Internet users in Singapore have experienced cybercrime, the fourth highest rate in the world (Symantec Corporation, 2011). In addition, with INTERPOL stepping up its efforts in regulating the global Internet by establishing its Global Complex in Singapore, it would be pertinent to explore Singapore’s commitment and contribution to the regulation of the global Internet locally. Adopting Lessig’s four modalities of constraint, this paper will discuss Singapore’s approach to Internet regulation. It will begin by exploring common cybercrimes and harms, both global and local, and highlight certain trends and characteristics relevant to the regulation of the Internet. It concludes by discussing Singapore’s Internet regulatory approaches, in terms of preventing its citizens from being either victims or perpetrators of cybercrimes and to consider future challenges.

1. Trends of Common Cybercrimes and Harms

Cybercrime is defined as “any violations of criminal law that involve a knowledge of computer technology for their perpetration, investigation, or prosecution” (Keyser, 2003, p. 290). Virus/malware attacks, phishing and online scams are the three most common cybercrimes globally (Symantec Corporation, 2011). In Singapore’s case, hacking, fraud, intellectual property (IP) theft, spamming, identity theft and harassment are common cybercrimes (Jin-Cheon, Hao, Yong, Hao, & Kandan, 2009). As such, this study will explore the characteristics of both victims
and perpetrators of these common cybercrimes. This paper will limit its scope to crimes that affect individual users, as opposed to crimes on a larger, nationwide scale such as cyber-terrorist attacks on national infrastructure, or organized hacking attacks. The following section highlights the common global and local cybercrimes.

1.1. High Involvement Rate of Youths

Youths are common victims of online harassment (Kirwan & Power, 2012), such as cyberbullying which typically occurs in schools and is extremely prevalent in Singapore (Gwee, 2008). They are also especially susceptible to virus and malware attacks, as they consume and share contaminated music and video content frequently (Yar, 2006). Their consumption patterns also make them the largest group of IP violators (Kirwan & Power, 2012). As such, youths are increasingly not just the victims of crimes and harms, but perpetrators as well. This trend does not affect just a minority of youths, especially for burgeoning harassment behaviors1 (Kirwan & Power, 2012; Lenhart, 2009; Tham & Toh, 2012). The creation and transmission of viruses or Trojan horses and illegal hacking are also frequently committed by young people (Kirwan & Power, 2012; Urbas, 2008).

1.2. Misguided Rationalizations

Virus and malware creators have been known to be motivated by “a curiosity about computer systems” (Kirwan & Power, 2012; Power, 2000, p. 11). This curiosity tends to desensitize the perpetrators to the moral dimensions and consequences of their activities, eventually escalating to committing a crime. Some perpetrators are known to exhibit Differential Association Syndrome, which involves rationalizing that their harmful activity is not much different from what others (peers or associates) are already engaging in (Power, 2000). Others exhibit the Higher Ethic Motive, which describes them having to choose between two conflicting ethics. For example, an accountant chose to embezzle company funds instead of allowing his mafia-linked bosses to profit from their ill-gotten gains. From this perspective, “overall, the cyber-criminal perceives himself as a problem solver rather than as a criminal” (Power, 2000, p. 15). With regard to Internet harassment activities, which have been very rampant in Singapore lately (Chen, 2010; Hou, 2010; Lim, 2012), many young people seem to be ignorant or heedless of the magnitude and consequences of their actions. In Singapore, many have taken to online exposure and shaming of culprits to discourage negative or racist comments in cyberspace (Wong, 2012). However, some vigilantes have taken this approach to extremes, with adverse consequences such as a case of a falsely accused person’s personal details being published online. It is no surprise that Singapore is second only to the United States in the number of cyberbullying cases per capita (Gwee, 2008). IP violators often perceive that copying music, video or software files is not theft as traditionally defined, as one is not denying anybody else of its use (Kirwan & Power, 2012; Yar, 2006). “As with most types of crimes, there is no single motive” (Kirwan & Power, 2012, p. 79) that accounts for all these behaviors. However, many of these behaviors observed stem from misjudgment of the consequences or inappropriate rationalization, such that perpetrators do not see their behavior as harmful or criminal.

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1 Cyberbullying, cyberstalking, cyberbaiting and sexting.
1.3. Lack of Astuteness

Perpetrators of cybercrimes involving fraud typically prey on victims’ ignorance and gullibility. Parker (1998) lists the perpetrators’ techniques as follows: baiting, name-dropping, bulletin-board reading, reading initial logon screens, mixing fact and fiction, exaggerating and lying, asserting authority, intimidating, threatening, and shocking, scaring, browbeating, belittling, aggravating, and exhausting, praising, sympathizing, flattering, aggrandizing, persistently calling false alarms, engaging in conspiracy, displaying artifacts, enticing and sexually attracting, eliciting loyalty, and intelligence gathering. A recent survey on Internet fraud identified human behavior as the key weakness in Singapore’s Internet security framework; that is, victims lack understanding on how such scams exploit their psychological weaknesses and ignorance (KPMG, 2011). As such, the success of fraudulent online activities, typically carried out via social engineering tactics, is arguably dependent on potential victims’ astuteness and level of Internet savvy.

The following section considers how these cybercrime trends can be abated.

2. Four Modalities of Constraints

Lessig (2006) claims that Internet behaviors in general can be regulated by four constraints — “the law, social norms, the market, and architecture” (p. 123). The law stipulates the behaviors which can be carried out to avoid legal punishment. Societal norms “constrain through the stigma that community imposes” (Lessig, 2006, p. 124). Typically, a high financial cost would constrain users’ behavior; these costs are called market forces. The affordability of technology, called the architecture, also limits users’ actions in cyberspace. This is sometimes referred to as the design of technology or the infrastructure. “Each constraint imposes a different kind of cost on the [user] for engaging in [a] behavior” (Lessig, 2006, p. 123). The constraints are interdependent, supporting or opposing one another, yet they are distinct. Arguably, these constraints can be perceived as tools that the government uses to manipulate cyberspace behaviors. The following section discusses the challenges associated with the constraints and also comments on Singapore’s regulatory approaches to Internet behaviors using this framework.

2.1. The Law

Globally, the law faces huge challenges in regulating the Internet. Firstly, only 10% of cybercrimes are reported, and less than 2% of reported cases resulted in successful prosecution (Jewkes, 2003; Symantec Corporation, 2011). Secondly, due to the difficulties of cross-border enforcement, it is easy for perpetrators to evade national or international Internet laws. This is further complicated by differing moral values and laws, and varied enforcement responses in different countries (Phair, 2007). As such, the law is limited in its effectiveness, and at times seen as the worst constraint (Grbosky, Smith, & Dempsey, 2001). Yet Singapore actively supports international agendas in combating cybercrime (Singapore Customs, n.d.; WIPO, n.d.). This gesture may encourage other nations, especially the developing ones in the Asia-Pacific region, to align with international legal and enforcement efforts, thereby extending the reach of international Internet laws, helps to prevent victimization of Internet users. Furthermore, Singapore’s efforts to minimize

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2 Wassenaar Arrangement and The World Intellectual Property Organization.
local perpetration of cybercrimes has seen it enacting and amending several laws\(^3\) to accommodate newer forms of cybercrime, extend its territorial jurisdiction and align with international interests (Attorney-General’s Chambers, 2010; Brenner & Koops, 2004; Leong & Wai, 2005; Urbas, 2008). Singapore has also been proficient in its use of existing legislations\(^4\) for prosecution of cybercrime (Urbas, 2008).

In summary, Singapore has been consistently updating its laws to keep pace with the changing times. It has been touted as one of the countries with the “toughest and most detailed cybercrime laws” (Putnam & Elliott, 2001, p. 51), with local perpetrators being punished “appropriately” (Urbas, 2008, p. 21). Given the limitations of jurisdiction and enforcement of the law, Singapore has nevertheless used the law well as a tool in the regulation of Internet behaviors.

### 2.2. The Architecture

While Lessig claims that technology is the “predominant regulatory institution for cyberspace” (Grabosky et al., 2001, p. 7), some have argued that cyberspace’s architecture created the potential for more criminal activities to occur (Jewkes, 2003). For example, system-based methods for payment of creative materials, intended as the solution to piracy, were quickly circumvented by the emergence of peer-to-peer file sharing services (Jewkes, 2003). As such, the architecture of cyberspace, though affording a technical solution to the prevention and monitoring of cybercrime, as well as enforcement of related legislation, is frequently circumvented.

The IDA actively consults and collaborates with the private and public sectors and has invested more than S$70 million in the Infocomm Security Masterplan (MP2), which seeks to use investigative and protective technologies to fight cyber threats (IDA, 2008). In its efforts to enhance security for individual consumers, IDA has mandated a 2-Factor-Authentication process for banking transactions (Leong & Wai, 2005). These technological advancements are meant only to deter computer-attacking behaviors such as malware, viruses and hacking, and does little to minimize social engineering based or harassment-type behaviors (IDA, 2010). The absence of technological attacks suggests that Singapore has successfully made use of architecture as a constraint.

### 2.3. The Markets

Online copies of movies and music are significantly lower in cost compared to their physical counterparts, and also when compared to retail prices in the past (Kirwan & Power, 2012). Yet statistics show that close to one billion people commit online piracy every year, with the creative industry (which produces music, movies and software) losing billions of dollars as a result (Symantec Corporation, 2011; Yar, 2006). Efforts by the IP industry to stem the tide of online piracy, by introducing Digital Rights Management (DRM), does little to prevent mass infringement of copyright laws. As such, the impact of market forces is arguably limited. Yet Singapore has success in this regard. The Business Software Alliance in Singapore encourages whistle-blowers, via a reward of S$20,000, to expose piracy activities. This has led to falling software piracy rates over the years (Tham, 2012).

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\(^3\) The Electronic Transactions Act, Evidence Act, Spam Control Act and Computer Misuse Act.

\(^4\) The Penal Code, Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act.
2.4. Social Norms

A social norm “governs socially salient behavior, deviation from which makes [one] socially abnormal” (Lessig, 2006, p. 340). Social norms in cyberspace have recently surfaced as a very powerful force in regulating behaviors. The recent Stop Online Piracy Act episode where online activists and other influential parties, such as Google and Wikipedia, successfully rallied against the passing of a stringent anti-piracy law arguably demonstrates the power of social norms over the law (Fight for the Future, n.d.). In Singapore, cases of online shaming have been shown to influence Internet users’ behavior. This indicates the power of social norms as a mode of constraint (Hou, 2010; Jin-Cheon et al., 2009; Wong, 2012).

Aside from being a powerful constraint, cybercrime trends suggest that it is the most relevant mode of regulating cyberspace behavior. Firstly, the effects of the architecture, when applied to technologically cognizant youths, are limited. In addition, most youths lack the financial means to mount a legal defense or pay fines, making it impractical to prosecute them (Phair, 2007). Secondly, as “education is, in part at least, a process through which we indoctrinate [users] into certain norms of behavior” (Lessig, 2006, p. 129), an emphasis on cultivating a sense of what is right and wrong – ie. values education – may eventually lead to less harmful behavior. Thirdly, as many victims fall prey to social engineering techniques, educating them and raising awareness of the persuasive techniques adopted by perpetrators is only pertinent. Notwithstanding Lessig’s other regulatory forces, this paper proposes that educating users, especially youths, is the most appropriate strategy.

There have been extensive and ongoing efforts to educate youths on the dangers of cyberspace and ways to avoid victimization (Livingstone & Haddon, 2009; Media Development Authority of Singapore [MDA], 2007, 2010; National Crime Prevention Council, 2012). Yet nearly half feel that they are not getting enough (Symantec Corporation, 2011). However, efforts in preventing the perpetration of cybercrime through education are lacking. In this regard, however, Singapore has done relatively well, with the introduction of cyberwellness education, which holistically includes awareness and values education for cyberspace life. The MDA lists four core values necessary for cyberwellness – “Balanced Lifestyle, Embracing the Net and Inspiring Others, Astuteness, Respect & Responsibility” (MDA, 2007, p. 1). These values are part of the nation’s education curriculum. Hence it can be seen that Singapore has ventured beyond Internet safety education into a more holistic cyberwellness education approach. The focus now is not just on protection from cyberspace harms, but also on encouraging positive, respectful and responsible use of the Internet.

3. Conclusion and Future Challenges

Singapore, befitting its status as a metropolitan city, has to adopt a glocalized approach in regulating its people’s behavior and usage of cyberspace. To this end, Singapore has adopted a ‘light touch’ philosophy by emphasizing education and, indeed, a well-balanced approach in its use of the law, design of technology, market forces and education in regulating cybercrimes. While Singapore develops a code of conduct for social media use (Chew, 2012; Wong, 2012), it has to consider the challenges that each modality presents. This paper recommends that this exercise be pursued holistically, with education as its primary means of regulating social media behaviors.
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**About the Author**

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A Tool for Monitoring the National and Local Governments in Dominican Republic: SISMAP

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Abstract: The Ministry of Public Administration (MAP) has developed many technological tools oriented to support key processes connected to its rectory role in the professionalization of civil service. One of these tools is called SISMAP (Public Administration Monitoring System). It is connected to other IT tool also developed by MAP, SASP (Public Employees Management System), a centralized platform to manage human resources in the public sector. SISMAP monitors the advance in every institution and every indicator defined by MAP. The distribution of indicators is inspired by Civil Service Barometer, a tool designed by Inter American Development Bank (IADB) to evaluate Civil Service in Latin America. The criteria are: Planning of HR, Job Organization, Employment Management, Performance Management, Compensation Management, Development Management, Human and Social Relationships Management and Organization of Human Resources Function, alongside Quality Management.

Keywords: Monitoring public institutions, monitoring Public Administration

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In the Dominican Republic, the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP) is in charge of public employment, including every system of the Civil Service Law and the institutional strengthening and implementation of quality management models in Public Administration, including local governments. The main functions of MAP are:

- Guarantee the professionalization of the Public Administration and implement a centralized HR management system.
- Strengthen all institutions of Public Administration, rebuilding organizational structures, redesigning processes and simplifying public services, elevating productivity of Public Management.

1 MAP reports directly to the President of Dominican Republic. The actual minister of Public Administration is Ramon Ventura Camejo.

2 The Civil Service Law (# 41-08), was promulgated in 2008 and created the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP). As article 7 says, “...it is created the Ministry of Public Administration as governing body of public employment and of the different systems under this law, of the institutional strengthen of Public Administration and Institutional Management Assessment.” (Ministry of Public Administration, 2008, p. 5)
• Implement quality management models, to guarantee the highest level of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of public services.

The Civil Service Statute is reinforced by the Dominican Constitution in its article #142, determining civil service on base of merit:

“…is a regime based on merit and professionalization…” (National Congress, 2010, p. 44)

1. Public Administration Monitoring System (SISMAP)

SISMAP is a software developed to monitor all indicators defined by MAP to assess how the advance of Public Administration is in every subject that is under its rectory: Its scope includes the ministries of central government and next year will reach local governments in the municipalities. It shows, in different layers, the status of the complete Public Administration; with the first layer showing Central Government and the Decentralized Sector. Very soon MAP is going to launch a second layer to display municipalities. Those indicators are classified according the Civil Service Barometer, besides the additional criterion dedicated to Quality Management.

SISMAP is inspired in the “organization charts” to graphically offer a detailed view of the status of every indicator and every public institution. It is a citizen-oriented tool, very simple to use and everybody can access SISMAP going to the web address: www.map.gob.do and clicking SISMAP logo. All the information is available for researchers, journalists, students, teachers and general public and, for best use, includes a user guide and tutorial.

2. Civil Service Barometer

The Civil Service Barometer is an assessment tool of Latin American civil service systems. It was developed in 2004 by Inter American Development Bank (IADB) and applied every four years. Results of last period are the base line to compare the situation of Civil Service in every country of our region.

The criteria evaluated by Civil Service Barometer, are:

• Human Resources Planning
• Job Organization
• Employment Management
• Performance Management
• Compensation Management
• Development Management
• Human and Social Relationship Management
• Organization of Human Resources Function

3 The Civil Service Barometer let us know about the actual situation of civil service in our region because “The Civil Service Barometer Report of Central America, Panama and Dominican Republic is an advanced contribution to know how is the public employment professionalization in the region.”(Iacovello, 2009, p. 3)
3. Indicators

For the purpose of having a mechanism for measuring the level of advancement of public management, of every public institution, the Ministry of Public Administration has defined 34 indicators to be monitored by SISMAP. These are:

1. Human Resources Planning
2. Job Analysis
3. Organizational Structure
4. Functions Manual
5. Process Map
6. Legal Base
7. History
8. Recruitment by open competitions
9. SASP
10. Technical Tests
11. Workshops of Recruitment and Selection
12. Absenteeism
13. Staff Turnover
14. Performance Evaluation
15. Employee Recognition
16. Workshops of Performance Evaluation
17. Salary Scale
18. Incorporation to Civil Service
19. Incorporation to Civil Service by Open Competitions
20. Incorporation to Civil Service by Internal Evaluation
21. Gap of Civil Service (no meritocratic civil servants)
22. Training
23. Postgraduate Training
24. Representative before Conciliation Commission
25. Civil Servants Associations
26. Compliance deadline for payment of employee benefits
27. Workshops of Labor Relationships
28. Occupational Health and Labor Risks
29. Human Resources Audit
30. Workshops of Civil Service
31. Self-Assessment with CAF
32. Internal Quality Committee
33. Service Level Agreement for Public Services
34. Workshops of CAF Methodology
Figure 1. Example of complete view: Organization Chart

Figure 2. Zooming an institution. Indicator: Organization Chart

Figure 3. Clicking for evidence: Organization Chart of the institution selected
4. Benefits

Since SISMAP was made public in December 2010, five rankings of the level of compliance of the Civil Service Law have been published in the Dominican Republic. It has generated public opinion about this matter and “suddenly” has helped to public managers to obey the civil service normative. It is user-friendly software and graphics-oriented, so anybody can use it and understand it.

5. Importance

For countries on the way of economic and social development, like DR, the efforts to build institutionality have needs mechanisms of monitoring the actions of public institutions. If these tools are available to citizens, then we have a powerful weapon to fight underdevelopment, injustice and corruption. With SISMAP, control organisms and citizens have an instrument to know who is doing well and who is not.

References


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Is the IT Director of the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP) in the Government at Dominican Republic. He is Computer Systems Engineer “summa cum laude”, from APEC University (Dominican Republic), and has a magister in Public High Management with Ortega & Gasset University Institute (Spain) and certified in E-Government in academies from Mexico (Monterrey Institute) and Argentina (INAP). Lizardo has participated in several international congresses about the subjects: E-gov in Dominican Republic, ICT applied in Public Administration and Tools for monitoring Public Administration. He has been advisor of many public and private institutions, in the implementation of different information systems. Among them: Central Bank of Dominican Republic, Dominican Refinery of Petroleum, Touristic Police Department, etc. He is responsible too, since 2010, for the coordination of Support Program of Public Administration Reform (PARAP), which is a four year long program executed by MAP with European Union funds.
Maintaining Face(book)
How Social Networks Breathe Life into Vietnam’s Public Sphere

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Abstract: Although social media platforms have garnered much attention in recent years for their putative role in dramatic political upheavals around the world, several scholars have suggested that the real potential of such tools for social change exists not in their capacity to bring about revolutions but in the way they empower citizens and organizations to privately and publicly articulate and debate a welter of conflicting views throughout society. According to this view, social media matters most not in the streets and squares but in the myriad spaces of what Jurgen Habermas termed the public sphere.

Social media in Vietnam is emerging as a powerful tool in this regard, offering a voice to a citizenry who since 1975 have been unable to express in public their views and opinions on many topics considered ‘sensitive’ by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and government officials, which exercise tight control over traditional media channels in the authoritarian nation. Vietnamese netizens increasingly utilize online social media outlets and platforms as tools of expressing and debating sentiment on issues of direct and indirect political relevance, in ways that have subtle but distinct influences upon politics and governance in this Southeast Asian nation.

Keywords: Vietnam, social media, Communism, public sphere, Internet, Facebook

Earlier this fall, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Tan Dung, made an unusual public announcement. In an official statement on the government’s website and, later, in a speech broadcast on state-run television, Dung took issue with three weblogs that he accused of ‘agitating against the state’ with claims and commentary regarding graft and willful financial mismanagement within the Vietnam government, extending even to the top of the Communist Party and the Prime Minister himself. Dung denounced the contents of the blogs—which included the popular Dan Lam Bao (‘People Doing Journalism’) and Quan Lam Bao (‘Officials Doing Journalism’)—as lies and fabrications, ‘villainous ploys of hostile forces’ overseas whom he asserted were using the Internet to ‘slander’ the Vietnamese government and its officials. He called for those behind the blogs to be arrested and severely punished, and ordered civil servants not to read the blogs.

While it’s not at all unusual for bloggers and other users of social media to be detained, arrested or imprisoned for alleged anti-state propaganda in this authoritarian, single-party Communist
nation, rarely does the Prime Minister himself take to the airways to inveigh against them, to say nothing of issuing a warning to citizens not to read the offending materials.

In a post following the announcement, one of the targeted blogs wrote, ‘Dan Lam Bao and its companions are prepared to be repressed and imprisoned rather than leading the life of a dumb dog that dares not to bark, subservient to those who abuse their power.’ Dan Lam Bao also revealed that their site recorded a record 32,000 hits in the hour immediately following the televised announcement.

A month later, on October 22, in remarks at the opening of the national assembly in Hanoi, the Prime Minister stood before the assembled parliamentarians and foreign ambassadors and conceded that he had mismanaged the country’s wilting economy, and he promised to push forward with reforms of bloated state-owned enterprises and the fight against corruption. ‘There are enormous challenges,’ he said. ‘Public dissatisfaction persists.’ In a his own speech at the event, Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong acknowledged that the government had failed to curb corruption in its top ranks.

Much has been written recently about the capacity of the Internet and social media platforms to mobilize political action. Last year’s remarkable string of grassroots-led uprisings across the Middle East, collectively known as the Arab Spring, has been attributed in no small part to the unique capabilities of social media platforms such as text messaging, email, Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook in inciting, publicizing, and coordinating those popular movements.

Other commentators have been less sanguine about the usefulness of social media in effecting political change, especially in authoritarian states with strict controls over online communications (Morozov, 2009; Gladwell, 2011). They note that social media-fueled protests have failed at least as often as they have succeeded—consider the Belarus protests against President Aleksandr Lukasheko’s alleged vote rigging in 2006, Iran’s Green Movement in 2009, Thailand’s lengthy but ultimately ineffectual 2010 Red Shirt uprising—and that just as social media empower individuals, they also empower states to surveil their citizens to unprecedented degrees.

Numerous observers have even suggested that Internet-based social media platforms may undermine real political engagement, nurturing instead a generation of “slacktivists” more concerned with self-gratification and social presentation than with actually addressing important political and social matters via substantive action. (Christensen, 2011; Hindman, 2009; Shulman, 2005, Skoric, 2012).

But none of these arguments fully captures the way Vietnamese Netizens increasingly utilize online social media outlets and platforms as tools of expressing and debating sentiment on issues of direct and indirect political relevance, in ways that have subtle but distinct influences upon politics and governance in this tightly controlled Asian nation. In Vietnam, where one of the 20th century’s bloodiest conflicts raged just over a generation ago and where, today, some 70% of the population is under the age of 35, citizens are far more interested in taking advantage of recent economic reforms to build individual prosperity than they are in fomenting revolution. Yet as the nation and its population of 90 million awaken to the picture of the modern world they view on their laptops, televisions, mobile phones, tablets and cinema screens, they are becoming increasingly hungry for political agency. Very few people have uprising on their mind in Vietnam, but they do have opinions, and—more and more—they want to share them.

Scholars and Internet commentators such as Manuel Castells and Clay Shirky have asserted that the real power of the Internet and social media does not always lend itself to TV-friendly
demonstrations and the felling of grizzled despots. Rather, they say, it is to be seen in the way these open, networked tools empower people and organizations to privately and publicly articulate and debate a welter of conflicting views throughout society. According to this view, social media matters most not in the streets but in the myriad spaces of what Jurgen Habermas termed the public sphere (Castells, 1997; Shirky, 2011).

‘The potential of social media,’ Shirky has written, ‘lies mainly in their support of civil society and the public sphere—change measured in years and decades rather than weeks or months’ (Shirky, 2011).

Shirky calls this the ‘environmental view’ of social media, contrasting it with an ‘instrumental view’ that places more importance upon the capacity of such tools to enable citizen access to restricted information from outside the country. A slowly developing public sphere, where public opinion relies on both media and conversation, he observes, is the core of the environmental view of Internet freedom. In this perspective, access to information is far less important, politically, than access to conversation. Every revolution and popular uprising, he says, is preceded by active public debate of state policy, governance, and their alternatives in this sphere (Shirky, 2011). Before anyone can walk the walk, in other words, they must talk the talk.

Social media in Vietnam is emerging as a powerful tool in this regard, offering a voice for a citizenry who otherwise are unable to express in public their views and opinions on many topics considered ‘sensitive’ by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and government officials. To the extent that commentators skirt directly criticizing government policy, the CPV or individual high-level officials, there is an active discussion among the population on blogs and web forums and other social networks such as Facebook and YouTube.

1. Social Media and the Public Sphere

In his seminal work *The Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas articulated the notion of the public sphere as a broad variety of discursive arenas in which news and matters of common concern could be freely exchanged and discussed by ordinary citizens—‘a realm of social life in which public opinion can be formed’ and thereby influence political action and matters of state (Asan, 1999; Habermas, 1991).

Although traditional mass media may be considered part of the public sphere, it is also a powerfully regulated forum of low-participatory communication which systematically privileges powerful and institutionalized actors, excludes smaller institutions and civil society, and essentially circumvents public debate: a primary point of Habermas’ writing on the subject (Habermas, 1991). Nowhere is this more true than in authoritarian societies like Vietnam, in which all media outlets are either fully or partly owned, and therefore controlled, by the government.

Yet numerous political scientists and communication scholars have found that the decentralized, networked, many-to-many communication capabilities that characterize the Internet give it the potential to fundamentally alter societal communication. The Internet would seem to provide for a significantly more effective public sphere than traditional mass media, returning to ordinary citizens the power of wide public debate and the formation of public opinion. In societies where the traditional media is in partial or total thrall to state control, the Internet and social media platforms can become powerful arenas in the process of allowing public opinion to form from the
bottom up, rather than from the top down, and thereby exerting a powerful influence upon affairs of state.

Although theories of the public sphere are most often associated with democratic political participation and traditions of state legitimacy which derives from the people, numerous scholars and observers have identified public spheres in operation within distinctly non-democratic states.

In examining the nature of the political impact of China’s estimated 200 million blogs, for example, Xiao (2011) has pointed to the role of bloggers there in the emergence of a quasi-public sphere in which state control is criticized and collective action can be mobilized. Like-minded observers claim the Internet, and in particular the explosive popularity of Twitter-like ‘weibo’ platforms there, has made it more difficult for the Chinese state to control the free flow of information and is thus creating an open, democratic forum that challenges state-supported views of power and authority (Xiao, 2011; Yang, 2009; Zheng, 2008). MacKinnon (2008) claims that blogs in China ‘serve as a “safety valve” by allowing enough room for a sufficiently wide range of subjects that people can let off steam about government corruption or incompetence ... before considering taking their gripes to the streets.’

The Communist-controlled government in Vietnam takes a similar position toward the free flow of information online, though the mechanisms it has in place to control content are significantly less sophisticated and ubiquitous than in China. The fine-grained, nearly instantaneous oversight that characterizes China’s so-called ‘Great Firewall’ does not exist in Vietnam. Instead, there is a watchful and often heavy-handed Propaganda Department, the chilling effect instilled by periodic arrests and imprisonments of outspoken commentators, and — perhaps most powerful of all — a carefully nurtured ideology among citizens that places national development, political stability, and social harmony above all individual interests and concerns. Yet these controls, while powerful, are not keeping up with the explosive rate of Internet penetration in the country’s urban areas nor with the people’s interest in making use of the newest Western tools and platforms available to them there.

2. Vietnam’s Social Media Landscape

Vietnam has a unique social media landscape and a singular population of Internet users. With approximately 90 million citizens, Vietnam is the 13th largest nation, by population, on earth. Of that population, roughly 31 million are Internet users, representing a penetration of 34%, putting the country on the same playing field as neighboring China, Thailand, and Philippines (Cimigo, 2012). Importantly, nearly all of these netizens have appeared in just over a decade; Vietnam’s Internet penetration growth has been a staggering 12,000% since 2000 (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2011). Vietnam claims more than 8.5 million social media users, representing a penetration of just 9% of the total population. Yet there are also 129 million mobile subscriptions in the country, making for a penetration of 139%, and 19 million mobile internet users, equating to penetration of around 21% (Cimigo, 2012; WeAreSocial, 2012).

Since November 2009, the online social network Facebook has been subject to an unofficial technical block at the DNS level in Vietnam. The government has taken pains never to directly acknowledge any responsibility for the site’s inaccessibility, but neither has it ever disavowed involvement. Despite this, Facebook presently has 8.5 million active members inside the country using technical workarounds to access the service (up from just 2.9 million a year ago, suggesting those restrictions may be loosening) (WeAreSocial, 2012). That makes it the single largest social
network in the nation, larger even than local Vietnamese language clone Zing.me and far larger
than the government-backed Go.vn, which requires national ID authentication and whose mostly
inactive members number in the few hundreds of thousands.

While Twitter remains accessible in the country, and a variety of similarly functioning
Vietnamese clones have been introduced, microblogs remain a negligible force in Vietnam’s social
media ecosystem. Where an estimated 75% of China’s Internet population uses one or more weibo
platforms there, Vietnam netizens have not yet fastened themselves to microblogs as a
conversational platform.

Authoritarian governments restrict mediated communication among their citizens because they
fear, correctly, that a better-coordinated populace would constrain their ability to act without
oversight (Shirky, 2012). As many have observed, the most convincing practical reason to believe
that social media can effect change in the spheres of politics and governance is that both citizens
and governments believe they can do so. The best illustration of social media’s potential impact, in
other words, is states’ reaction to it (Shirky, 2011; Safranek, 2012; Etling, Faris & Palfrey, 2010). By
this measure, Vietnam is well aware of the potential impact unrestricted use of social media could
have in the nation upon politics and governance, and consequently takes measures to mitigate and
suppress it.

The Communist-controlled Vietnamese government has always imposed tight restrictions upon
media content—all media outlets in the country are state-run and controlled—but it has
traditionally taken a more ad hoc approach in doing so. A few websites are sporadically blocked—
CNN, BBC Vietnamese, and other irregularly offending news outlets, as well as a handful of
pornography sites—but apart from the Facebook block, which is easily circumvented, there’s been
little effort to constrain Internet activity in the Chinese vein.

 Authorities have, however, taken a much stricter stance against any sort of online expression
critical of the Communist Party in Vietnam, government policy, or individual officials. Bloggers
and other users of social media who tread willfully and regularly into ‘sensitive’ territory are
harassed, threatened, beaten, detained, arrested, and imprisoned. This year has seen a marked
uptick in arrests for activities against the state, in all likelihood a result of the nation’s worsening
economic situation.

This summer saw a significant escalation in tensions between Vietnam and China over the
sovereignty of the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, known in Vietnam as the
East Sea. The Vietnam government cracked down on dozens of prominent bloggers for writing
about the situation, for criticizing Vietnam’s policy toward China regarding the islands, for
participating in demonstrations against China, and for speaking to foreign media.

In July the mother of a jailed blogger died after setting fire to herself outside the headquarters of
the People’s Committee in Bac Lieu in an act of protest toward her daughter’s pending trial for
criticizing corruption and injustice in her blog. In August, two bloggers were convicted of anti-
government propaganda under article 88 of the criminal code, one of them a former military
officer. In early September, a reporter for the Tuoi Tre daily newspaper was convicted of giving
bribes to police officers after writing two stories about police corruption for which he posed as a
traffic offender and paid a policeman several hundred dollars to release an impounded car. He
was arrested only after his articles appeared in print and on the newspaper’s website.

In late September, Vietnam tried and jailed three bloggers accused of spreading anti-
government propaganda. The three were accused of posting political articles on a long-banned
website called Free Journalists’ Club, as well as articles critical of the government on their personal blogs. Former policewoman Ta Phong Tan, who wrote a blog called Justice and Truth and whose mother immolated herself in protest earlier this summer, received a sentence of 10 years.

And in October, two prominent Vietnamese musicians became the latest activists to be jailed, for posting songs critical of the Chinese government on YouTube and a website operated by an overseas Vietnamese opposition group.

3. The Beginnings of an Active Online Public Sphere

Yet while openly criticizing the state, the Party, or government policy is an invitation to a lengthy prison term in Vietnam, that’s not to say social media there do not support a wide-ranging and robust discussion of such topics, nor that social media users restrict themselves only to the most innocuous of smalltalk.

Reacting to changes that have occurred online, particularly in blogging and citizen journalism sites, new types of more professional journalists and marketers have developed what might be deemed a new state press in Vietnam. This has created opportunities as well as challenges for various factions in government and in the CPV. The emergence of new online media outlets has accelerated this process, with market forces playing a key role. Editors and journalists have increasingly been driven more by pragmatic economic forces to make news more relevant, interesting, and professional, thereby also expanding the range of topics that can be reported. Feedback from online engagement further drives this process and reinforces it. The readers’ comments sections of Vietnamese online publications are surprisingly lively areas of debate, for instance.

It is common for readers of the high-circulation, state-controlled dailies, such as Thanh Nien, to post comments on articles on corruption, crime, or land rights issues that are laced with biting irony and harsh criticism of official incompetence or graft. It’s possible to view this as simply an innocuous ‘safety valve,’ as MacKinnon terms it, that allows citizens to vent grievances without taking further action. Yet considered collectively, these thousands of daily comments create multiple foci, widely broadcast, for hashing over the public secrets of governance breakdowns and corruption, as well as grievances by victims. These forms of commentary may not appear overtly political, in the sense of challenges to the existing political regime. But they directly impinge upon key political problems in today’s Vietnam: lack of transparency and accountability of often incompetent local officials and civil servants; nepotism; massive and systemic corruption; police brutality and abuses; land seizures and real estate speculation; the absence of an independent judiciary; growing socioeconomic inequalities; and the lack of access for many to decent education and health care.

An example: In January, a fish farmer named Doan Van Vuon opened fire on more than 100 police officers and soldiers trying to evict him and others from their homes in the Tien Lang district, in the northern port city of Haiphong. He was being pushed off his state-owned plot a year before his lease was set to end. Vuon and three relatives were quickly charged with attempted murder. In a nation where economic decentralization has lent more political power to local and provincial officials, and where unchecked land evictions are therefore increasing, the story at first did not receive much coverage. Vietnam’s state-run press published quick reports based on police sources, which stuck to the narrative that Vuon was a criminal who had used illegal firearms (Brown, 2012).
A month later, however, the situation went from a hushed skirmish to a national imbroglio when two newspapers, Nông Thôn Ngày Nay (Countryside Today) and Pháp Luật Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh (Ho Chi Minh City Law), unearthed their own findings that district officials broke an earlier agreement reached in court and lied about statements made by witnesses (Brown, 2012; McKinley, 2012).

The Tien Lang affair, as the case was called, released a torrent of popular grievances over corruption in local police departments, much of which could be found in the comments sections of these newspapers’ online reportage. Yet rather than end the controversial and potentially damaging coverage, as might be expected in a one-party state, the Party permitted the reporting to continue, albeit grudgingly. The online commentary continued as well, although Internet journalists and media executives involved in that coverage have admitted that they continued to be pressured by the Ministry of Information and Communications to remove critical reader comments from their websites (Cain, 2012a).

In February, relentless online and offline media criticism against district officials prompted Prime Minister Dung to issue a statement announcing that several of the officials would be punished for their malfeasance. The prime minister’s spokesman publicly praised the two newspapers involved for providing ‘timely reports [that had] helped the central government agencies see the matter clearly and proceed to deal with it in an appropriate way’. Newspapers, he said, did good work ‘serving the nation’ and ‘orienting public opinion’ (Cain, 2012a). He made no mention of the active online civil society that had sprung up around the controversy and had made all of this possible, but its impact was clear.

A few months later, after a similar incident outside Hanoi in Hung Yen Province, images of hundreds of police in riot gear facing residents of Van Giang village were posted on blogs, going viral instantly. The protesters were demanding higher compensation for land taken by local authorities to build a satellite city on the outskirts of Hanoi. Local newspapers remained silent on the incident, as directed by the Propaganda Department, until video was released online of two local journalists being beaten by police at the site. At that point, state media jumped on the coverage (Brown, 2012).

In authoritarian regimes, bloggers, online forums, and other forms of new media provide alternative sources of news and information (Etling, Faris & Palfrey, 2010). Increasingly, both journalists and the Vietnamese public are relying on blogs and social networks to discuss events like this. Etling (2010) has observed that the Internet accommodates the rise of a new public sphere even in authoritarian nations by reducing the influence of gatekeepers and by making it possible for citizen journalists to engage in previously expensive journalistic, transparency, or fact-checking endeavours. Once in the public forum, it is easier for mainstream reporters to cover those events for their news organisations, and even to use them to push a different agenda. In an increasing number of cases, Vietnamese bloggers are doing the heavy lifting with unauthorized investigative journalism that, once made public, provides political cover for the traditional state-owned press to pursue the story. Some journalists, frustrated by the restrictions imposed by their editors, even post on blogs under pen names to circumvent censorship.

More than just information sources, blogs and other social media platforms have become rallying points for ersatz civil society groups representing different causes: land use, religious rights, and anti-China sentiment, for example. Many journalists use blogs to get information on public protests, and some readers use blogs and other social media to call for their own protests.
During this summer’s escalation in tensions between Vietnam and China over the sovereignty of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, tens of thousands of young Vietnamese changed their Facebook avatars to images of the Vietnamese flag as visible displays of their patriotism and solidarity against China (Figure 1). When Chinese search giant Baidu began exploring a business expansion into Vietnam called Baidu Trà đà Quán, Vietnamese youth promptly created an anti-Baidu Trà đà Quán page on Facebook, using it as a forum to register their unhappiness with the move and galvanizing supporters to speak out against it. During the same several months, Facebook also served as a coordinating tool for several anti-China street protests that took place in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh.

But as Shirky notes, governments jeopardize more than their own legitimacy when they seek to stifle online public communication on matters of social interest; they also threaten economic growth when they ban technologies that can be used for both political and economic coordination (Shirky, 2012).

In the first part of this year, the Vietnam National Assembly introduced draft legislation that would require Google, Facebook and all other non-local social networks to locate data servers inside the country and to establish local offices, both of which would presumably be under local control. They would additionally be required by law to cooperate with local authorities in identifying any user who engages in activities prohibited by the decree or other relevant laws. The same legislation called for mandating the use of real names and verifiable online identities for all Vietnamese citizens (Hookway, 2012).

At the beginning of the year, however, Vietnam was in a somewhat different economic position. As 2012 has progressed, it’s become clear that Vietnam’s anointment as the next Asian success story may have been premature. At the end of 2012, Vietnam is struggling with a weak currency, high inflation, paralysing bureaucracy, and endemic corruption that has led to billions of dollars of waste. Many of these problems stem from a credit boom in 2009 and 2010; much of the money lent is now considered bad debt, and a lack of transparency throughout the banking system is sending
foreign investors looking elsewhere (Cain, 2012b). At the end of September, Moody’s downgraded the country’s credit rating, citing weaknesses in its banks and a stuttering economy (AP, 2012).

While public officials may wish to impose tight internal controls on social media platforms like Facebook, Google, Wordpess and the rest, and thereby prevent the public discussion of its dirty laundry in places like Quan Lam Bao, they likely also realize that doing so may well jeopardize the one way they have out of the current economic mess.

The Asia Internet Coalition, a lobby group founded by some of the world’s biggest technology companies, has urged authorities to tone down the content of the draft law, pointing out that it would stifle the growth of Internet-driven businesses here. Authorities have also been warned about the side effects of blocking sites such as Facebook, which would significantly hinder Vietnamese entrepreneurs from building connections with potential partners both inside the country and around the world (Hookway, 2012). To date, the decree has yet to be implemented in legislative form and there is talk that the government is in discussions with Facebook to reach an agreement that would satisfy both parties’ interests.

As elsewhere, popular culture in Vietnam provides cover for political uses of social media. Blogs and social networks like Facebook are fashionable sites for the posting of mashups that discreetly satirize a wide variety of Vietnamese social issues. A preferred source for such mashups is the Japanese manga comic Doraemon, hugely popular in Vietnam (Figure 2). Dozens of Facebook pages and personal blogs are devoted to the posting of mashed-up, remixed versions of Doraemon manga, often including other images, in which the original Japanese language has been removed and replaced with Vietnamese-language dialogue. These remixed comics are used as a form of social expression, often subtly coded, but providing insightful commentary on modern Vietnamese society nonetheless.

Figure 4: A Doraemon manga mashup with Vietnamese language social commentary from the site Doraemon Che (http://doremonche.com, 2012)
The CPV has not historically been known for its keen sense of humour, and typically takes the same restrictive attitude toward satire and parody as it does straightforward criticism. But once a year, during the annual Tet New Year celebration, it allows a single television broadcast of a live program called “Gặp nhau cuối năm.” The show presents an evening of satirical sketch-comedy acts in which the events of the previous year in Vietnam are sent up in tongue-in-cheek fashion. For years, millions of Vietnamese gathered around the television to enjoy the one occasion each year in which they could legally enjoy mockery of government policies and failures, knowing there’d not be another opportunity until the following Tet.

But in recent years, clips from the program have been uploaded to YouTube, where they’re available for viewing—and, crucially, commenting upon and sharing—any time. In one popular clip from 2009, for instance, three “kitchen gods” perform a satirical song-and-dance number to the well-known melody of a post-war patriotic song whose original lyrics praised the development of the country and the many blessings the government brought to the people under post-war Communism (Figure 3). As can be seen in the YouTube clip from the program, however, the performers have transformed the traditional lyrics into an ironic paean about the massive flooding that inundates Hanoi each time it rains. The same patriotic song now has become a gently satirical mockery of the woeful condition of Vietnamese state infrastructure, corruption, and official ineptitude.

![YouTube clip from the once-a-year Vietnamese television broadcast “Gặp nhau cuối năm.”](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69e2ln1ikYE, 2009)

At other times, the uses of online popular culture to make political statements are more overt, and consequently riskier. After Vietnamese police used violence to break up anti-China protests in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City—protests that were largely promoted and coordinated using social media—34-year-old musician Viet Khang wrote two songs about it and uploaded them onto YouTube. The songs, entitled ‘Where is My Country?’ and ‘Who are You?’, soon went viral,
attracting about 1 million hits in total. A few months later, Khang was arrested and on October 30 was sentenced to four years in prison for conducting 'propaganda against the state.' Despite strict censorship spanning decades, composers in Vietnam have rarely been prosecuted for the content of their music. However, with lyrics like ‘Where is your nationalism? Why consciously take orders from China? ... Your hands will be stained with the blood of our people,’ directed at security forces, Khang’s songs hit a nerve with CPV officials.

Bloggers also commonly publish online translated stories from the foreign press, making them available to a wider Vietnamese audience. Similarly, writers and journalists inside Vietnam translate foreign literature, often short stories and authors for which Vietnamese language editions do not exist or which are not well known in the country (Vietnam strictly restricts foreign titles brought into the country and sold at bookstores). Translations often include books and articles from mainstream outlets: David Lodge’s *Art of Fiction* or features and interviews from *The Paris Review* or *The New Yorker*, for instance. In doing so the translators make widely available new authors and, more importantly, new ideas and viewpoints on such topics as feminism, sexuality, the environment, East Asian diplomacy, and many others. They work in part because they self-consciously want to raise the quality of writing, literary criticism, and intellectual debates in Vietnam overall. They also want to introduce new ways of writing literature in Vietnam, and therefore new ways of thinking about possible ways of being Vietnamese and communicating in Vietnamese with fellow citizens. Some of these literary blogs have tens of thousands of hits and hundreds of visitors. The information and texts from these blogs are relayed in social media, reposted in personal Facebook pages, and disseminated further by photocopying, thus blending old and new media.

The political nature of this project, like other uses of popular culture in Vietnam, is rarely foregrounded, and yet it is never far from the minds of those who create literary blogging and digital projects in the arts. This is a subtle, muted form of political engagement, but no less significant for it. Despite that nothing apparently political is taking place in these hundreds of pages of online translations from English, French or German literature, the capacity of Kafka, Camus, or Orwell to comment on contemporary politics in any part of the world is obvious. On one hand, most of the translators who act as cultural brokers in this fashion eschew such well-known targets. Yet by translating Nabokov’s *Lolita*, or short stories by Alice Munro or Virginia Woolf, they contribute indirect but powerful commentary on a key tension in Vietnamese society today: the inability of the creaky educational and political system to address or engage productively with evolving gender roles and new attitudes toward sexuality, marriage, and the family.

The rapid rise of Internet penetration in Vietnam and the subsequent growth of social media have made possible a vast extension of the range of public debate and discussion that is rarely overtly political in an open, confrontational sense, but which is gradually expanding Vietnam’s public sphere and thereby creating a more informed, engaged citizenry. New ideas that would or could never have originated from state media or state political apparatuses are in circulation, especially among younger, more educated, and disenfranchised and disenchanted Vietnamese. The infusion of new ideas about society and the state—and powerful new conversational capabilities for a growing population that’s increasingly comfortable with open, robust dialogue and debate—portends a fundamental shift in the relationship between the individual and the state in Vietnam as it moves into the 21st century.
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**About the Authors**

*Patrick E. Sharbaugh*
Patrick Sharbaugh teaches and conducts research into new media technologies and practices at RMIT International University in Saigon, Vietnam. His most recent research is on Vietnamese conceptions of online personal privacy.

*Christophe Robert*
Christophe Robert is a cultural anthropologist (PhD, Cornell University, 2005). He taught at Princeton PIIRS, Yale CSEAS, and City University of Hong Kong. He is currently conducting ethnographic research in Saigon on media, youth, and criminality. He is Director of Online Qualitative Research at Cimigo, a consultancy firm, and lectures in anthropology at Loyola University Chicago - Vietnam Center.

*Marianne S. Brown*
Marianne Brown is a British multimedia journalist who has written on the impact of blogs on Vietnam state-controlled media. She has worked for local and foreign news agencies in Vietnam for four years.
Appendix
Call for Papers

The International Conference on e-Democracy and Open Government Asia 2012 (CeDEM-Asia-2012) is a forum that aims to bring together academics, researchers, policy-makers, industry professionals, and civil society activists to discuss the role of social and mobile media in the future of governance in Asia and elsewhere. CeDEM-Asia-2012 will be held on November 14-15 in Singapore.

Call for Papers

New means of interacting with government and political institutions are causing significant shifts in political and social life. The emerging social and mobile media practices, including content generation, collaboration, and network organization, are changing our understanding of governance and politics. While the changes are already widely debated in mature, developed democracies, there is an even greater need to address them in the context of rapidly developing Asian societies. Following five successful conferences at the Danube University of Krems, CeDEM is looking to open a new forum in Asia for the exchange of ideas, networking, and collaboration on the topics of e-democracy and open government. This year, CeDEM is pleased to be working with the Asian Media Information and Communication Centre (AMIC) as its conference organizer and the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore as its main partner. CeDEM-Asia-2012 seeks to critically analyze present and future developments in fields, with a special focus on the following themes:

- Social media to engage citizens, smart & mobile democracy, sustainability of e-participation
- Mobilization via social media, networks vs. traditional party-structure, online campaigning
- Communication technologies and their use for governmental transformation
- Open data initiatives, transparency, participation and collaboration in government
- Cultures of governance, access and openness, crowdsourcing for government
- Information provision, mobile devices, service delivery via new communication channels
- Online communities, innovation, bottom-up vs. top-down
- Network effects, power laws, long tail, social web

Important Dates

- Extended submission deadline for full papers and workshop proposals: 10 August 2012
- Notification of acceptance: 24 September 2012
- Camera-ready paper submission: 15 October 2012
- Conference dates & location: 14-15 November 2012, Singapore

Conference Chairs

- Nojin Kwak, University of Michigan, USA
- Peter Parycek, Danube University Krems, Austria
- Marko M. Skoric, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Program Committee
Georg Achleitner, Institute of Technology Assessment, AT
Axel Bruns, ARC Centre for Creative Industries and Innovation, AUS
Thomas Budelehm, Austrian Ambassador to Iran, AT
Scott W. Campbell, University of Michigan, USA
Giorgos Chalelis, National University of Singapore
Juhee Chei, Yonsei University, South Korea
Peter Cruickshank, Edinburgh Napier University, UK
Olivier Glasser, IDHEAP, CH
Julia Gilchrist, 21c Consultancy, UK
Debbie Goh, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Marijn Janssen, TU Delft, NL
Randy Kluver, Texas A&M University, USA
Robert Krimmer, ODIHR-elections, PL
Kal Kilian Liew, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Arthu Lupia, University of Michigan, USA
Arun Mahidhara, Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore
Peter Mambrey, Universität Duisburg-Essen, DE
Francesco Molinari, Partherre project, IT
Philipp Müller, University of Salzburg, Austria
Karine Nahan, University of Washington, USA
Natalie Pang, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Han Wise Park, Younghans University, South Korea
Ismail Peña-López, Open University of Catalonia, Spain
Reinhard Riedl, University of Zurich, CH
María Robles, Asian Media Information & Communication Centre (AMIC), Singapore
Fel Shen, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR
Jakob Svensson, Karlstad University, Sweden
Andy Williamson, Hansard Society, United Kingdom
Weiyu Zhang, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Submission Guidelines
The submission portal will be open mid June 2012: www.cdem-conference.org/CaDEMAsia2012
• Research Papers
Research papers shall be 12 pages maximum and will be double-blind peer-reviewed.
• Finished Case Studies and Project Papers
Finished Case Studies/Project Papers shall be 12 pages maximum and will be double-blind peer-reviewed. The research must be finished and except for the final outcomes must be presented in the paper.
• Ongoing Case Studies and Project Papers
Ongoing Case Studies & Project Papers shall be 12 pages maximum and will be double-blind peer-reviewed. The research must not be finished but the methodology of the research must be clearly described. Expected outcomes or intermediate evaluation data is appreciated, but not mandatory.
• Reflections
Reflections shall be 6 pages maximum and will be selected by the chairs (this section includes non-academic papers). These papers allow space for reflections and speculation about current developments as well as for presentations of specific issues. These papers won’t be peer-reviewed.
• Workshop Proposals
Workshop Proposals shall be 2 pages maximum and will be selected by the conference chairs. Please provide a short summary of your workshop content, aims, and methodology/didactics.
Appendix

Publications
The conference proceedings will be published and made available online under the Creative Commons License. A revised selection of best research papers and case studies of eDEM-Asia-2012 will be published with the open access eJournal of eDemocracy and Open Government (www.jadem.org).

Travel Information
Conference Venue: Orchard Parade Hotel
Located at the entrance of the Orchard Road, Singapore’s most famous shopping belt, Orchard Parade Hotel is just a 10 minute walk from Lido Cinemas and major shopping centers such as IOI Orchard, Wisma Atria and Ngee Ann City. It is also within 10 minutes by foot to Scotts Road, another famous shopping district in Singapore. The same amount of walking time will bring you to Orchard MRT station, which can connect you to other parts of the country. With the hotel itself also providing a myriad of retail options ranging from fine wines and cigars to even a tailor for made-to-measure suits, guests will definitely be spoilt for choice. Business travellers will enjoy the accessibility of Orchard Parade Hotel. A 10-minute drive will get you to the Central Business District or Suntec Singapore International Convention & Exhibition Centre. Orchard Parade Hotel is also only 30 minutes from Changi International Airport.

About Singapore
Even though it is geographically small, Singapore is one of the most developed countries in Southeast Asia. The city is a multi-religious, multicultural and multilingual mix, which offers a unique ethnic tapestry to visitors. Singapore has a wide array of sightseeing and culinary opportunities to choose from. A full calendar of traditional festivals and holidays celebrated throughout the year adds to its cultural appeal. In addition, Singapore offers great shopping, delectable cuisine and also not forgetting its two Integrated Resorts (IRs). Located at the Southern tip of Malaysia, Singapore’s excellent infrastructure enables both business and leisure travellers to enjoy its many sites and attractions in a safe, clean and green environment. The award winning Changi Airport connects locals and tourists to major cities around the world.

Registration

Local Organizing Committee/Secretariat
Tharuka Prematilake, AMIC, Singapore
James Chen, AMIC, Singapore
Sangeetha Madasamy, AMIC, Singapore

Peer-Review Manager
Michael Sachs, Danube University Krems, Austria

Further Information
- http://www.donau-uni.ac.at/cadem
- http://www.amic.org.sg/
# Conference Programme

## Conference Programme, Day 1

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<td>Research Papers</td>
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<td>15:45</td>
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<td>16:15</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
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### Keynote
- **New Media & Good Governance: What Now, What Next?**
- Janan Chauvel, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, NUS
  - M. Jeyamohan, Professor of Policy Studies, Lee Hsien School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
  - Andreea Iam, Research Associate, Ministry of Communication and Information, Singapore

The Internet has allowed bloggers and civil society to press for more openness and accountability from a Singapore government more used to a compliant media and society. How will and can the government manage this new, demanding environment?

### Research Papers
- **Tweaking Vertically?**
  - Twitter and Official Interactions with Citizens on Twitter
  - Joshua Oppenheimer, Judy Kho, and Matthew Shepard

- **Is there a Business Case for Governments using Social and Mobile Media?**
  - Exploratory Evidence from the U.S. and USA

### Research Papers
- **Engagement Engagement and the Digital Divide**
  - John Seaton

### Research Papers
- **The Power of the Internet**
  - Daniel von der lippe

### Workshop
- **New Media and Politics in Singapore: Understanding the Promise and Perils of Digital Engagement**
  - Marko Stanko, Lee Hsien School of Communication and Information, NUS
  - Liew Khiu Khiu, Lee Hsien School of Communication and Information, NUS
  - Navin Gondal, Lee Hsien School of Communication and Information, NUS

This panel will focus on the role of social and mobile media in facilitating civic and political engagement, and discuss the emerging practices of civic activism and youth and diaspora engagement in Singapore.
**Conference Programme, Day 2**

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<th>Time</th>
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| 9:30  | -                    | New Communication Technologies and Civic Life: Socially Networked, but Politically Engaged?  
Najin Kwak, Director, Nams Center for Korean Studies, and Associate Professor, Department of Communication Studies, University of Michigan |
| 9:45  |                       |                                                                         |
| 10:00 | Coffee Break          |                                                                         |
| 10:30 | Workshop              |                                                                         |
| 10:30 | -                    | Maintaining Face(book): How Blogs, Online Forums, and a Blocked Social Network Breathe Life into Vietnam's Public Sphere  
Convenor: Patrick Shadbrough, Lecturer, RMU International University in Saigon, Vietnam |
| 11:00 |                       |                                                                         |
| 12:30 | Lunch Break           |                                                                         |
| 1:30  | Workshop              |                                                                         |
| 1:30  | -                    | E-Governance and Good Governance: Case Studies from Asia and Austria  
- Social Media in the Public Sector: South Korea's Twitter use  
Hong Woo-Park, Youngnam University  
- Social Media Usage for Civil Society in Japanese Municipalities  
Muney Kirie & Leslie Tsuchikawa, University of Tsukuba  
- Open Government Data in Austria  
Peter Porac, Donau-Universitat Krems |
| 3:15  |                       |                                                                         |
| 3:45  | Coffee Break          |                                                                         |
| 4:00  | Reflections and Short Papers |                                                                         |
| 4:00  | -                    | Traditional Media, Social Media, and the Developing World: Insights from 28 Countries  
David J. McBrey & Carlo J. Pecor |
| 4:00  |                       | E-government for Government or for Citizens?  
Hyhyun Hwang |
| 4:00  |                       | Youth Engagement and ICTs in Asia: Reflections on Emerging Trends  
Witav Zhang & Clinton David |
| 4:00  |                       | A Tool for Monitoring the National and Local Governments in Dominican Republic: SBAMP  
Rayson Lizande |
| 4:00  |                       | Singapore's Regulation of Cybercrime  
Her Nan Siew |
| 4:00  |                       | Evaluation Online Citizen Service Projects offered by Chennai City Corporation  
Mithya Balasubramanian, P. Govindaraju Ponnusamy |
| 4:00  |                       | Use of WWS to monitor Food Day Meat Scheme: A study from Uttar Pradesh  
Rubina Maiti, Anand Kumar |
| 5:30  | Closing Session       |                                                                         |
| 5:30  | -                    | Review and Outlook  
Najin Kwak, Peter Tonyuk and Marko Shanic |
The Conference for E-Democracy and Open Government in Asia 2012 presents papers that cover the latest developments in digital governance and politics. The integration of mobile and social media in citizens’ everyday lives will sustainably change the interaction with governments. Politics already embraces digital and mobile technologies and governments will have to follow. These conference proceedings reflect on the impact of a permanently connected society on forms of governance.

The CeDEM Asia 2012 brings together experts from academia and practitioners as well as representatives of businesses and policy makers.