Roots and Routes: The Partition of British India in Indian Social Memories

CHRISTIANE HARTNACK*

Abstract This contribution focuses on the Indian experience of the Partition. The personal and shared (i.e., social) memories regarding the history of India and Pakistan will inform the examination of the temporal dimension of the Partition, i.e., its “roots”. Tracing the re-established and new interconnections in terms of trade, travel, transportation, and communication between India and Pakistan along historical lines gives insight into the spatial dimension of the Partition’s aftermath, i.e. its “routes”. The main argument of this analysis is that the traumata resulting from the Partition are still not overcome and contain the potential for explosive conflicts in the future.

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Referring to the political context surrounding the November 2008 terrorist carnage in Mumbai, the Indian author Arundhati Roy wrote:

"On this nuclear subcontinent, that context is Partition. . . . Each of those people carries, and passes down, a story of unimaginable pain, hate, horror, but yearning too. That wound, those torn but still unsevered muscles, that blood and those splintered bones still lock us together in a close embrace of hatred, terrifying familiarity, but also love . . . “1

According to conservative estimates, as a result of the dividing of British India along religious lines into India and Pakistan in 1947 (an event referred to as the Partition or simply Partition), between 200,000 and two million South Asian men, women, and children lost their lives, nearly 100,000 women were raped and about 15 million people fled their homes.2

The tapestry that continues to emerge out of a shared past and the current tense situation in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh is woven by the threads of various individual and social memories – memories that not only differ from one another, but themselves change over time. Of the three state-sanctioned narratives of the Partition and its aftermath, none is static. Moreover, minorities, subaltern groups or otherwise marginalized individuals tend not to share the mainstream social memory rooted in one of these three official national narratives.3 Women and children and others

* Christiane Hartnack is Chair of the Center for Intercultural Studies, Danube University, Krems, Austria.
who were especially vulnerable to the tribulations of the Partition might have constructed yet other forms of memories of these events. Location matters as well: the experiences of the Partition in the West (the Punjab and Sindh) differ from those in Bengal. Taking into consideration and encompassing these differences with regard to social stratification, gender, age and location, the use of the plural in the term “social memories” is a deliberate choice.

**Common Roots, Different National Aspirations**

In the *longue durée* of the history of the Indian subcontinent, the last sixty plus years of political, religious, economic, social and cultural separation – first into two countries (India and Pakistan) and then into three in 1971 when East Pakistan gained independence and became Bangladesh – appear to be a an almost trifling time span. The long centuries of shared history between these two countries has led to substantial cultural commonalities that transcend even the effects of the Partition.

The majority of British India’s population did not strive for or initiate the Partition. In fact, most people were oblivious to the run-up to it. Rather, the Partition of British India was externally imposed and internally sanctioned. Based on the assumption of a deeply rooted animosity between Muslims and Hindus, the last British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten pushed through the hasty decision to separate the South Asian population according to religion. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Jawaharlal Nehru, the leaders of the Muslim League and of the Indian National Congress respectively, took advantage of Britain’s precipitous and poorly planned disengagement from India to implement state-building activities. Shaped as they were by their privileged social backgrounds, Western education and thinking as well as lifestyle, both politicians basically shared political views similar to those of the former British rulers; each wanted to overcome British colonial rule by establishing an independent state. In this respect, the Partition of British India was a prerequisite for each man to realise his vision: Jinnah’s of a separate state not dominated by the Hindu majority, and Nehru’s of an India independent of British colonial rule.

The “vivisection of Mother India” (as Gandhi characterized the Partition) grew out of colonial perceptions and modes of government in which the notion of “divide and rule” according to religious distinctions not only was implemented but transmitted. Ironically, whereas religious affiliation had hardly been a public feature in South Asia prior to colonial rule, suddenly religion began to play an essential role in South Asian politics. This is in contrast to the daily
reality of inhabitants in many villages, where still today people of different faiths often share the same festivals and customs, and practise syncretistic forms of devotion. From 1947 on, India and Pakistani politicians created not only separate religious but also different economic, political and military agendas. So far, unresolved conflicts stemming from the Partition have resulted in three wars between India and Pakistan (1947–1948, 1965, 1971), each with a high number of casualties. Even today, the Indian-controlled valley of Kashmir and some surrounding areas remain disputed and might serve as yet another casus belli for India and/or Pakistan. Both nation-states are also continuously building up and publicly brandishing their arsenal of nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

The Long Shadows of the Partition

That official national histories tend to be constructed to serve nationalistic purposes is evident in the case of South Asia. To give legitimacy to their respective political agendas, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh each highlight different aspects of the past. With the passage of time, divergent – even opposite – interpretations of their common past are surfacing in these three nation-states. For the purposes of strengthening a Hindu national identity, official histories in India at the beginning of the 21st century, where the Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was in power between 1998 and 2004, tended to downplay the many centuries of Muslim rule and their concomitant cultural impact. In contrast, the voices of Pakistani and Bangladeshi officialdom often proclaimed the advent of the first Muslim invaders as the beginning of their cultural development while neglecting to mention their long-lasting and rich pre-Muslim cultural antecedents.

Attempts to annihilate the Muslim influence in India’s past peaked in 1992 in the city of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. Militant Hindus claimed that about five centuries earlier, the local Babri mosque had been built on the grounds of the Rama-Janmabhoomi temple, an important sacred site for Hindus. After severe disputes, Hindu fundamentalists destroyed the mosque and rebuilt the temple. Hindu pilgrims have been frequenting this place ever since, and the name Ayodhya has become synonymous with post-Partition Hindu-Muslim tensions.

In 2001, a severe earthquake in Gujarat uprooted the primarily Hindu population in the region in the most literal sense of the word. Nerves were very much on edge in the aftermath of the quake, when a few months later a train carrying Hindu pilgrims returning from Ayodhya caught fire and 58 Hindus died. Without any investigation,
the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Damodardas Modi, immediately declared that this was a terrorist attack by Muslims against Hindus, thus sparking pogroms that involved looting, rapes and murders. According to official estimates, 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus were killed. For years after this incident, the Muslim inhabitants of the Gujarati capital Ahmedabad have had to live under curfew behind barbed wire in a kind of ghetto.\(^9\) Similarly, the bomb attack on the parliament in New Delhi in 2001, the massacre in Mumbai in November 2008 and other atrocities in different parts of India are always immediately attributed to Muslim, i.e. Pakistani, terrorist attacks.

The legacy of the Partition provides a backdrop against which to place unresolved conflicts and continued expressions of hatred and commission of atrocities.\(^10\) The author Vikram Chandra stated in an interview: "What you need to make a human being into a terrorist is also a persuasive narrative about history, a story of wounds suffered, overlooked grievances, stolen lands. A narrative about that perfect world which is worth fighting for . . ."\(^11\) The biographies of some of India’s most wanted terrorists confirm this observation. The family of Hafiz Muhammed Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a radical terrorist organization, reportedly lost 36 of its members while fleeing from Shimla (India) to Lahore during the Partition.\(^12\)

There are indications that the long shadows cast by the Partition may not vanish anytime soon. Texts in Indian schoolbooks that were rewritten during the rule of the BJP are illustrative of India’s most vociferous attempts to disparage Muslim historical figures and create a unified public social memory of the Partition. Filled with one-sided perspectives, stereotypes and amplifications, content relating to the Partition clearly was not intended to provide fertile ground for future generations to achieve a truce and develop constructive relations with Muslim neighbour states.\(^13\)

**Social Memories of the Partition in Public Discourse and in Private Spheres**

Accounts of the Partition vary not only between neighbouring nations, but also within India, where they depend to a great extent on the perspective stemming from one’s social position. The British historian Ian Talbot pointed out that official Indian accounts of the rehabilitation of refugees elevate the heroic efforts of the Indian state. Quite another picture emerges when the same events are depicted by refugees, yet narrative dissonance occurs even among these accounts, with the texture of the narrative in most cases highly correlated with the social status of the narrator at the time of the events.\(^14\)
Now that the loss of oral accounts is imminent due to the foreseeable demise of the last eyewitnesses to the Partition, the idea of a museum on the subject of refugees – to be located in New Delhi – is under discussion. This quest for a museum has opened new avenues for public discourse on social memories since the shift in focus from the intangible memories of individuals to their objectified and tangible manifestation as public exhibits needs to be negotiated before it can be given form. One concern is that static exhibits in a museum will deprive individually experienced or socially shared memories of their main characteristic: their fluidity. It will be especially interesting to see how such sensitive issues as Jinnah’s role in the last stage of pre-Partition history, Pakistan’s post-independence politics and the reality of the roughly 150 million Muslims currently living in India will be portrayed in such a museum.15

With all of the literary, visual and other artistic representations of massacre, rape, dislocation and upheaval as a result of the Partition and its aftermath, there is certainly enough material available to fill a museum. The challenge is rather to keep track of it all and organize it into meaningful form. Most of the work is documented in Punjabi, Urdu, Sindhi, Bengali and other languages spoken by victims of and witnesses to the Partition; this would need to be translated if presented to a wider audience.16

Not all works are in Indian languages; numerous literary publications with a focus on the Partition are written in English.17 Among the first English-language texts is Kushwant Singh’s famous and highly popular novel “Train to Pakistan”, which was published in 1956.18 Other well-known novels are Salman Rushdie’s Booker Prize-winning “Midnight’s Children”, Vikram Seth’s voluminous novel “A Suitable Boy”, Balraj Khanna’s “Nation of Fools”, a witty story on post-Partition Punjab, and Amitav Ghosh’s historically informed novels, including “The Shadow Lines” and “The Hungry Tide”.19

In late 1960, the Bengali film director Ritwik Ghatak began to produce a series of emotionally touching films in which the feelings of those dispossessed and displaced by the Partition are represented. J.P. Dutta’s 1997 war film “Border” and his feature film “Refugee” from 2000 both won several awards. Among the many popular Bollywood films that depict aspects of the Partition, “Gadar” and “Veer-Zaara” were blockbusters. The well-known film “Earth” from Deepa Mehta’s trilogy “Fire”, “Earth”, “Water”, which is based on the story “Ice Candy Man/Cracking India” by Bapsi Sidwa, is set against a backdrop of the riots in Lahore. Pankraj Butalia’s feature film “Karvan” (“Shadows in the Dark”) from 2009 is based on Hindustani dialogues written by the historian Shahid Amin. Documentary cinematic depictions of the Partition include:

Around the 50th anniversary of the Partition, historians and social scientists at Indian universities increasingly took up the topic of Partition. Among the major historical publications are those by Mushurul Hassan, Gyanendra Pandey and Dipesh Chakrabarty.21 In 2001, Oxford University Press India published a so-called “Partition Omnibus”, an edited collection of historical writings and documents on this topic.22 In the social sciences, the anthropologist Veena Das and the social psychologist Ashis Nandy have focused on topics related to violence. Nandy, former director of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi and one of the foremost Indian intellectuals, was also the driving force behind an oral history research unit on the Partition.23

Urvashi Butalia’s, Ritu Menon’s and Kamla Bhasin’s oral history research has allowed women and Dalits (Untouchables) to give voice to their suffering, where previously they were either kept, or kept themselves, silent.24 Women, in addition to suffering the refugee experience, were confronted with the legacy of iizzat (honor). In Butalia’s words, women were “both cast as prostitute (when they belonged to ‘other’ communities) and symbols of national honor (when belonging to ‘our’ community)”. This was a time when “killing women was viewed not as violence, but as saving the honour of the community.”25

In conclusion, Indian social memories with regard to the Partition serve political, social and/or psychological functions. In the public sphere, they might be evoked to legitimise the dominant power structure, or to distinguish one collective identity construct from another. In the private sphere, they might help people cope with individually experienced trauma. They do not always form a coherent narrative, but might contain contradictory or repressed elements, gaps and denials. Memories with regard to the Partition have taken many forms depending on whether they have been politically proclaimed or whether they have been personally experienced, and were perhaps suppressed or hidden. Like the currents and eddies of a river, they are fluid and changeable, in that they are continually constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed.26

**Routes: The (Re-)Establishment of Communication between Indians and Pakistanis**

Wars and the renewed threat of nuclear skirmishes have been highly visible forms of interaction between India and Pakistan. But these are not the only ones. At the end of “The Other Side of Silence”,

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Butalia tells the moving story of the correspondence between a Pakistani Muslim and an Indian Hindu. After the Hindu fled his house in Lahore, it was henceforth inhabited by the Muslim. Because he had left a manuscript behind, the Hindu wrote a letter addressed to “The New Occupant”, which this person answered. The resulting correspondence contains sentences such as:

“I write to you as a human being... We are human beings first and Hindu and Muslim only after that. I firmly believe you will oblige me by answering this letter in the name of the human bond we have...” and “I read your letter over and over again and felt that it had been written by a true friend... I shudder to think of what Hindus and Muslims have done to their fellow countrymen.”

Despite recurring flare-ups of animosity, Indian and Pakistani politicians continued to stay in contact over the past decades and to hold talks in person: Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan in the 1950s, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan in the 1960s, Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto in the 1980s, and several others since then. The long list of negotiations, treaties and agreements resembles less the neat stitches invisibly reweaving a significant tear in a colourful tapestry than the poorly interlocking teeth of a rather haphazard zipper. Nevertheless, slowly but visibly, a growing network of former connections has been re-established, and new and constructive forms of communication have begun to develop between India and Pakistan.

After the Partition, the first forms of co-operation were with regard to water treaties. Since the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers flow through India before reaching Pakistan or Bangladesh, it was a matter of utmost urgency to negotiate agreements to secure water supplies essential to the survival of people living in large provinces in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Dams or canals or pollution upstream in India would affect millions of Pakistani or Bangladeshi peasants and fishermen. When India cut the flow of the Sutlej River (which merges with the Indus) in 1948, it was a disaster for millions of Pakistani peasants in the affected regions, who relied on the upstream water supply for irrigation.

In the last decade a growing number of former roads traversing the 3,000-km length of the India-Pakistan border have been repaired and reopened. To make these routes safe, some parts were cleared of mines and, where necessary, protected via special security arrangements. On April 7, 2005, India and Pakistan re-established bus service between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar. In October 2008, a historic trade route through Kashmir was reopened to transport fruit, honey and spices from the eastern part of Kashmir and rock salt and raisins from western part.
Both nations also cooperated to re-connect some former train routes. Currently several freight trains shuttle between Pakistan and India, mostly bringing cement from Pakistan, thus delivering a commodity that is in high demand due to the ongoing construction boom in India. A passenger train, the Thar Express commutes between Karachi and Jodhpur, from where it connects to a New Delhi train, while another passenger train, the Samjhauta Express, covers the route between New Delhi and Lahore.\textsuperscript{31} Due to devastating bomb attacks, these trains are always very heavily guarded. When the Samjhauta Express to Lahore, for example, gets ready to depart from New Delhi station, police officers armed with machine guns guard the train, while passengers pass through electronic checkpoints and every piece of luggage is carefully inspected. Inside the train, police patrols conduct spot-checks of suspicious items and passengers. Despite these measures, on February 18, 2007, 68 passengers (mostly Pakistani) were killed in a terrorist attack on this so-called “Peace” Express.

Improvements have also been made in (re-)establishing flight connections between India and Pakistan. The few direct flights per week, i.e., those not routed through hubs in the Middle East, are indicative of the long-standing commercial ties between Mumbai and Karachi and between Delhi and Lahore. From the astonishing fact that direct flights between the two capitals were established only as recently as 2008, one could conclude that current business interests are more important than political considerations.

New forms of transnational alliances and future-oriented communications are also beginning to be developed between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh by members of the South Asian business community. Until the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century, business meetings were scheduled in neutral locations such as Dubai or Abu Dhabi, but since 2003 business leaders from India and Pakistan have also been meeting on their home turf in the context of the newly formed India-Pakistan CEOs Forum. Most recently Pakistan agreed to grant India most favoured nation status, a move that business representatives heralded as allowing them to extend trade that is still minimal compared with the levels of imports and exports flowing from and to other countries. Banking facilities also need to be modernised in order for trade between the two countries to flourish. Augmenting the growing legal trade between India and Pakistan, grey and black market trading via hubs in third countries like the United Emirates or Singapore, or through smuggling, is estimated to be considerable.

The beginning of software outsourcing from India to Pakistan dates back to 2005 when a subsidiary of the Tata conglomerate began a large-scale outsourcing project. Tata Consultancy Services
Ltd. (TCS) teamed up with Pakistan-based Techlogix Inc. to offer courses to train software engineers. The reasons behind this are pragmatic and typical for outsourcing projects: India is running short of inexpensive human resources in software development, so Pakistan might become one of the regions where Indian companies find cheaper labour than at home. As an added benefit Pakistan offers a work force with fewer communication problems compared with more culturally distant places offshore.

Since 2004 restrictions were lifted for Indian and Pakistani citizens to visit the emotionally charged desh, the ancestral soil, trees and buildings located across the border. However, such travel also lifted the veil of mystery surrounding places so often spoken about at family gatherings, the palace of the family lore might in reality turn out to be a mansion, the mansion an ordinary house, and the trees might not be as lush as imagined.32

Nowadays, well-to-do Pakistani couples not only dream of visiting, but actually enjoy seeing the world’s largest monument of love, the Taj Mahal located south of Delhi and completed in 1648 by Shah Jahan, a Muslim ruler. Similarly, with its gilded flutes domes and cupolas and ornate balustrades, the mausoleum of Sikh ruler Maharaja Ranjit Singh in Lahore is not merely a picturesque architectural site, but a highly symbolic one, which Sikhs from India are now allowed to visit. Moreover, they can embark on pilgrimages to the sacred town of Nankana Sahib, the birthplace of the central figure of Sikhism, Guru Nanak Dev.

Popular culture and the public sphere are clearly indicative of changes in relations between the two states. In the early days after Partition, Indian films stereotyped Muslims in a rather obvious attempt at constructing a collective Hindu identity and forcing an ideological separation of these two nations. For example, while Hindu images and rituals were prominently displayed and positively portrayed, Muslim women were often depicted as promiscuous and Muslim men as violent. Even when the connotations were not negative, at best, Muslim characters were folkloristic caricatures. However, for economic reasons, it became evident that alienating a market segment consisting of millions of Muslim viewers worldwide by nourishing animosities and prejudices towards them was a bad business strategy for Bollywood film producers. As a result, producers have recently taken care that the portrayal of Muslims should not offend the sensibilities of these audience members.33

These developments contributed to a thaw between the Pakistani film board and Indian producers. To the great pleasure of millions of Pakistanis, who have little difficulty understanding the actors’ Hindi because of its linguistic proximity to Urdu, the ban on Indian
films which was introduced in 1965 was partially lifted in 2008. There are still restrictions though: films need to be shot in a country other than India and scenes that offend religious conservatives, such as women dancing in wet saris, are censored. Since about 1,000 films are produced every year in Bollywood studios, this means that for the most part, Bollywood movies in Pakistan are watched in private on cable television, and of course there are also illegally downloaded Indian DVDs available in bazaars. As a result of the new agreement regarding Indian films, it is no longer embarrassing to sing songs from Hindi film or imitate a dance scene from a Bollywood movie, thus popular culture is shared to a certain extent.

As in many other countries in the world, sport trumps politics. So, despite political tensions (if not animosity or outright hostility), people in South Asia connect through a shared passion for watching and playing team sports, especially cricket. In South Asia, sporting events are actively leveraged as a vehicle for understanding. In particular, cricket diplomacy and tourism between India and Pakistan, has been a major factor in paving the way for constructive post-Partition communication. Former Pakistani President General Pervez Musharaff and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, for example, shared their fondness for cricket when they met for yet another round of tough negotiations in 2005.

In 2007, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Partition, historians, psychologists, visual artists, playwrights, actors and storytellers from India and Pakistan came together to “look at how Partition continues to live on in our lives in the subcontinent and how to move away from it, into the future . . .”34 Ashis Nandy went one step further and deconstructed the concept of a nation based on ethnic homogeneity as an outdated European ideal, as such a concept of nation states basically originated in 18th century Europe. He concluded his essay “The Fantastic India-Pakistan Battle” with the hope that the younger generation of South Asians will look at the organisational principles of their societies and “rediscover that the South Asian societies are woven not around the state, but around their plural cultures and pluri-cultural identities. They will also discover . . . the end of the present phase of self-hatred and attempts to live out some other culture’s history”.35

Travelling the Data Highway: The Impact of Cyberspace on Social Memories

There is more to current Indo-Pakistani transnational communication than conferences, sports, minor trade, visits to world-famous architectural monuments and long-lost ancestral lands. Techno-
Logical progress ushered in by the digital age has provided new formats for communication, and thus a growing number of virtual routes between India and Pakistan. With both time and space shrinking, bridges of communication between people are built much more easily and new South-South contacts have brought about the demise of some of the remnants of colonialism. Telephone calls between Delhi and Islamabad that used to be routed via London, for example, can now be made directly, and transnational communication can take place at low or no cost in cyberspace. In fact, as a result of the “wikipediazation” and “google-ization” of social memory, local citizens might become global netizens with a social memory that can be shared anonymously and across a much larger population.

Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider introduced the concept of a cosmopolitan memory, one that transcends the national memory cultures and sets the stage for a shared memoryscape. Whereas memories that are narrated in person-to-person communication are collectively constructed and bounded by social, or at most, national borders, memories that pop up in transnational chat rooms are de-territorialized, more or less anonymous and somewhat borderless in that the respective national background is not obvious. Such transnational communication can stimulate revision of social memory constructs. Inherent in such free-floating communications (and that includes Indo-Pakistani communications) is the chance that the patchwork of distorted parochial social memories might become a publicly argued cosmopolitan memoryscape.36 It remains to be seen how such memories will eventually be shaped in cyberspace. On the one hand, the internet offers an unprecedented variety of thoughts, writing and opinions, as well as the potential to bring to light repressions, distortions or amplifications of social memories. On the other, people can choose to be just as parochial as ever, i.e., visiting only those chat rooms or forums that confirm and harden their existing prejudices. Despite the various new alignments between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the array of technological options available through which to develop a shared memory-space, it is far from certain whether Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis will leverage the new technologies in service of refining their collective social memories.

Much might depend on whether and to what extent the diaspora, that is, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis living in England, North America, Australia or elsewhere, in what Homi Bhabha labelled a “third space”, can or will create a bird’s eye view or a meta-perspective on the Partition and its aftermath.37 A remarkable cooperation has been taking place in the field of history. In 2003, Ayesha Jalal, who teaches at Tufts University, and Harvard pro-
Professor Sugata Bose jointly published the volume “Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy”, the first exploration of modern South Asian history by a Pakistani and an Indian in collaboration.38

Conclusion

The increasing number of communication threads connecting India and Pakistan coincides with a growing percentage of young people in both countries for whom British India and a unified subcontinent lie far in the past. It might theoretically be quite conceivable that relations between the two countries could continue to move along a path toward normalization where each country is a wholly separate state with its own future, but for one inconvenient practical reality: the smouldering conflicts surrounding Kashmir. The Radcliffe line that divided British India did not provide any arrangement for this formerly princely state. Two months after winning their independence, India and Pakistan embarked on their first war over Kashmir; two more wars and several military clashes have followed since then.39 Since 1991 almost all of the remaining Hindus in the Kashmir valley have migrated south to the city of Jammu or even to Delhi and nowadays Srinagar and surrounding regions might become a haven for transnational terrorist networks like al Qaeda and others supported directly or indirectly by Pakistan.

This fiercely contested region is a flashpoint fueled by the unfinished agenda of the Partition, thus resulting in Kashmir’s legacy as the oldest unresolved conflict under perpetual discussion in the United Nations. Due to the geopolitical situation with borders to China (over which India was also at war in 1962) and the proximity to Afghanistan and Tajikistan, this conflict might create ripple effects that spread to other parts of the region.

Whether the ambivalence mentioned by Arundhati Roy in her article will sustain or eventually coalesces to hatred or love in the social memory of the Partition remains an open question. However, in light of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear potential, it is a highly crucial one.

Notes

2 Talbot, Ian and Gurharpal Singh, The Partition of India. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.2; Images of the treks of refugees are


12 The Hindu, December 9, 2008, 5.
13 Sewrak, Manjrika, School Curriculum and Pedagogy in India and Pakistan, New Delhi: WISCOMP, 2008; Ahmed, Zahid Shahab and Michelle Antonette Baxter, Attitudes of Teachers in India and Pakistan: Texts and Contexts, New Delhi: WISCOMP, 2008; Kumar, Krishna, Prejudice and Pride: School Histories of the freedom Struggle in India and Pakistan, New Delhi: Viking, 2001; A survey of articles on the impact of fundamentalist ideas on the school textbooks both in India as well as in Pakistan is found in: http://sacw.net/HateEducation/index.html (accessed on: 02/02/2010).

15 This represents about 14 % of India’s overall population.

20 Athique, Adrian M., A Line in the Sand: The India-Pakistan Border in the Films of J.P. Dutta, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 31, 3,


25 Butalia, Urvashi, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India, 284.
26 For a reflection on the connections between history and memory, see: Assmann, Aleida, Transformations between History and Memory in: Social Research, Vol 75, No. 1, Spring 2008, 49–72.
27 Butalia, Urvashi, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India, 291–293.
28 Another similarity is that in both countries, family dynasties developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, the children of former heads of state continued the post-Partition negotiations of a parent (Benazir Bhutto for her father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Rajiv Gandhi for his mother Indira Gandhi). When India’s prime minister Mannohman Singh, and Pakistan’s head of state General Perverz Musharaff met, it was pointed out that each man was born in the country the other man then represented (Musharaff’s family is originally from India and Mannohman Singh’s stemmed from what is now Pakistan).
29 For a detailed account of the various treaties, see: Kux, Dennis, India-Pakistan Negotiations, Washington D.C. United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006.
31 Samjhauta (Samjhota) means understanding, compromise, peace or accord in both Urdu and Hindi.
33 Hirji, Faiza, Change of pace? Islam and tradition in popular Indian cinema, South Asian Popular Culture, 6, 1, April 2008, 57–69.

